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Case No. 20160500-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,

v.
JAMES CHRISTOPHER MCCALLIE,

Defendant/Respondent.

Brief of Petitioner
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court
of Appeals in State v. McCallie, 2016 UT App 4,369 P.3d 103 (Addendum A).
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)
(West Supp. 2016).

INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, Miranda v. Arizona required police to warn a person
they are about to question that (1) the person has the right not to talk to
them, and (2) if he does talk to the1n, anything he says can and will be used
against him in court.

Since then, Miranda warnings have "become so

embedded in routine police practice [that they] have become part of our
national culture." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).

But

despite the universal understanding that anything a person says to police
will be used against him in court, the court of appeals has now held that
many things a person says to police actually cannot be used against him in
court. And this is true, the court of appeals concluded, even when the
statements conflict with the defendant's trial testiinony.
Under Doyle v. Ohio, a person who chooses to exercise his right not to
talk to police cannot have his silence used to impeach his testiinony at trial.
According to the court of appeals, silence includes statements about the
interrogation rather than about the crime.
Here, Defendant did not choose to exercise his right not to talk to
police when they tried to question him about a shooting that had happened
only moments before they arrested him. Instead, he demanded to know
why police were questioning him, claimed that the police had awakened
him, and professed to be unaware that the shooting had happened. Then at
trial, he admitted that he knew about the shooting, but claimed the victim
was shot accidentally after he pulled his gun in self-defense. The State used
his post-Miranda protestations of ignorance of any shooting at all to impeach
his trial admission to a shooting done while he was acting in self-defense.
The court of appeals held this was error, reasoning that the statements were
the same as silence because, in its estimation, they were statements about
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the interrogation, rather than indisputably admissible statements about the
crime itself. This holding depends on a distinction-actual statements and
silence-equivalent statements - that Doyle itself does not draw. And even
though the court of appeals affirmed on harmlessness grounds, its
reasoning denies the State access to impeachment evidence that no
constitutional rule prohibits using-post-Miranda denials to police that
cannot be squared with an explanation offered at trial.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
This Court granted review on the following question:
"Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding the prosecutor
improperly com1nented on Respondent[']s failure to assert self-defense
during an interview with police."

Standard of Review. This Court reviews the court of appeals' decision
for correctness. See Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, if 6,358 P.3d 1067.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum C:
e

U.S. Const. amend. V
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary of facts. 1

G

After a long night of drinking, Defendant shot his friend John. See
R.297:28-29, 132; R.298:7, 36, State's Ex. 1. John had been visiting his Aunt
Jody and Uncle Tim at their home, where Defendant also rented a room. See
R.297:14-16, 64-65; R.298:31, 36.
Jolm had arrived at their home late one morning for an extended visit.

See R.297:16. When Defendant arrived home later that evening, John and
Tim were playing cribbage. See R.297:18-19, 74. They all "exchanged some
pleasantries" and Defendant sat down with them. R.297:17-19; R.298:40.
Defendant drank beer and John drank whiskey while they visited. See id.
"[A]ll of a sudden," Defendant got "an attitude" and called Jody a
"cunt." R.297:19-20, 76, 82, 88. John was "shocked" and told Defendant to
apologize. R.297:20, 82, 89. Thn told Defendant he could not speak that
way to Jody. See R.297:20, 82. But things soon "calmed down" and John
and Tim finished their cribbage game. R.297:21, 83. Afterwards, Tim and
Jody went to bed. R.297:21. John and Defendant stayed up, playing poker
and "taking shots" of whiskey. R.297:21, 78-79.
1

Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are stated in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict and conflicting evidence is presented
only as needed to understand the issues raised on appeal. See State v.
Kruger, 2000 UT 60, if2,· 6 P.3d 1116.

-4-

At one point, John and Defendant "got in a little argument over what
[Defendant] had called" Jody. R.297:22. John told Defendant that he had
"disrespect[ed]" his family, but Defendant answered that "it was just how
he felt . . . and he was not going to apologize."

R.297:22, 76-77.

The

argument woke Tim, who came out of his bedroom and told them to be
quiet. See R.297:23. John and Defendant '' quieted down" and continued to
play poker. Id.
Defendant later invited John into his bedroom for a "shot of brandy."
R.297:22. They talked about golf as John followed Defendant to his room.

See id. As they reached the foot of Defendant's bed, John asked if they were
going golfing in the morning. See R.297:23-24. Defendant turned around
and answered, "How about I just fuckin' kill you?" Id. Defendant had a
gun in his hand. See R.297:24. With his finger on the trigger, Defendant
"[p]ulled back the hammer, raised it up and pointed it in Uohn's] face."
R.297:24. Not wanting "to get shot," John grabbed Defendant's wrist with
one hand and "the barrel of the gun" with the other and "tried to pull it
away." R.297:24, 27. The gun, however, "went off." R.297:27. The bullet
hit John below his ribcage and exited out his back. See R.297:27-29; State's
Ex. 1. Fearing that Defendant would shoot him again, John held onto the
gun and Defendant's wrist while trying to pull the gun free from
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Defendant's hands. See R.297:29. Defendant fell back onto his bed. See id.
John put one knee on Defendant's wrist and "screamed for help." Id.
Awakened by the gunshot, Tim and Jody ran to Defendant's
bedroom. See R.297:68-69, 80, 90. Tim saw Defendant lying on his bed,
holding a gun with his finger on the trigger. See R.297:69-70. John stood
over Defendant with one foot on the floor and his other knee on
Defendant's wrist. See R.297:69-70, 80. John was holding the barrel of the
gun with one hand and Defendant's wrist with the other. See R.297:69-70.
John told his aunt and uncle that he had been shot. See R.297:70, 81,
91. Tim "rushed" Jody "out of the room" and called 911. R.297:71. Soon

after, Tim informed John and Defendant-who were still struggling over
the gun- that the police had arrived and were outside.
R.298:50-51.

See R.297:30;

To persuade Defendant to let go of the gun, John told

Defendant that he would go outside and tell the police that the shooting
was an accident. See R.297:30; R.298:51. Defendant surrendered the gun
and John carried it outside to the waiting police.

See R.297:30, 49.

An

ambulance took John to the hospital where he was treated and later
released. See R.297:31, 42.
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Q

At the hospital, John told the investigating officer, Detective Arnn,
that Defendant had pointed a gun at him and said something like "I'm just
going to kill you" or "I should kill you now." R.297:46-47, 117.

Defendant's police interview: "You woke me up" 2
After John walked outside to the waiting police, Defendant changed
his clothes. See R.298:51. He then walked outside. See R.298:51-52. The
police immediately arrested Defendant and took him to the police station
for questioning. R.298:54. Once in an interview room, the interviewing
officer, Detective Arnn, observed that Defendant smelled "very strong[ly]"
of alcohol. R.297:131. He offered Defendant a Coke. See R.297:131; R.298:64.
Defendant responded that he wanted "a rum and Coke," then a "six pack
and a cigarette."

R.298:64.

And Defendant asked the police officers

whether they thought they could "all handle" him. R.298:54, 63-64.
Defendant told Detective Arnn, "Still don't understand why I'm here.
What happened?" R.298:64.

When Detective Arnn explained that

Defendant was under arrest, Defendant asked, "for what?" and then asked
repeatedly why he was there. R.298:64-65. In response, Detective Arnn read
Defendant his Miranda rights, but Defendant replied that he did not
2

A transcript of Defendant's police interview is not in the record on
appeal. This account is taken from Defendant's testimony at trial. See
R.298:56, 63-66, 70.
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understand his rights. See R.298:65. Detective Arnn asked him what part of
his rights he did not understand and Defendant retorted, "The part where
you're fucking jerking me off. What the fuck am I doing here to begin with?
You people woke me up." Id. He continued, "I want to know what the fuck
I am doing here .... " Id. Detective Arnn told Defendant that he was under
arrest for attempted murder and Defendant asked, "To who?" R.298:70. In
answer, Detective Arnn explained that someone had been shot.
R.298:65, 70.

See

Defendant responded, "Whose [sic] got a gunshot wound?"
~·

Id. Defendant continued, "I want to know what the fuck is going on ....
You woke me up. I want to know what is going on." R.298:65. Detective
Arnn eventually stopped the interview. See R.297:1.
Defendant's phone calls from jail:
Changing the "game plan" to self-defense

While in jail awaiting trial, Defendant made several phone calls. He
first called Tim, asking him to tell him "what happened" because Defendant
did not "remember anything" and the police had told him he shot Tim.
R.298:24, 55-56. Later, Defendant called his mother. R.298:58. He told her
that he needed John "to say this was an accident." Id.

A day later, he

assured his mother that John would be a "team player" and "say this was an
accident." R.298:58:25, 58.
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Defendant later called a friend, Christy. R.298:59, 66-67. When Christy
told Defendant that John was "unwilling to say this was an accident,"
Defendant asked her to "[t]alk to him again," "be pushy," and tell him that
they would "take care of him" and make it "well worth his while" if he told
police that the shooting was an accident. Id.
But Defendant later told his mother in another call that he would
"have to change the game plan" and was "[g]oing a different direction with
the story, [it's] self-defense now since John ... doesn't want to play ball."
R.298:25, 59-60.
B.

Summary of proceedings.

Defendant was charged with felony discharge of a firearm with
injury, a second degree felony, and aggravated assault, a third degree
felony. See R.46-47.

Defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of his police interview
The morning of trial, defense counsel orally moved to exclude
"anything in regard to" Defendant's police interview. R.297:8, 1. Defense
counsel argued that Defendant had not cooperated in the interview and
"stated numerous times that he didn't understand his Miranda rights and
finally the State gave up and did not question any further."

R.297:1.

The State represented that it would not "go into the content" of
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Defendant's interview,

but wanted

the

detective

to

testify

about

Defendant's behavior so that the jury could "understand that the defendant
was inebriated" like John.

R.297:2, 9.

When the trial court stated that

"behavioral descriptions" "should be acceptable," defense counsel further
objected that Defendant's "belligerent" attitude was not relevant. R.298:2, 9.
The State clarified that it would ask the officer only "[v]ery general"
questions about Defendant's intoxication and not "paint the defendant as a

See R.297:10.

jerk."

The court stated, "I think that addresses [defense

counsel]'s concerns. Is that correct?" R.297:11. Defense counsel answered,
"it will." Id.

The State's case
The State called John, Tim, Jody, and Detective Arnn to testify at trial.

See R.297. The State also played excerpts of the jail house phone calls.
R.298:21-26. 3 The jury heard that Defendant called Tim, asking him to tell

him "what happened" because Defendant did not "remember anything"
and the police had told him he shot Tim. R.298:55-56. They also heard
Defendant telling his mother that he believed John would be a "team
3

The phone calls were not transcribed and the recordings were not
transported with the rest of the record on appeal. See supplemental index;
R.135. The prosecutor, however, su1nmarized some portions of the phone
calls on the record and Defendant also testified to what he said in the calls.
See R.298:21-26, 55-60, 66-67.
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player" and "say this was an accident." R.298:58:25, 58. They then heard
Defendant's ask Christy to talk with John, "be pushy," and tell him that
they would "take care of him" and make it "well worth his while" if he told
police that the shooting was an accident. R.298:59, 66-67. And finally, they
head Defendant telling his mother that they would "have to change the
game plan" and go "a different direction with the story, [it's] self-defense
now since John ... doesn't want to play ball." R.298:25, 59-60.
Detective Arnn testified about his interviews with Defendant and
John.

See R.297:104-152.

True to his word, the prosecutor did not ask

Detective Arnn about the content of Defendant's interview or about
Defendant's attitude; he asked only about Defendant's drunken demeanor.
See R.297:130-132.

And Detective Arnn testified only that Defendant

appeared drunk and that Defendant acted "more inebriated" than John.
R.297:132.
When defense counsel cross-examined Detective Arnn, he asked
whether Defendant was "a little mad," "[b]elligerent," and not "very
cooperative" in the interview. R.297:138-139. Detective Arnn answered yes
to each question. Id.
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Defendant's defense: Self-defense
Defendant testified. See R.298:31-70. He claimed that he had pulled
out his gun in self-defense and that John had pulled the trigger himself
when he grabbed the gun and fell on top of him. See id.
According to Defendant, after he called Jody a "fat fucking cunt,"
John told him to apologize. R.298:43-44. Defendant refused and went to his
room. R.298:44. He claimed that he was sitting on his bed when John came
in uninvited, stepped "on top" of Defendant's feet, put both of his fists
"up," and stood "over the top" of Defendant.

R.298:44-45.

Defendant, "you're going to apologize to my aunt."

John told

R.298:45.

Feeling

"threatened," Defendant grabbed his loaded gun from under his pillow,
pointed it at John, and told him, "you need to get out of my room."
R.298:45-46.
Defendant testified that John, however, grabbed the gun, pinning
Defendant's finger against the gun frame. See R.298:46. John then lost his
balance, fell on top of Defendant, and John's finger "pushed the trigger and
fired the weapon." Id.
After John was shot, Defendant did not let go of the gun for fear that
John would "turn around and use it" on him. R.298:50. But Defendant
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relinquished the weapon when John told him that he would go outside and
tell the waiting police that the shooting was an accident. See R.298:51.
Defendant also gave an explanation for his phone calls from jail. He
asserted that he had lied to Tim about not remembering the shooting simply
because he wanted to "find out what's going on on his end." R.298:56. And
he explained that he talked to Christy about compensating John because
Christy had told him that John did not want to "press charges" and "just
wanted to [be] compensated for the days off that he missed from work."
R.298:59-60.
While explaining his phone call with Tim on direct examination,
Defendant testified that the police had h·ied to read him his Miranda rights
and ask him what happened, but he told them, "I'm not telling you
anything."

R.298:56.

His counsel also asked him whether he was

"belligerent" and "uncooperative" at his police interview.

R.298:54, 64.

Defendant agreed that he had been. See id.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor stated that he wanted to "round
off" Defendant's testimony about being "belligerent" during his police
interview. R.298:63. The prosecutor asked Defendant about his requests for
rum and Coke, a six pack, and cigarettes. R.298:64. He asked Defendant
about his taunting officers with whether they could "all handle" him.
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R.298:54, 63-64. And he asked Defendant whether he demanded to know
why police were questioning him, claimed that the police had awakened
hhn, and professed to be unaware that the shooting happened. R.298:65, 70.
Defendant admitted that he had made all those statements, including "I
want to know what's going on," "You people woke me up," "Whose [sic]
got a gunshot wound?" and "To who?" in response to being informed that
he was under arrest for attempted murder. See R.298:54, 63-65, 70. Defense
counsel did not object to any of the questions. See id.
Defendant called other witnesses to testify on his behalf. His mother
testified that John had told her the shooting was an accident. See R.298:75,
77, 79. Defendant's 1nother's friend testified that she overheard John say the
shooting was an accident over the phone. R.298:76, 80-81. And a physician
testified as an expert that John's blood alcohol level was high enough to
impair one's ability "[t]o think, to understand, to remember" and "walk in a
straight line." R.298:8.
Closing argum.ents

In closing, the prosecutor explained how the evidence met the
elements of the crimes of discharge of a firearm with injury and aggravated
assault. He also argued that Defendant had not acted in self-defense: "He
brought the gun to what had been a word fight." R.298:96-97.
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In Defendant's closing, defense counsel argued that Defendant had
pulled his gun in self-defense and that John" discharged" the gun when he
tried to take it. R.298:107-113. He further argued that the jail house phone
calls were consistent with the defense theory and that Defendant merely
had been willing to compensate John for his lost wages. R.298:112.
Defense counsel also argued that Defendant was "belligerent" and
"uncooperative" at his police interview because he was "an innocent man,"
and that his behavior "cause[d] [Detective Arnn] to be not very pleasant
when he comes to testify." R.298:111.
On rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that Defendant's self-defense
theory was not believable because his story had evolved: first, he claimed to
the police and to John's uncle that he did not know what happened; then he
asked his friend to push John into saying that it was an accident; and when
that did not work, he finally claimed that he acted in self-defense.
R.298:119-120. The prosecutor explained that Defendant told the police in
his interview not that he acted in self-defense, or even that it was an
accident, but that he did not know that anything had happened:
The evolution of his story from the very beginning when they
questioned him, what does he say? Why am I here? Why are
you jerking me off? Nothing happened. You woke me up.
You woke me up. He didn't say it was an accident. He doesn't
say this was self-defense.

-15-

R.298:120.

Defendant iinmediately objected and moved for a mistrial: "That is a
c01nment on my client's right to remain silent and I move for a mistrial."
R.298:121.

The trial court denied the motion, ruling that it was not a

comment on Defendant's right to remain silent, and even if it were, it did
not influence the jury to Defendant's prejudice. R.298:123-124, R.178.
The jury ultimately convicted Defendant of aggravated assault, but
found him not guilty of discharge of a firearm with injury. See R.135, 138;
R.298:128.

Defendant ti1nely appealed. R.264.
The court of appeals' decision
On appeal, Defendant argued in part that the prosecutor's closing
argument impermissibly used his silence as evidence of guilt, violating his
right against self-incrimination. State v. McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, if 13, 369
P.3d 103.

The court of appeals agreed, holding that the prosecutor

impermissibly commented on Defendant's exercise of his right to remain
silent when he pointed out in closing argument that Defendant had not told
the police that he acted in self-defense, as he had testified at trial. See id. at
,126.
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Although the court of appeals recognized that Defendant "did not
remain silent in the usual sense" -for Defendant "in fact made statements
to police" - it nonetheless treated Defendant's statements as "the equivalent
of silence." Id. at ,I,I13 n.3, 21-22, 29. This was because the court of appeals
believed that "controlling case law treats commenting on the suspect's
statements about the interrogation-as opposed to statements about the
crime-as tantamount to commenting on the suspect's silence." Id. at ,I13
n.3.

The court of appeals relied on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and

Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam). It noted that although
the Doyle decision prohibited the use of a defendant's post-Miranda
"silence," two footnotes in the opinion revealed that one of the two
defendants in the case made two statements to police after arrest: either "I
don't know what you are talking about" or "What's this all about?" and
"you got to be crazy." McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ifl7 (quoting Doyle, 426
U.S. at 614-615 n.5 & 622 n.4 (Stevens, J. dissenting)).
And in Charles, the United States Supreme Court recognized- again
in a footnote- that Doyle '" analyzed the due process question as if both
defendants had remained silent."' McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ,I20 (quoting

Charles, 447 U.S. at 407 n.2).
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Relying on these two footnotes, the court of appeals declined to take

Doyle at its word- that it prohibits using a defendant's post-Miranda
silence-and concluded that "[w]hat matters," is not whether the defendant
is silent, but whether his post-Miranda statements are "'about [a
defendant's] involvement in the crime."' Id. (quoting Charles, 447 U.S. at
407) (second alteration in original). The court read Charles to hold that postarrest statements about the suspect' s involvement in the interrogation
itself-such as 'What's this all about?' 'You got to be crazy,' and 'I don't
know what you are talking about' - are for Doyle purposes, the equivalent
of silence." Id. at ,121.
Applying this principle, the court of appeals determined that
Defendant's statements-namely '"Why are you jerking me [around]?"'
"'Nothing happened,"' and '"You woke me up"' -although "more
bellicose," were similar to those in Doyle and accordingly were statements
about his interrogation, not about the crime.

Id. at ~22 (addition in

original). The court of appeals thus proceeded "as if [Defendant] had
remained silent" and held that the prosecutor violated the Doyle
proscription when he referred to Defendant's statements in his closing
argument. Id. at i1i122, 26, 29.
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Although the court of appeals found constitutional error, it
nonetheless affirmed Defendant's conviction because the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where evidence of Defendant's
evolving

story- independent

of

his

statements

to

police- was

overwhelming, Defendant's own testimony supported his aggravated
assault conviction, and the prosecutor's comment was an "isolated
reference" -roughly four lines of transcript. Id. at ,I33-36, 38.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals erred when it held that the prosecutor
unconstitutionally commented on Defendant's exercise of his right to
remain silent because Defendant's post-Miranda statements "about his
involvement in the interrogation" were equivalent to silence under Doyle v.

Ohio and Anderson v. Charles. Neither Doyle nor Charles supports treating
Defendant's statements as the equivalent of silence. First, Doyle and Charles
did not distinguish between a defendant's statements about the
interrogation and a defendant's statements about the crime. Rather, the
controlling distinction between what Doyle permits and what it prohibits is
whether the prosecutor's questions were "designed to draw meaning from
silence," or "to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement."
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Where the prosecutor elicits an explanation for a pnor inconsistent
statement, there is no Doyle violation. That is what the prosecutor did here.
When police questioned Defendant about the shooting, he protested
his factual innocence by pretending to know nothing about it. By the time
of trial, he protested his legal innocence by admitting to the shooting he told
police he knew nothing about, but giving the jury a legally exonerating
explanation for it. The two stories cannot be squared with each other, and
the prosecutor properly informed the jury of the conflict.
But even if Doyle or Charles arguably created a distinction between
statements about the interrogation or statements about the crime, the court
of appeals still erred because Defendant's statements here were not about
the interrogation.

They were instead statements about the crime that

conflicted with the version he gave at trial. Defendant's statements told an
exculpatory story that he was not involved in the crime:

he had been

asleep, he was awakened by the police, and he did not know that anyone
had been shot. By prohibiting the State from inquiring into statements like
Defendant's, the court of appeals has denied the jury access to information
important to assessing whether a defendant's testimony is true. This Court
should reverse.
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONESOULY HELD THAT
DEFENDANT'S
INCONSISTENT,
POST-MIRANDA
STATEMENTS WERE EQUIVALENT TO SILENCE UNDER
DOYLE V. OHIO AND ANDERSON V. CHARLES

The court of appeals erred when it held that the prosecutor
unconstitutionally commented on Defendant's exercise of his right to
remain silent under Doyle v. Ohio.
When a defendant exercises his right not to talk to police, then
testifies to an exculpatory version of events at trial, Doyle v. Ohio and

Anderson v. Charles prohibit the State from arguing that the jury should not
believe the defendant's testimony on the basis that he withheld that version
from police when he refused to talk to them.
But Defendant did not remain silent after Miranda warnings. Instead,
he told police that he had been asleep at the time of the shooting and did
not know that anyone had been shot. See R.298:63-65, 70. These statements
conflicted with his trial testimony that he was awake and knew that John
had been shot in a struggle that resulted when Defendant merely tried to
defend himself.
Even though the prosecutor did not rely on Defendant's postMiranda

silence,

the

court of appeals

held

that the

prosecutor

unconstitutionally commented on Defendant's exercise of his right to
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remain silent. To get there, the court of appeals recognized a different kind
of post-Miranda "silence" -post-Miranda silence-equivalent statements. It
concluded that post-Miranda statements about the interrogation are the
sa1ne as silence and Doyle and Charles prohibited using those statements to

r·.
~

impeach Defendant's inconsistent trial testimony.
Neither Doyle v. Ohio nor Anderson v. Charles support treating
Defendant's statements as the equivalent of silence. First, Doyle and Charles
did not distinguish between a

defendant's statements about

the

interrogation and a defendant's statements about the crime, or otherwise
characterize statements about the interrogation as the equivalent of silence
that the State may not use. Second, even if Doyle or Charles arguably did so,
the court of appeals still erred because Defendant's statements here were
not about the interrogation; they were instead statements about the crime
that conflicted with the version he gave at trial. By prohibiting the State
from inquiring into statements like Defendant's, the court of appeals has
denied the jury access to information hnportant to assessing whether a
defendant's testimony is true.
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A.

Doyle v. Ohio and Anderson v. Charles did not create a
category of silence-equivalent statements that the State
cannot use at trial.

Neither Doyle v. Ohio nor Anderson v. Charles support the proposition
that a defendant's statements are to be treated as silence when they concern
the interrogation and not the crime. Rather, both cases support the longstanding understanding that a prosecutor may impeach a defendant with
his post-Miranda statements that conflict with his trial testimony.
The Fifth Amendment to the Utah States Constitution provides that
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.... "

U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda v. Arizona, the

United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires "a
person taken into custody be advised immediately that he has the right to
be silent, that anything he says may be used against him, and that he has the
right to retained or appointed counsel before submitting to interrogation."
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976). Implicit in Miranda's warning is the

assurance that if a person invokes his right to remain silent, his "silence will
carry no penalty." Id. at 618. Thus, in Doyle v. Ohio, the United States
Supreme Court held that "the use for impeachment purposes of [a
defendant's] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda
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warnings, violate[s] the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."

Id. at 619.

<iJ

Doyle based its holding on two grounds.

First, as stated, it was

"fundamentally unfair" to use a defendant's post-Miranda silence when the
warning implicitly assured him that "silence will carry no penalty." Id. at
618. Second, silence is not necessarily inconsistent with later trial testimony.

Id. at 617. Indeed, post-Miranda silence is "insolubly ambiguous" because it
"may be nothing more than ... [an] exercise of these Miranda rights." Id.
The petitioners in Doyle, Doyle and Wood, had been charged with
selling marijuana to an informant. Id. at 611. They were arrested near the
scene of the transaction and given Miranda warnings by the arresting officer.

Id. at 612. They were tried separately and each testified at both trials that
they were actually attempting to buy marijuana and that the informant had
framed them. Id. at 612-613.
During

cross-examination

of

each

petitioner,

the

prosecutor

repeatedly asked why they had not told the frame-up story to the arresting
officer: if "you are innocent ... why didn't you tell hiln?" Id. at 613-614.
And in closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the petitioners' postarrest silence showed they were guilty: "if you are innocent ... You tell the
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truth. You tell them what happened .... " Id. at 633-634 n.12 (Stevens,

J.,

dissenting).
The Doyle opinion characterized petitioners Doy le and Wood as
remaining silent after arrest. Id. at 613, 616 (framing issue as "use of a
defendant's post-arrest silence" and quoting cross-examination of Wood
who testified that he did not tell arresting officer anything). But a footnote
in the majority's opinion shows that one of the petitioners, Doyle, made one
statement at arrest. Id. at 614 n.5. At his trial, Doyle testified that he said
only "'What's this all about?"' when arrested. Id. He denied making the
statement, '"I don't know what you are talking about."' Id. A footnote in
the dissenting opinion also shows that at Wood's trial, Doyle testified that
he made two statements at arrest, "What the hell is all this about" and "you
got to be crazy." Id. at 622 n.4 (Stevens,

J.,

dissenting). Wood remained

silent. See id.; Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407 n.2 (1980) (per curiam).
But the Doyle Court never directly acknowledged that Doyle made
one or two statements at arrest. See generally, Doyle, 426 U.S. 610. It did not
consider whether Doyle's statement(s) were "the equivalent of silence."

McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, 'if 21.

And it did not distinguish between

statements made about an interrogation and state1nents made about the
facts of the crime. See generally, Doyle, 426 U.S. 610.
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In Anderson v. Charles, the United States Supreme Court made clear
that Doyle does not prohibit a prosecutor from impeaching a defendant with
his post-Miranda statements when they are inconsistent with his trial
testimony.

447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam).

This is true even if the

prosecutor's questioning "concerned the respondent's failure to tell the
police the story he recounted at trial." Id. at 408.
Charles was arrested while driving a stolen car that belonged to a
murder victim. Id. at 404. After receiving Miranda warnings, Charles told
police that he stole the car from a certain street. Id. at 405, 408-409. But at
h·ial he testified that he stole the car from a parking lot at a location two
miles distant fr01n this street. Id. The prosecutor cross-examined Charles
about this inconsistency, asking hhn, "Don't you think it's rather odd that if
it were the truth that you didn't come forward and tell anybody at the time
you were arrested, where you got that car?" Id. at 406.
The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's questioning was not a

Doyle violation. "Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely
inquires into prior inconsistent statements." Id. at 408. And although the
"two inconsistent descriptions of events 1nay be said to involve 'silence'
insofar as it omits facts included in the other version . . . Doyle does not
require any such formulistic understanding of 'silence."' Id. at 409.
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The Charles court explained that the underpinnings of the Doyle
decision did not apply in that situation. First, "[s]uch questioning makes no
unfair use of silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after
receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. As to
the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent
at all." Id. at 408 (citing with approval United States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350,
354-356 (3rd Cir. 1979) (en bane) (explaining "Doyle can have no application
to a case in which the defendant did not exercise his right to remain silent";
for "to hold that a prosecutor may not question or refer to a defendant's
statements and conduct which were designed to deceive the police
regarding the commission of a crime, we would be extending the holding of
Doyle far beyond its rationale"). Compare Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618 (explaining
it is "fundamentally unfair" to use a defendant's post-Miranda silence when
the warning implicitly assured him that "silence will carry no penalty").
Second, the questions "were not designed to draw meaning from
silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement."

Charles, 447 U.S. at 409. Compare Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617 (explaining postMiranda silence is not necessarily inconsistent with trial testimony because it
"may be nothing more than ... [an] exercise of these Miranda rights"). See

also People v. McReavy, 462 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Mich. 1990) (explaining that if
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defendant is silent "there is an irrebuttable presumption of irrelevancy, and
such silence may not be used substantively or for impeachment purposes
since there is no way to know after the fact whether it was due to the
exercise of constitutional rights or to guilty knowledge ... [but w]here the
defendant has not maintained 'silence,' but has· chosen to speak, the Court
has refused to endorse a formalistic view of silence").
In its discussion of Doyle, Charles described the case as one that
"involved two defendants who made no postarrest statements about their
involvement in the crime." Charles, 447 U.S. at 407. In a footnote, Charles
recognized that Doyle actually made two statements at arrest, but that both
the Doyle majority and dissent "analyzed the due process question as if both
defendants had remained silent.

The issue was said to involve cross-

examination of a person who 'does remain silent."' Id. at 407 n.2 (quoting

Doyle, 426 U.S. at 620) (Stevens,

J.,

dissenting)). Charles did not otherwise

examine or address why Doyle characterized the petitioners as remaining
silent, but observed that "[i]n any event, neither" of Doyle's statements
"contradicted the defendant's later trial testhnony." Id.
Like Doyle, Charles did not consider whether Charles's statements
could be "the equivalent of silence." McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, if 21. It also
did not distinguish between state1nents made about an interrogation and
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statements made about the facts of the crime. See generally, Charles, 447 U.S.
404. And while Charles noted that Doyle did not make any statements about
his "involvement in the crime," it also observed that Doyle's statements did
not contradict his trial testimony in any way. Charles, 447 U.S. at 407 & n.2.
In other words, Doyle's post-Miranda statements were not prior inconsistent
statements that could be used to impeach his trial testimony. See Grunewald

v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 418 (1957) ("It is, of course, an ele1nentary rule
of evidence that prior statements may be used to impeach the credibility of
a criminal defendant ... [b]ut this can be done only if the judge is satisfied
that the prior statements are in fact inconsistent."); United States v. Hale, 422
U.S. 171, 176 (1975) (" A basic rule of evidence provides that pnor
inconsistent statements may be used to impeach the credibility of a
witness.").

See also Reynolds v. State, 114 So.3d 61, 134 (Ala. App. 2010)

(hypothesizing that Doyle's statements were "construed to be silence for the
purposes of analysis, presumably because it did not actually contradict
Doyle's trial testimqny") (citing Charles, 447 U.S. at 408 n. 2).
Thus, the controlling distinction between what Doyle permits and
what it prohibits is not whether a defendant's statements are about his
involvement in the crime or about the interrogations itself, as the court of
appeals declared, McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ,I20. Rather, the controlling
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distinction is whether the prosecutor's questions were "designed to draw
meaning from silence," or "to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent
statement." Charles, 447 U.S. at 409. See also State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 315
(Utah 1985), abandoned on other grounds as stated in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986), (explaining that to constitute an impermissible comment on a
defendant's silence, the remark must be '"manifestly intended or ... of such
character that a jury would naturally and necessarily construe it to amount
to a comment on defendant's silence"'); United States v. Cantebun;, 985 F .2d
483, 486 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining Doyle violation "turns on whether the
cross-examination was designed to impeach the defendant's trial testimony
by calling attention to prior inconsistent state1nents or, instead, was
designed to suggest an inference of guilt from the defendant's post-arrest
silence."); Greico v. Hall, 641 F.2d 1029, 1034 (1st Cir. 1981) ("[O]nce a
defendant makes post-arrest statements that may arguably be inconsistent
with the trial story, inquiry into what was not said at arrest may be
designed not 'to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for
a prior inconsistent statement."') (quoting Charles, 447 U.S. at 409); United

States v. Caruto, 532 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that there is no
Doyle violation where "differences between the post-arrest staten1ent and
the trial testimony [are] 'arguably inconsistent"').
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And where the

prosecutor elicits an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement, there is
no Doyle violation. Charles, 447 U.S. at 408-409. See also State v. Velarde, 675
P.2d 1194, 1195 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) ("The inconsistency of that
testimony with what defendant had told the officer is a legitimate basis for a
prosecutor's testing the credibility of a witness by way of impeachment.").
Here, there can be no doubt that the prosecutor did only what Doyle
permits: confront Defendant with his prior inconsistent statements. When
police questioned Defendant about the shooting, he protested his factual
innocence by pretending to know nothing about it. See R.298:63-35, 70. As
time showed him that that strategy would likely fail, he changed course. By
the time of trial, he protested his legal innocence by admitting to the
shooting he told police he knew nothing about, but giving the jury a legally
exonerating explanation for it. See R.298:44-46. The two stories cannot be
squared with each other, and the prosecutor properly informed the jury of
the conflict:
The evolution of his story from the very beginning when they
questioned him, what does he say? Why a1n I here? Why are
you jerking me off? Nothing happened. You woke me up.
You woke 1ne up. He didn't say it was an accident. He doesn't
say this was self-defense [like he did at trial].
R.298:120.
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The prosecutor's cross-examination and closing argument were thus
not designed to suggest that Defendant was guilty because he was silent at
arrest Rather, the prosecutor's argument was designed, like in Charles, "to
elicit an explanation" for his inconsistent stories. Charles, 447 U.S. at 409. By
II

pointing out that Defendant's story had evolved," the prosecutor made no
use of Defendant's silence. R.298:120.
Likewise, the two bases of the Doyle decision do not apply here. First,
the prosecutor's argument made "no unfair use of silence because a
defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not
been induced to remain silent." Charles, 447 U.S. at 408.

11

As to the subject

matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all." Id.
Second, Defendant's statements were not "insolubly ambiguous"; they were
patently inconsistent with his trial version of events. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.

See also State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1097-98, 1100 (Conn. 2010) (explaining
that "Once an arrestee has waived his right to remain silent, the Doyle
rationale is not operative because the arrestee has not remained silent and
an explanatory statement assuredly is no longer 'insolubly a1nbiguous.' By
speaking, the defendant has chosen unambiguously not to assert his right to
remain silent. He knows that anything he says can and will be used against
. ") ,
h lffi
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Thus, contrary to the court of appeals' reading, neither Doyle nor

Charles understood · that the silence that the State cannot inquire into
includes statements about the interrogation. They only prohibit drawing an
unfair inference from the defendant's exercise of a right he has just been
informed he has the right to exercise. See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 787788 (Utah App. 1991) (holding no Doyle violation where prosecutor pointed
out that Harrison did not tell police that murder victim was armed like he
did at trial when claiming self-defense); Velarde, 675 P.2d at 1195-1196
(holding that prosecutor properly impeached Velarde's trial testimony that
he remembered how he arrived in Morgan with statement to police that he
did not know he was in Morgan); United States v. Ochoa-Sanchez, 676 F.2d
1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that prosecutor's questions about details
defendant omitted in interrogation not Doyle violation because prosecutor
was not "attempting to draw meaning from the defendant's silence");

United States v. May, 52 F.3d 885, 887, 890 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding no Doyle
violation where prosecutor argued in closing that "[n]ever once did" May
tell the story that he told at trial because "focus of the prosecutor's
comments was not on May's failure to present his exculpatory story at the
time of arrest, but on prior inconsistent stories as in Anderson v. Charles");

Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that cross-
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examination "was within permissible limits because [defendant] presented
a new story at h·ial that was materially different from the information he
provided police").
The court of appeals' classification of statements about the
interrogation as opposed to statements about the crime is problematic for
other reasons as well. In most cases, a defendant's statements about his
interrogation would likely not be admissible at trial simply because they
would not be relevant.

But there may be cases where a defendant's

statements-although not about the crime-would be relevant and
necessary at trial.

For example, where a defendant raised an insanity

defense, but he coherently speaks during the interrogation, his statements
could be used at trial to rebut his defense. See Commonwealth v. Hunsberger,
565 A.2d 152, 153-155 (Penn. 1989) (finding no Doyle violation where State
introduced defendant's questions," Are public defenders as good as money
lawyers?" and "How can I get to see the public defender on the sixth floor
of the courthouse if I am in jail?" to rebut insanity defense). And where a
defendant is charged with DUI, his statements about the interrogation could
be relevant to show his intoxication. See State v. Lee, 967 A.2d 1161, 11641166 (Vt. 2008) (holding no Doyle violation where prosecutor showed Lee's
police interview of him drunkenly yelling obscenities while officer read
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Miranda rights, then was silent; "The State did not offer the tape to show
defendant was guilty because he refused to speak with the officer.").
Likewise, where a defendant raises an intoxication defense, his statements
about the interrogation would be relevant to rebut his defense. See Shaw v.

State, 2014 WL 3559389, **24, 26 (Ala. App. 2014), petition for certiorari
docketed by Aubrey Shaw v. Alabama, U.S. Aug. 26, 2016 (holding that there
was no Doyle violation where prosecutor introduced Shaw's post-Mirqnda
statements that "turn[ed] around all of the questions on the officers" like
"No need to waste y'all' s time," "What's age got to do with it anyway?" and
"We're talking" because they rebutted his intoxication defense).
But under the court of appeals' decision, in each of these cases, the
State would be constitutionally prohibited from presenting the defendant's
statements simply because the statements were about the interrogation and
not about the facts of the case. This is not what Doyle intended. See State v.

Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 634 (Utah App. 1997) (explaining defendant has "'no
right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without
laying himself open to cross-examination upon those facts"').
Indeed, the State is aware of no other jurisdiction that has treated a
defendant's statements about his interrogation as the equivalent of silence
under Doyle or Charles, and the court of appeals cited none. Rather, many

-35-

courts have found no Doyle violation where the prosecutor impeached a
defendant with statements that were not about his involvement in the
crime. See Hunsberger, 565 A.2d at 153-155 (Penn. 1989) (finding no Doyle
violation where State introduced defendant's questions, "Are public
defenders as good as money lawyers?" and "How can I get to see the public
defender on the sixth floor of the courthouse if I am in jail?''); Lee, 967 A.2d
at 1164-1166 (holding that there was no Doyle violation where prosecutor
showed Lee's police interview of him drunkenly yelling obscenities); Shaw,
2014 WL 3559389, *24, 26 (holding that there was no Doyle violation where
prosecutor introduced Shaw's post-Miranda statements like "No need to
waste y'all' s time," "What's age got to do with it anyway?" and "We' re
talking"); Boyd, 992 A.2d at 1100 (finding no Doyle violation where Boyd
told police that he "he was not yet ready to tell the police everything that he
knew about the murder and that he was not willing to discuss the crime
scene"); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1412-1413 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding
no Doyle violation where prosecutor impeached defendant's trial version
with his statements to police that he was not guilty, he wanted protective
custody, and wanted to take a polygraph test).
The court of appeals thus erred when it treated Defendant's
statements as the "equivalent of silence." McCallie, 2016 UT App 4,
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if 20.

"Because the impeachment evidence here concerned Defendant's statement

... Doyle's rule does not apply." United States v. Gomez, 725 F.3d 1121, 1127
(9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). "A contrary rule 'would pervert the
constitutional right into a right to falsify free from the embarrassment of
impeachment evidence from the defendant's own mouth."'
(quoting Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975)).

Id. at 1128

This Court should

reverse.
B.

Defendant's statements were not about his interrogation; they
were about the crime because they amounted to a denial of
his involvement.

Even if the court of appeals' disparate treatment of statements about
interrogations versus statements about crimes were supportable, the court
of appeals also erred when it held that Defendant's statements were not
about the crime. And that error sets precedent for cases where defendants
make state1nents similar to Defendant's.
While some of Defendant's statements bare superficial similarities to
Doyle's, Defendant did not merely inquire into what was happening, like
Doyle did. Defendant's statements instead told an exculpatory story that he
was not involved in the crime: he had been asleep, he was awakened by the
police, and he did not know that anyone had been shot.

-37-

Q

Context matters. True, if a defendant had been awakened by police
days or months after a shooting, such a statement might not be about the
facts of the crime.

But that is not what happened here. Police arrived

almost immediately after Defendant shot John- indeed, Defendant and
John were still struggling over the gun. See R.297:30; R.298:50-51. They
immediately arrested Defendant and took him to the police station for
questioning. See R.298:51-54. Thus, Defendant's statements that the police
had just awakened him and that he wanted to know what was going on
were necessarily statements about the crime, not the interrogation. And by
equating Defendant's statements to the ones Doyle gave without accounting
for this context, the court of appeals' decision will allow defendants to give
conflicting accounts of their involvement in a crime without letting the jury
know about the conflict so long as the statements to police bare some
superficial similarity to Doyle's.
But Doyle and Charles do not give defendants the right to hide post-

Miranda stories to police that contradict the stories they tell at trial. Quite
the opposite. And to separate the permitted from the prohibited, the "court
1nust look at the particular use to which the disclosure is put, and the
context of the disclosure." State v. Maas, 1999 UT App 325, ,I21, 991 P.2d
1108.

Indeed, it is "the prosecution's duty to clear up discrepancies
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manufactured by the defendant. ... " State v. Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373, 376 (Utah
1982) (per curiam) (holding no Doyle violation where prosecutor asked
defendant whether he told police the story he told at trial after defendant
testified that he had not had an opportunity to give his version of events).
"There is nothing irregular about trying to straighten out something out on
the record, if a prosecutor is confronted with a voluntary statement of an
accused who has taken the witness stand ... by asking questions to test the
credibility of the witness." Id. at 375. Because McCallie allows defendants to
give conflicting accounts without being answerable to explain the
discrepancies-and improperly skews the truth-finding process by doing
so-this Court should reverse and make clear that alleged Doyle violations
must be considered in the context of each case and not a rule that looks only
to superficial similarities between statements made by different defendants
in different contexts.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
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J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Opinion, in which

JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME

and KATE A. TOOMEY concurred.

VOROS, Judge:
<Jll
After an evening of drinking and card-playing, James
Christopher McCallie and an acquaintance had an altercation
involving a handgun. The acquaintance (Victim) got the worst of
it, suffering a non-fatal gunshot wound to his abdomen.
McCallie claimed self-defense, but the jury convicted him of
aggravated assault, a third-degree felony. On appeal, McCallie
contends that his right to remain silent was infringed when the
prosecutor questioned why McCallie had not claimed selfdefense in his police interview. We agree with McCallie that
constitutional error occurred, but we agree with the State that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore
affirm the conviction.

State v. McCallie
B.ACKGROUND1
12
Around 10:00 a.m. on March 30, 2013, Victim visited his
aunt and uncle at their home. He brought a half gallon of
whiskey for a day of drinking and cribbage. Sometime later,
McCallie, who rented a room from Victim's aunt and uncle,
returned home with an 18-pack of beer after completing a longhaul route as a truck driver.
McCallie and Victim drank, played cards, argued, and
talked about guns. Victim asked to see McCaHie's gun, and
McCallie obliged. McCallie retired to his bedroom multiple
times; each time, Victim followed and asked McCallie to come
o_ut and drink with him; each time McCallie joined him. At some
point McCallie and Victim's aunt got into a verbal
confrontation. McCallie called her a derogatory name, and
Victim demanded that McCallie apologize. McCallie refused; he
"went to [his] room and ... was going to go to bed ... when
[Victim] came in for the last time."

13

14
McCallie testified that as he sat on his bed, Victim stood
over him with one foot on top of McCallie' s feet and "both of his
fists up." McCallie grabbed his gun from under his pillow.
McCallie testified that he did not have his finger on the trigger
but rather that he placed it "across the frame of the weapon.
Then, according to McCallie, Victim grabbed the gun, McCallie
pulled back on the gun, Victim fell on top of him, and when
Victim fell, Victim "pushed the trigger and fired the weapon
himself."
11

<j{5
Victim gave a different version of events. He testified that
McCallie invited him to his room for some brandy. Victim

1. "On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most
favorable to the jmy's verdict and recite the facts accordingly.
We present conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand
issues raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Cjl 2, 10 P.3d
346 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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followed McCallie down the hall to his room when, suddenly,
McCallie turned around "and he's got a gun." Then, according
to Victim, McCallie "[p lulled back the hammer, raised it up and
pointed it in [Victim's] face." Victim testified that McCallie said
"How about I just fuckin' kill you?" Victim grabbed McCallie's
wrist with one hand and the barrel of the gun with the other
hand. As Victim tried to pull the gun away, it came down near
his side, "and then the gun went off." Victim suffered a non-fatal
gunshot wound to his abdomen. 2
~16
After his arrest, McCallie acted- to use his word"belligerent" with police. He testified that they "were trying to
read [me] my rights and do the interrogation ... they were
asking me what happened and it's like, 'I'm not telling you
anything' and they read my rights and said I'm-'no, I don't
understand my rights, I'm not telling you anything."' On crossexamination, McCallie described the attempted interrogation:
[Prosecutor:] [T]hen they offered you a Coke?
[McCallie:] Yes.

[Prosecutor:] And your answer was, yes, I'll have a
rum and Coke.
[McCallie:] Sure. I was being belligerent.

[Prosecutor:] ... And they came back and [said]
we'll go get you a Coke and then you said not a
problem, how about a six pack and a cigarette?
[McCallie:] Yes.
[Prosecutor:] And then you asked them, "Still don't
understand why I'm here. What happened?"
[McCallie:] Exactly.

2. The jury acquitted McCallie of the count of discharge of a

firearm. Accordingly, his version of the shooting is most
consistent with the jury's verdict.
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[Prosecutor:] They said you're under arrest and
you said for what? Yes?
[McCallie]: Yes.

[Prosecutor:] And then [they] tried to explain and
again you said, "For what? 'Why am I here?" And
then they explained your rights.
[Mccallie:] Yes.

[Prosecutor:] And then at one point [the detective]
says what part of your rights do you not
· understand and your answer was "The part where
you're fucking jerking me [around]. What the fuck
am I doing here to begin with? You people woke
me up."
[McCallie:] Yes.
[Prosecutor:] [The detective] tries to explain-this
could be a real short thing. And you said, "No, I
want to know what the fuck I am doing here in the
first place .... "
Before trial, McCallie' s h·ial counsel moved to exclude
McCallie's police interview because he "stated numerous times
that he didn't understand his Miranda rights and finally the State
gave up and did not question [him] any further." The prosecutor
responded that he would not elicit any testimony from the
detective about the content of his interview with McCallie,
because "that can be cast as us commenting on his right to
remain silent." Accordingly, the detective testified about
McCallie's demeanor, attitude, and general belligerence during
the attempted interrogation but not about any of McCallie's
statements.

<]]?

'Il8
However, in closing arguments, the prosecutor described
the evolution of McCallie' s story over time as proof that
McCallie had fabricated it:
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[T]he facts that I've offered react together, show an
evolution, a progression of what? Of the
defendant's fabrication.
The evolution of his story from the very beginning
when they question him, what does he say? Why
am I here? Why are you jerking me [around]?
Nothing happened. You woke me up. You woke
me up. He didn't say it was an accident. He doesn't
say this was self-defense.
McCallie' s trial counsel objected and moved for a mistrial on the
ground that the prosecutor had "comment[ed] on [McCallie's]
right to remain silent." The court denied the motion.
«jI:9
Ultimately, the jury acquitted McCallie of felony
discharge of a firearm but convicted him of third-degree-felony
aggravated assault. After the verdict, McCallie moved for a new
trial, which the court denied.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
<J[lO
McCallie raises two challenges on appeal. First, he
contends that the trial court committed constitutional error by
denying his mistrial and new trial motions, because the
prosecutor impermissibly commented on McCallie's exercise of
his right to remain silent. Second, he contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict based on the
insufficiency of the evidence.

ANALYSIS
I. Constitutional Error
McCallie contends that the trial court erred "in denying
[his] motion for mistrial and motion for a new trial, given the

1(11
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State's comments regarding [his] exercise of his right to remaih
silent." The State contends that the prosecutor's closing
argument "was not that Defendant had remained silent when
given an opportunity to offer an innocent explanation for his
conduct, but rather that his statements to the police and others
were inconsistent with his trial testimony." Accordingly, the
State maintains that "[t]his type of argument is proper."
':[12 "We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new
trial under an abuse of discretion standard. At the same time,
however, we review the legal standards applied by the trial
court ... for correch1ess .... " State v. Billingsley, 2013 UT 17, 'lI 9,
311 P.3d 995 (first omission in original) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). If we determine the trial court erred,
and "the error results in the deprivation of a constitutional right,
we apply a higher standard of scrutiny, reversing the conviction
unless we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, c_[ 45, 55 P.3d 573; see also Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). "The State bears the burden of
proving that an error passes muster under this standard." Brecht
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993).
A.

The Prosecutor Impermissibly Commented on McCallie's
Silence.

<J{13 McCallie argues that "[t]he State's use of Mr. McCallie's
silence as evidence of guilt violates his right against selfincrimination and was a critical error requiring reversal." He
asserts that the prosecutor's statement during closing amounted
to an argument that "McCallie made up the story later,
otherwise he would have shared it at the time of interrogation." 3

3. McCallie did not remain silent in the usual sense. But, as we
explain below, for Fifth Amendment purposes controlling case
law treats commenting on the suspect's statements about the
interrogation-as opposed to statements about the crime-as
tantamount to commenting on the suspect's silence.
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<J{14 The State, on the other hand, argues that the prosecutor
"described how Defendant told the police not that he acted in
self-defense or that it was an accident-as he did at trial-but
that he did not know what happened because the police had just
awakened him." Thus, the State argues that the prosecutor "did
not raise the inference that silence equals guilt; in fact the
fprosecutor] did not mention Defendant's silence at all. Instead,
the [prosecutor] properly argued that Defendant's trial
testimony was inconsistent with his prior statements to the
police" and others.
<J{lS The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
commands, ''No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself ... . U.S. Const. amend. V.
And the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), requires "that a person taken into custody be ad vised
immediately that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says may be used against him, and that he has a right to
retained or appointed counsel before submitting to
interrogation." Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976). Implicit in
the Miranda warning is the "assurance that silence will carry no
penalty." Id. at 618. Consequently, where a defendant remains
silent after hearing Miranda warnings, "it would be
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow
the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an
explanation subsequently offered at trial." Id. (footnote omitted);
see also State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981).
11

<J{16 In Doyle, the Supreme Court examined "whether a state
prosecutor may seek to impeach a defendant's exculpatory story,
told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant
about his failure to have told the story after receiving Miranda
warnings at the time of his arrest." Doyle, 426 U.S. at 611. The
case involved two defendants, Doyle and Wood, who were
arrested together, charged with a single sale of marijuana, and
tried in separate trials about one week apart. Id. J/The evidence at
their trials was identical in all material respects." Id.
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<jfl 7 .~t those trials, the prosecufion argued that "the
discrepancy between an exculpatory story at trial and silence at
time of arrest gives rise to an inference that the story was
fabrkated somewhere along the way." Id. at 616. To support this
theory at Doyle's trial, the prosecutor elicited the following
testimony from Doyle:

Q. (By the prosecutor.) ... You are innocent?
A. (By Doyle.) I am innocent. Yes Sir.
Q. That's why you told the police department and
[the officer] when they arrived . . . about your
innocence?

A.... I didn't tell them about my innocence. No.
Q. You said nothing at all about how you had been
set up?

A. Not that I recalt Sir.
Q. As a matter of fact, if I recall your testimony
correctly, you said instead of protesting your
im1ocence, as you do today, you said in response to
a question of [the officer], "I don't know what you
are talking about."
A. I believe what I said [is] "What's this all about?"
If I remember, that's the only thing I said ....

Q. All right. But you didn't protest your innocence
at that time?
A. Not until I knew what was going on.

Id. at 614-15 n.5 (first and third omission in original). And at
Wood's trial, the prosecutor asked Doy]e why he didn't te11
police that he had been framed; Doyle responded that he said to
the detective "what the hell is all this about and he said you are
under arrest for the suspicion of selling marijuana and I said you
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got to be crazy. I was pretty upset." Id. at 622 n.4 (Stevens,
dissenting).

J.,

<J[18 The Supreme Court held that this "use for impeachment
purposes of [the defendants'] silence, at the time of arrest and
after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 619. And because
"[t]he State has not claimed that such use in the circumstances of
this case might have been harmless error," the Supreme Court
reversed the convictions. Id. at 619-20.

119 Four years after issuing Doyle, the Supreme Court applied
that precedent in Anderson v. Cha1'les, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per
curiam). Anderson involved a murder. The defendant was found
with the victim's car. The defendant testified at trial, and his
testimony about the car differed crucially from his statement to
police at the time of his arrest. Id. at 404-06. The Supreme Court
held that Doyle did not forbid impeaching a defendant's trial
testimony about the crime with his police statement about the
crime; the prosecutor's questions in that case "were not designed
to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a
prior inconsistent statement." Id. at 409.
'f(20 The Anderson Court distinguished Doyle on the ground
that Doyle "involved two defendants who made no postarrest
statements about their involvement in the crime." Id. at 407.
However, as the Court acknowledged, that assertion was not
literally true, at least as to Doyle. Doyle asked arresting officers,
"What's this all about?" and "e...-xclaimed 'you got to be crazy,' or
'I don't know what you are talking about."' Id. at 407 n.2
(citations omitted). But the Court noted that both the majority
and dissenting opinions in Doyle II analyzed the due process
question as if both defendants had remained silent." Id. What
matters, the Court explained, are post-arrest statements "about
[a defendant's] involvement in the crime." Id. at 407.

~l21 Consequently, under Anderson, post-arrest statements
about the suspect's involvement in the interrogation itself-such
as "What's this all about?" "You got to be crazy," and "I don't
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know what you are talking about" -are, for Doyle purposes, the
equivalent of silence. Accordingly, the prosecutor may not use
such statements to impeach a defendant's trial testimony. We
thus must decide whether McCallie' s post-arrest statements fall
into this category of comments about his involvement in the
interrogation or, on the contrary, whether they can be fairly
described as comments about his involvement in the crime.

<]{22

Discussing Mccallie' s police interview in closing
argument, the prosecutor asked rhetorically, "[W]hat does he
say? Why am I here? Why are you jerking me [around]? Nothing
happened. You woke me up. You woke me up." Though more
bellicose, these statements by McCallie are similar to statements
by Doyle in his police interview: "What's this all about?" "You
got to be crazy," and "I don't know what you are talking about."
Both men were addressing the interrogation itself, not the crime
for which they were being interrogated. And because the
Supreme Court "analyzed the due process question as if [Doyle]
had remained silent," Anderson, 447 U.S. at 407 n.2, we do the
same, proceeding here as if McCallie had remained silent. 4
1123 The State also argues that because McCallie made
statements to the police, his claim that he '"remained silent' at
the police interview is incorrect." The State relies on the
Supreme Court's decision in Bergltuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370
(2010), to argue that McCallie did not remain silent and made
substantive statements to the police. The State argues that under
Berghuis, no Doyle violation exists absent an affirmative
invocation of the right to remain silent. In Berghuis, the Court
held that a suspect who wishes to invoke his right to remain
silent "must do so 'unambiguously."' Id. at 381. The Court
4. We of course realize that suspects' statements feigning
ignorance during a police interrogation may turn out to be
"graphically inconsistent with their trial testimony." Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 621 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But again,
McCallie's statements and Doyle's statements are in this regard
ind is tingu isha b le.
r.~.

"v'
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clarified that the defendant II did not say that he wanted to
remain silent or that he did not want to talk to police. Had he
made either of these simple unambiguous statements, he would
have invoked his right to cut off questioning." Id. at 382 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
'1124

Berghuis does not control the present case. The Supreme

Court has distinguished Fifth Amendment right-to-remain-silent
cases from due process comment-on-silence cases. Thus, Berghuis
holds that the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, like the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, must be invoked
unambiguously. Id. at 375-76, 381. And a plurality of the
Supreme Court has held in the Fifth Amendment context that
"[a] suspect who stands mute has not done enough to put police
on notice that he is relying on his Fifth Amendment privilege."
Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (2013) (plurality opinion). 5
1{25 But the plurality also stated that "due process prohibits
prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent
after he heard Miranda warnings. 11 Id. at 2182 n.3 (emphasis in
original) (citing Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-18 (1976)). The plurality's
formulation of Doyle's holding emphasizes the suspect's having
heard- not necessarily invoked- his Miranda rights. And there
is no dispute here that McCallie heard his Miranda rights. Nor do
we discern any intent by the Salinas plurality to abandon or
narrow Doyle. And in Doyle, neither defendant "claimed the
privilege and ... Doyle did not even remain silent." Doyle, 426
U.S. at 627-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, we cannot agree
that in the post-Miranda context, a suspect must unambiguously
invoke his right to remain silent to trigger Doyle's "assurance
that silence will carry no penalty." Id. at 618 (majority opinion).

5. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the
judgment of the Court on the ground that a prosecutor's
comments on a defendant's precustodial silence do not violate
the Fifth Amendment. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184
(2013) (Thomas, L concurring).
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CJ{26

In sum, we conclude that the prosecutor committed a

Doyle violation when he commented on McCallie's exercise of
his right to remain silent. Having concluded a constitutional
error occurred, we will reverse "unless we find the error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT
86, c_r[ 45, 55 P.3d 573; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967).

B.

The Constitutional Error Was Harmless Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt.

c_r[27 Most constitutional errors do not automatically result in
reversal. Barring structural error, "an otherwise valid conviction
should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently
say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Delawate v. Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). Doyle errors are not structural. See Brecht
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993) (citing Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307 (1991)). Thus, we address whether
we may confidently say, on the whole record, that the Doyle
error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
<J[28 In determining whether a Doyle error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, we may consider four factors:
(1) whether the jury would naturally and
necessarily construe the comment as referring to
defendant's silence; (2) whether there was
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt;
(3) whether the reference was isolated; and
(4) whether the trial court instructed _the jury not to
draw any adverse presumption from defendant's
[silence].

State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (alteration in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
~f29 First, we do not believe that the jury would have
"naturally and necessarily" construed the prosecutor's comment
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as a comment on McCallie's silence. See id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). As explained above, Doyle and
Anderson require us to "analyze[] the due process question as if
[McCallie] had remained silent." Andetson v. Chatles, 447 U.S.
404, 407 n.2 (1980) (per curiam). But McCallie in fact made
statements to police, and the prosecutor's improper comments
referred to these statements. Given this factual context, we
cannot say that a lay jury would naturally and necessarily have
understood the prosecutor's reference as a comment on.
McCallie' s silence in the Fifth Amendment sense. We therefore
conclude that the first Byrd factor weighs in favor of
harmlessness.

-~

'Il:30 Second, we consider whether the evidence of McCallie's
guilt was overwhelming. See Byrd, 937 P.2d at 535. Because the
jury acquitted McCallie of discharge of a firearm and convicted
him only of aggravated assault, we consider only the latter
offense.

As this court explained in Byi-d, "Courts have generally
refused ... to conclude that evidence was overwhelming in cases
that ultimately rested on the jury's resolution of conflicting
evidence, particularly where the defendant's credibility is
involved." Id. at 536. However, on the point in questionwhether McCallie's story had evolved over time-the evidence
did not conflict and was overwhelming.
~[31

1132

The prosecutor demonstrated the evolution of McCallie's
story through a series of jailhouse phone calls. Portions of these
recorded phone calls were played for the jury. In a call to his
mother, McCallie stated that he needed Victim "to say this was
an accident." A day later McCallie assured his mother that
Victim would be a "team player" and would "say this was an
accident." But a friend later told McCallie that Victim "was
unwilling to say this was an accident," to which McCallie
replied, "I told [Victim] we'd take care of him. Talk to him again.
This will be well worth his while." He also asked the friend if
she could "be pushy" with Victim "about saying this was an
accident.'' Finally, McCallie told his mother, "I'm going a
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different direction with the story now, it's self-defense now since
[Victim] ... doesn't want to play ball."
. ~[33 These phone calls, far more clearly than Mccallie' s
belligerent statements to police., demonstrate that McCallie's
story had indeed evolved over time. Thus, in closing argument,
after summarizing these phone calls-but before mentioning
McCallie' s police interview- the prosecutor stated, "That's the
evolution of the story." He continued, "At first it's got to be an
accident. ... All of a sudden it's self-defense because [Victim's]
not playing ball .. .
11

c_J(34 Furthermore, McCallie' s own version of events at trial
supported the charge of aggravated assault. McCallie testified
that after Victim barged into his room "for the umpteenth time,"
McCallie felt threatened and so grabbed his loaded handgun
from under his pillow, "c[a]me up with it/' placed his finger
"across the frame of the weapon," and ordered Victim out of his
room. Under the law then in effect, "a threat, accompanied by a
show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another" constituted an assault. Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102(1)(b)
(LexisNexis 2012). Use of a dangerous weapon elevated the
offense to aggravated assault. Id. § 76-5-103(1)(a).6 Therefore,
barring his recently evolved theory of self-defense, McCallie's
testimony alone provided evidence on which the jury could
reasonably have found the elements of aggravated assault.
<jf35 Accordingly, we conclude that the second Byrd factor
weighs in favor of harn1lessness.
136 Third, the prosecutor's comment on McCallie' s silence
constituted an isolated reference. See State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532,
535 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Although the comment occurred at a
crucial junction of the trial-the prosecutor's rebuttal in closing
6. The same conduct meets the current defh~ition of aggravated
assault. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (LexisNexis Supp.
2015).
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argument-it occupied at most four lines of the transcript.7 We

therefore conclude that it constituted an isolated statement.
Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of harmlessness.

Finally, the trial court did not instruct the jury not to draw
any adverse inference based on the prosecutor's improper
comment. See id. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of
harm.

<j{37

<J{38 In sum, the Byrd factors weigh in favor of harmlessness.
Because the prosecutor's isolated comment did not clearly refer
to McCallie' s silence, because the evidence that McCallie' s story
had evolved over time was overwhelming, and because
McCallie's own version of events supported his conviction for
aggravated assault, we conclude that we "may confidently say,
on the whole record," that the Doyle error here "was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 681 (1986).

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

~[39 McCallie also contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a directed verdict based on the
sufficiency of the evidence. On appeal from a denial of a motion
for a directed verdict based on the sufficiency 0£ the evidence,
"[t]he applicable standard of review is ... highly deferential."
State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, c_[ 30, 326 P.3d 645. "The evidence is
to be viewed in the light most favorable to the [S]tate." State v.
Montoya, 2004 UT 5, c_[ 29, 84 P.3d 1183. And "[w]e will uphold
the trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, we conclude
that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could
find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. (alteration in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a directed
7. By comparison, the prosecutor's discussion of the jailhouse
phone calls occupied thirty-four lines of transcript.
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verdict, "the court is not free to weigh the evidence and thus
invade the provh1ce of the jury, whose prerogative it is to judge
the facts." Id. ~[ 32 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
A.

We Review the Entire Record on Appeal.

<J{40 The parties disagree on wl~ether we may canvas the entire
record for evidence supporting McCallie' s conviction or are
limited to evidence presented in the State's case-in-chief-that is,
the evidence actually before the court at the time McCallie
moved for a directed verdict.
<jf 41
In a criminal case, a defendant may move for a directed
verdict of dismissal at the close of the State's case-in-chief or
after the close of all the evidence. See Utah R. Crim. P. 17(p). If
the defendant moves for a directed verdict at the close of the
State's case, and if, as often happens, the court denies the
motion, the defendant may call defense witnesses, after which
the State may call rebuttal witnesses. The question is whether the
appellate court may consider this post-motion evidence in
reviewing the trial court's denial of the motion.

Cjl42 The State asks us to explicitly adopt the "waiver doctrine"
or "waiver rule." Under this rule, "if the defendant elects to
introduce evidence following the denial of a motion for a
judgment of acquittal, appellate review of the defendant's
conviction encompasses all of the evidence presented to the jury,
irrespective of the sufficiency of evidence presented during the
state's case-in-chief." State v. Perkins, 856 A.2d 917, 929 n.16
(Conn. 2004). The State argues that Utah "seems to implicitly
follow" the waiver rule. 8

8. The State describes the waiver rule as the prevailing view as
well as the federal rule. See 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Crimin.al
Procedure § 24.6(b) (3d ed. 2007). Our research bears out the
State's characterization. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d
(continued ... )
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143 McCallie contests this characterization. Further, he
observes that, in any event, the State bases its sufficiency
argument entirely on evidence presented in its case-in-chief;
consequently, he argues, this court "ought to postpone ruling on
this issue until a case comes before it with relevant facts from the
entire case.''
'Il44 Our own research suggests that the Utah Supreme Court
adopted the waiver rule some years ago. In State v. Stockton, 310
P.2d 398 (Utah 1957), the court held that presenting evidence
after denial of a motion for directed verdict constih1tes "waiver
of the motion to direct":
In jurisdictions where it is held to be the duty of
the court, in a proper case, to direct an acquittal, it
is the general rule that, if the entire evidence is
sufficient to sustain a conviction, the introduction
of evidence by the defense, after the court has
refused to direct a verdict of acquittal at the close
of the prosecution's case, amounts to a waiver of
the motion to direct.

Id. at 400. The court added that a defendant "cannot complain of
the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, though

( ... continued)
1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ( All eleven numbered circuits and
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals are now on record ...
as adhering to the waiver rule"); State v. Kinsella, 2011 ND 88,
~l 11, 796 N.W.2d 678 ("Further, our adherence to the waiver rule
is consistent with the position taken by the federal circuit courts
of appeals and the majority of state courts.") The waiver rule
"eliminates the bizarre result that could occur in its absence,
namely, that a conviction could be reversed for evidentiary
insufficiency, despite evidence in the record sufficiently
establishing guilt." State v. Perkins, 856 A.2d 917, 932-33 (Conn.
2004).
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the State. failed to make a case, if he himself proved one for it."
Id, (quoting Slate ·o. Potello, 119 P. 1.023, 1029 (Utah 1911)). But see
State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, <JI 9, 988 P.2d 949 (stating, in
reviewing a denied motion to dismiss, that "this court's review
of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the evidence
adduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief'').

<J[45

In any event, in the present case, McCallie himself has
placed the entire record before us, In arguing that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for directed verdict, McCallie relies
not only on evidence presented in the State's case-in-chief, but
also on the testimony of four defense witnesses, including his
own. Accordingly, as concerns this case, the parties apparently
agree that we may assess the sufficiency of the evidence in light
of the entire record.

B.

The Evidence Supports McCallie's Conviction.

~f46 McCallie's argument that sufficient evidence failed to
support his conviction rests on the severe intoxication of Victim,
the State's key witness. Specifically, McCallie argt1es that the
State "failed to make out its prima fade case because the
evidence, which depended entirely on [Victim's] testimony, was
based on a non-existent memory from extreme intoxication, and
was so contradictory to the physical evidence, as to be utterly
non-persuasive." Distilled to its essence, McCallie's argument
goes to Victim's credibility. He maintains that, given Victim's
extreme intoxication, "he would have had no or little ability to
form a memory [of the events] at all. What this reflects is that
[Victim] likely created [his} memories subsequently, when he
was no longer so highly intoxicated."

1147 No party disputes that Victim had a blood alcohol content
(BAC) of .31. And at trial, an expert wih1.ess testified on behalf of
the defense, explaining that someone who did not regularly
drink and who had a BAC of ,31 "would be non-functional,"
"they'd be out cold on this level, almost certainly." He
anticipated that "[s]omeone who drank alcohol on a regular
basis ... would be significantly impaired." The expert explained
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that at this level of intoxication, the ability "[t]o think, to
understand, to remember, . . . and that sort of thing and to
reason" would be significantly impaired. But on crossexamination the expert also explained that a seasoned drinker
could tolerate higher levels of alcohol:
Well, his brain is used to seeing blood alcohols that
are more substantial and so he'll have, you know,
adapted to that and, you know, be able-he'll be
able to function more normally, not completely
normal, he'll be able to function more normally on
higher blood alcohols than, you know, a nondrinker or a rare drinker.

All relevant evidence was before the jury to consider, and we
will not invade the province of the jury by reweighing it. See
State z,. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, <Jl 32, 84 P.3d 1183. "[I]t was the
jury's prerogative to weigh [Victim's] testimony in light of the
[expert testimony], and [Victim s] testimony, if believed, was
sufficient to support a conviction" for aggravated assault. See
State v. Peterson, 2015 UT App 129, i 8, 351 P.3d 812. 9
1

~[48 Moreover, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, as we must, see Montoya, 2004 UT 5, i 29,
we conclude sufficient evidence supports McCallie' s aggravated
assault conviction. "A person commits aggravated assault if the
person commits assault ... and uses a dangerous weapon .... "
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). Assault is,
among other things, "a threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another." Id.
§ 76-5~102(1)(b). Taking Victim's testimony at face value-as it
constitutes the evidence most favorable to the State-Victim
testified that McCallie had a gun; that he "[p ]ulled back the
9. We also note that it appears the jury apparently disregarded at

least some of Victim's testimony, because it acquitted McCallie
of one qmnt of discharge of a firearm with injury.
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hammer, raised it up and pointed it in [Victim's] face"; and that
he uttered, "How about I just fuckin' kill you?" This alone
constitutes sufficient evidence to uphold McCallie's aggravated
assault conviction. Moreover, even if the jury found Victim's
testimony wholly incredible, we conclude, as explained above,
that McCallie' s own testimony provided some evidence of every
element of the crime of which he was convicted. See supra '1[ 34.
~[49 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in
denying McCallie's motion for a directed verdict, because the
State and the defense presented sufficient evidence to support
McCallie' s conviction.

CONCLUSION

G

'1[.50 In sum, we conclude that the prosecutor improperly
commented on McCallie's right to remain silent, but that this
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We also
conclude that sufficient evidence exists to support McCallie' s
conviction. We therefore affirm.
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Defendants were convicted before the Common Pleas
Court of Tuscarawas County, Ohio, of selling marihuana,
and they appealed. The Court of Appeals of Tuscarawas
County, affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Powell, held that although
the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that
silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit
to any person who receives the warnings, that where
defendants, who were given the Miranda warnings on
arrest, did not complain to arresting officer that they had
been framed but gave their exculpatory story for first time
at trial, prosecutor's cross-examining defendants as to why
they had not told the frame-up story on arrest violated
due process and that cross-examination as to defendants'
postarrest silence was not justified on grounds of necessity,
i. e., that discrepancy gave rise to inference that story was
fabricated and that such cross-examination was necessary
in order to present to the jury all information relevant to
the truth of such story.
Reversed and remanded.

exculpatory story that they had not previously told to the
police or the prosecutor. Over their counsel's objection,
they were cross-examined as to why they had not
given the arresting officer the exculpatory explanations.
Petitioners were convicted, and their convictions were
upheld on appeal. Held : The use for impeachment
purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and
after they received Miranda warnings, violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Post-arrest
silence following such warnings is insolubly ambiguous;
moreover, it would be fundamentally unfair to allow an
arrestee's silence to be used to impeach an explanation
subsequently given at trial after he had been impliedly
assured, by the Miranda warnings, that silence would
carry no penalty. Pp. 2244-2246.
Reversed and remanded.

Attorneys and Law Firms
James R. Willis, Cleveland, Ohio, for petitioners.
Ronald L. Collins, New Philadelphia, Ohio, for the
respondent, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.

Opinion
*611 Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
(1) The question in these consolidated cases is whether
a state prosecutor may seek to impeach a defendant's
exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, by crossexamining the defendant about his failure to have told the

story after re~eiving Miranda warnings 1 at the time of his
arrest. We conclude that use of the defendant's post-arrest
silence in this manner violates due process, and therefore
reverse the convictions of both petitioners.

Mr. Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion in which Mr.
Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined.

**2241 *610 Syllabus *
During the course of their state criminal trials petitioners,
who after arrest were given warnings in line with Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-473, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
1624-1627. 16 L.Ed.2d 694, took the stand and gave an
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Petitioners Doyle and Wood were arrested together and
charged with selling 10 pounds of marihuana to a local
narcotics bureau informant. They were convicted in the
Common Pleas Court of Tuscarawas **2242 County,
Ohio, in separate trials held about one week apart.
The evidence at their trials was identical in all material
respects.
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The State's witnesses sketched a picture of a routine
marihuana transaction. William Bonnell, a well-known
"street person., with a long criminal record, offered to
assist the local narcotics investigation unit in setting up
drug "pushers" in return for support in his efforts to
receive lenient treatment in his latest legal problems.
The narcotics agents agreed. A short time later, Bonnell
advised the unit that he had arranged a "buy" of IO
pounds of marihuana and needed $1,750 to pay for it.
Since the banks were closed and time was short, the
agents were able to collect only $1,320. Bonnell took this
money and left for the rendezvous, under surveillance
by four narcotics agents in two cars. As planned, he
met petitioners in a bar in Dover, Ohio. From there, he
and petitioner Wood drove in Bonnell's *612 pickup
truck to the nearby town of New Philadelphia, Ohio,
while petitioner Doyle drove off to obtain the marihuana
and then meet them at a prearranged location in New
Philadelphia. The narcotics agents followed the Bonnell
truck. When Doyle arrived at Bonnell's waiting truck in
New Philadelphia, the two vehicles pro(?eeded to a parking
lot where the transaction took place. Bonnell left in his
truck, and Doyle and Wood departed in Doyle's car.
They quickly discovered that they had been paid $430
less than the agreed-upon price, and began circling the
neighborhood looking for Bonnell. They were stopped
within minutes by New Philadelphia police acting on
radioed instructions from the narcotics agents. One of
those agents, Kenneth Beamer, arrived on the scene
promptly, arrested petitioners, and gave them Miranda
warnings. A search of the car, authorized by warrant,
uncovered the $1,320.
At both trials, defense counsel's cross-examination of
the participating narcotics agents was aimed primarily
at establishing that due to a limited view of the parking
lot, none of them had seen the actual transaction but
had seen only Bonnell standing next to Doyle's car
with a package under his arm, presumably after the
transaction. 2 Each petitioner took the stand at his trial
and admitted practically everything about the State's case
except the most crucial point: who was *613 selling
marihuana to whom. According to petitioners, Bonnell
had framed them. The arrangement had been for Bonnell
to sell Doyle 10 pounds of marihuana. Doyle had left the
Dover bar for the purpose 9f borrowing the necessary
mo~ey, but while driving by himself had decided that he
only wanted one or two pounds instead of the agreed-upon
1Opounds. When Bonnell reached Doyle's car in the New

Philadelphia parking lot, with the marihuana under his
arm, Doyle tried to explain his change of mind. Bonnell
grew angry, threw the $1,320 into Doyle's car, and took all
IO pounds of the marihuana back to his truck. The ensuing
chase was the effort of Wood and Doyle to catch Bonnell
to find out what the $1,320 was all about.
Petitioners' explanation of the events presented some
difficulty for the prosecution, as it was not entirely
implausible and there was little if any direct evidence
to contradict it. 3 As part of a wide-ranging crossexamination for impeachment purposes, and in an effort
to undercut the explanation, the prosecutor asked each
petitioner at his respective trial why he had not told
the frameup story to Agent Beamer when he arrested
petitioners. In the first **2243 trial, that of petitioner
Wood, the following colloquy occurred: 4
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) Mr. Beamer did arrive on the
scene?
"A. (by Wood.) Yes, he did.

"Q. And I assume you told him all about what happened
to you?
"A.No.

Q
*614 '. You didn't tell Mr. Beamer?

"A.No.

"Q. You didn't tell Mr. Beamer this guy put $1,300 in your
car?

"A. No, sir.
"Q. And we can't understand any reason why anyone
would put money in your car and you were chasing him
around town and trying to give it back?
"A. I didn't understand that.

"Q. You mean you didn't tell I~im that?
"A. Tell him what?

"Q. Mr. Wood, if that is all you had to do with this and
you are innocent, when Mr. Beamer arrived on the scene
why didn't you tell him?
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Q. But in any event you didn't bother to tell Mr. Beamer

anything about this?
"A. No, sir."

Defense counsel's timely objections to the above questions
of the prosecutor were overruled. The cross-examination
of petitioner Doyle at his trial contained a similar
exchange, and again defense counsel's timely objections
were overruled. 5

*615 Each petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals,
Fifth District, Tuscarawas County, alleging, Inter alia,
that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor
to cross-examine the petitioner at his trial about his
post-arrest silence. The Court of Appeals affim1ed the
convictions, stating as to the contentions about the postarrest silence:
"This was not evidence offered by the state in its case in
chief as confession by silence or as substantive evidence of
guilt but rather cross examination *616 of a witness as
to why he had not told the same story earlier at his first
opportunity.
**2244 "We find no error in this. It goes to credibility of

the witness."

The Supreme Court of Ohio denied further review. We
granted certiorari to decide whether impeachment use of
a defendant's post-arrest silence violates any provision
of the Constitution, 6 a question left open last Term in
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45
L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), and on which the Federal Courts of
Appeals are in conflict. See Id., at 173 n. 2, 95 S.Ct., at
2135.
II

The State pleads necessity as justification for the
prosecutor's action in these cases. It argues that the
discrepancy between an exculpatory story at trial and
silence at time of arrest gives rise to an inference that the
story was fabricated somewhere along the way, perhaps to
fit within the seams of the State's case as it was developed
at pretrial hearings. Noting that the prosecution usually
has little else with which to counter such an exculpatory

story, the State seeks only the right to cross-examine a
defendant as to post-arrest silence for the limited purpose
of impeachment. In support of its position the State
emphasizes the importance ofcross-examination *617 in
general, see Brown l'. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-155,
78 S.Ct. 622, 626-627, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958), and relies
upon those cases in which this Court has permitted use for
impeachment purposes of post-arrest statements that were
inadmissible as evidence of guilt because of an officer's
failure to follow Miranda's dictates. Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Oregon
v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570
( 1975); see also Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62,
74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954). Thus, although the
State does not suggest petitioners' silence could be used as
evidence of guilt, it contends that the need to present to
the jury all information relevant to the truth of petitioners'
exculpatory story fully justifies the cross-examination that
is at issue.
{21
131
(4]
(5]
(6) Despite the importance of crossexamination, 7 we have concluded that the Miranda
decision compels rejection of the State's position. The
warnings mandated by that case, as a prophylactic means
of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights, see Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-444, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2363-2364,
41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), require that a person taken into
custody be advised immediately that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says may be used against
him, and that he has a right to retained or appointed
counsel before submitting to interrogation. Silence in the
wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the
arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every
post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what
the State is required to advise the person arrested. 8
See **2245 *618 United States v. Hale, supra, 422
U.S., at 177, 95 Ct., at 2137. Moreover, while it is true
that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance
that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is
implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such
circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a
deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently
offered at trial. 9 *619 Mr. Justice White, concurring in
the judgment in United States v. Hale, supra, at 182-183,
95 S.Ct., at 2139, put it very well:
"(W)hen a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda
requires, that he may remain silent, that anything he
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says may be used against him, and that he may have
an attorney if he wishes, it seems to me that it does
not comport with due process to permit the prosecution
during the trial to call attention to his silence at the time of
arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about the
facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do,
an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the truth
of his trial testimony .... Surely Hale was not informed
here that his silence. as well as his words, could be used
against him at trial. Indeed, anyone would reasonably
conclude from Miranda warnings that this would not be
the case." 10
(7) We hold that the use for impe.achment purposes of
petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving
Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. 11 The State has not *620
claimed that such use in the circumstances of this case
might have been harmless error. Accordingly, petitioners'
**2246 convictions are reversed and their causes
remanded to the state courts for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

Mr. Justice STEVENS, with whom Mr. Justice
BLACKMUN and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST join,
dissenting.
Petitioners assert that the prosecutor's cross-examination
about their failure to mention the purported "frame"
until they testified at trial violated their constitutional
right to due process and also their constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. I am not persuaded by the
first argument; though there is merit in a portion of the
second, I do not believe it warrants reversal of these state
convictions,
I
The Court's due process rationale has some of the
characteristics of an estoppel theory. If (a) the defendant
is advised that he may remain silent, and (b) he does
remain silent, then we (c) presume that his decision was
made in reliance on the advice, and (d) conclude that
it is unfair in certain cases, though not others, 1 to use
his silence to impeach his trial testimony. The key to the

Court's analysis is apparently a concern that the Miranda
warning, which is intended to increase the probability
*621 that a person's response to police questioning will
be intelligent and voluntary, will actually be deceptive
unless we require the State to honor an unstated promise
not to use the accused's silence against him.
In my judgment there is nothing deceptive or prejudicial to
the defendant in the Miranda warning. 2 Nor do I believe
that the fact that such advice was given to the defendant
lessens the probative value of his silence, or makes the
prosecutor's cross-examination about his silence any more
unfair than if he had received no such warning.
This is a case in which the defendants' silence at the
time of their arrest was graphically inconsistent with their
trial testimony that they were the unwitting victims of
a "frameup" in which the police did not participate. If
defendants had been framed, their failure to mention that
fact at the time of their arrest is almost *622 inexplicable;
for that reason, under accepted rules of evidence, their
silence is tantamount to a prior inconsistent statement and
admissible for purposes of impeachment. 3
Indeed, there is irony in the fact that the Miranda warning
provides the only plausible explanation for their silence. If
it were the true explanation, I should think that they would
have responded to the questions on cross-examination
about why they had remained silent by stating that they
relied on their understanding of the advice given by the
arresting officers. Instead, however, **2247 they gave
quite a different jumble of responses. 4 Those *623
response negate the Court's presumption that their silence
was induced by reliance on deceptive advice.

**2248 Since the record requires us to put to one side
the *624 Court's presumption that the defendants' silence
was the product of reliance on the Miranda warning,
the Court's entire due process rationale collapses. For
without reliance *625 on the waiver, the case is no
different than if no warning had been given, and nothing
in the Court's opinion suggests that there would be any
unfairness in *626 using petitioners' prior inconsistent
silence for impeachment purposes in such a case.
Indeed, as a genera] proposition, if we assume the
defendant's silence would be admissible for impeachment
purposes if no Miranda warning had been given, I should
think that the warning would have a tendency to salvage
the defendant's credibility as a witness. If the defendant
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is a truthful witness, and if his silence is the consequence
of his understanding of the Miranda warning, he may
explain that fact when he is on the stand. Even if he is
untruthful, the availability of that explanation puts him
in a better position than if he had received no warning.
In my judgment; the risk that a truthful defendant will be
deceived by the Miranda warning and also will be unable
to explain his honest misunderstanding is so much less
than the risk that exclusion of the evidence will merely
provide a shield for perjury that I cannot accept the
Court's due process rationale.
Accordingly, if we assume that the use of a defendant's
silence for impeachment purposes would be otherwise
unobjectionable, I find no merit in the notion that he is
denied due process of law because he received a Miranda
warning.

II
Petitioners argue that the State violated their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by asking
the jury to draw an inference of guilt from their
constitutionally protected silence. They challenge both the
prosecutor's cross-examination and his closing argument.

A
Petitioners claim that the cross-examination was improper
because it referred to their silence at the time of *627
their arrest, to their failure to testify at the preliminary
hearing, and to their failure to reveal the "frame" prior
to trial. Their claim applies to the testimony of each
defendant at his own trial, and also to the testimony
each gave as a witness at the trial of the other. Since I
think it quite clear that a defendant may not object to the
violation of another **2249 person's privilege, 5 I shall
only discuss the argument that a defendant may not be
cross-examined about his own prior inconsistent silence.

In support of their objections to the cross-examination
about their silence at the time of arrest, petitioners
primarily rely on the statement in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, that
the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that the
defendant stood mute or claimed the privilege in the
face of accusations during custodial interrogation. 6 There
are two reasons why that statement does not adequately
support petitioners' argument.

First, it is not accurate to say that the petitioners
"stood mute or claimed the privilege in the face of
accusations. 11 Neither petitioner claimed the privilege and

*628 petitioner Doyle did not even remain silent. 7 The
case is not one in which a description of the actual
conversation between the defendants and the police would
give rise to any inference of guilt if it were not so flagrantly
inconsistent with their trial testimony. Rather than a claim
of privilege, we simply have a failure to advise the police of
a "frame" at a time when it most surely would have been
mentioned if petitioners' trial testimony were true. That
failure gave rise to an inference of guilt only because it
belied their trial testimony.
Second, the dictum in the footnote in Miranda relies
primarily upon Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, which held that the
Fifth Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth,
prohibited the prosecution's use of the defendant's silence
in its case in chief. But as long ago as Raffel v.
United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.
1054, this Court recognized the distinction between the
prosecution's affirmative use of the defendant's prior
silence and the use of prior silence for impeachment
purposes. Raffel expressly held that the defendant's
silence at a prior trial was admissible for purposes
of impeachment despite the application in federal
prosecutions of the prohibition that Griffin found in the
Fifth Amendment. Raffel, supra, at 496-497, 46 S.Ct., at
567-568.
Moreover, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the author of
the Court's opinion in Miranda, joined the opinion in
Walder v. United States. 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98
L.Ed. 503. which squarely held that a valid constitutional
objection to the admissibility of evidence as part of the
Government's case in chief did not bar the use of that
evidence to impeach the defendant's trial testimony. The
availability of an objection to the affirmative use of
improper evidence does not provide the defendant "with
a shield against contradiction of his untruths." Id., at 65,
74 S.Ct., at 356. The need to ensure the integrity *629
of the truth-determining function of the adversary trial
process has provided the predicate for an unbroken line of
decisions so holding. 8
*630 Although I have no doubt concerning the propriety
of the cross-examination about petitioners1 failure to
mention the purported **2250 "frame" at the time of
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their arrest, a more difficult question is presented by their
objection to the questioning about their failure to testify
at the preliminary hearing and their failure generally to
mention the "frame" before trial. 9 Un1ik~ the failure
*631 to **2251 make the kind of spontaneous comment
that discovery of a "frame" would be expected to prompt,
there is no significant inconsistency between petitioners'
trial testimony *632 and their adherence to counsel's
advice not to take the stand at the preliminary hearing;
moreover, the decision not to divulge their defense prior
to trial is probably attributable to counsel rather than to
petitioners. 10 Nevertheless, unless and until this Court
overrules Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct.

566, 70 L.Ed. 1054, 11 I think a state court is *633 free to
regard the defendant's decision to take the **2252 stand
as a waiver of his objection to the use of his failure to
testify at an earlier proceeding or his failure to offer his
version of the events prior to trial.

B

In my judgment portions of the prosecutor's argument
to the jury overstepped permissible bounds. In each trial,
he commented upon the defendant's silence not only as

inconsistent with his testimony that he had been "framed,"
*634 but also as inconsistent with the defendant's
12

innocence.
Comment on the lack of credibility of the
defendant is plainly proper; it is not proper, however, for
the prosecutor *635 to ask the **2253 jury to draw a
direct inference of guilt from silence-to argue, in effect,
that silence is inconsistent with innocence. But since the
two inferences perjury *636 and guilt are inextricably
intertwined because they have a common source, it would
be unrealistic to permit comment on the former but to
find reversible error in the slightest reference to the latter.
In the context of the entire argument and the entire
trial, I am not persuaded that the rather sophisticated
distinction between permissible comment on credibility
and impermissible comment on an inference of guilt
justifies a reversal of these state convictions. 13
Accordingly, although I have some doubt concerning the
propriety of the cross-examination about the preliminary
hearing and consider a portion of the closing argument
improper, I would affirm these convictions.

All Citations
426 U.S. 610, 96S.Ct. 2240,49 L.Ed.2d 91, 54 USLW 2230

Footnotes

*

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287,
50 L.Ed. 499.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-473, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624-1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 {1966).
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Defense counsel's efforts were not totally successful. One of the four narcotics agents testified at both trials that he had
seen the package passed through the window of Doyle's car to Bonnell. In an effort to impeach that testimony, defense
counsel played a tape of the preliminary hearing at which the same agent had testified only to seeing the package under
Bonnell's arm. The agent did not retract his trial testimony, and both he and the prosecutor explained the apparent
inconsistency by noting that the examination at the preliminary hearing had not focused upon whether anyone had seen
the package pass to Bonnell.

3

Seen. 2, Supra.

4

Trial transcript in Ohio v. Wood, No. 10657, Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Wood Tr.),
465-470.

5

Trial transcript in Ohio v. Doyle, No. 10656, Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Doyle Tr.),
504-507:
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) ... You are innocent?
"A. (By Doyle.) I am innocent. Yes Sir.
"Q. That's why you told the police department and Kenneth Beamer when they arrived
"(Continuing.) about your innocence?
"A. ... I didn't tell them about my innocence. No.
"Q. You said nothing at all about how you had been set up?
"Q. Did Mr. Wood?
"A. Not that I recall, Sir.
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6

7

8

9

10

11

"Q, As a matter of fact, if I recall your testimony correctly, you said instead of protesting your innocence, as you do today,
you said in response to a question of Mr. Beamer, 'I don't know what you are talking about.'
"A. I believe what I said, 'What's this all about?' If I remember, that's the only thing I said.
"A. I was questioning, you know, what it was about. That's what I didn't know. I knew that I was trying to buy, which was
wrong, but I didn't know what was going on. I didn't know that Bill Bonnell was trying to frame me, or what-have-you.
"Q. All right, But you didn't protest your innocence at that time?
"A. Not until I knew what was going on."
In addition, the court in both trials permitted the prosecutor, over more objections, to argue petitioners' post-arrest silence
to the jury. Closing Argument of Prosecutor 13-14, supplementing Wood Tr.; Doyle Tr. 515, 526.
Petitioners also claim constitutional error because each of them was cross-examined by the prosecutor as to why he
had not told the exculpatory story at the preliminary hearing or any other time prior to the trials. In addition, error of
constitutional dimension is asserted because each petitioner was cross-examined as to post-arrest, preliminary hearing,
and general pretrial silence when he testified as a Defense witness at the other petitioner's trial. These averments of error
present different considerations from those implicated by cross-examining petitioners as defendants as to their silence
after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of arrest. In view of our disposition of this case we find it unnecessary to
reach these additional issues.
We recognize, of course, that unless prosecutors are allowed wide leeway in the scope of impeachment crossexamination some defendants would be able to frustrate the truth-seeking function of a trial by presenting tailored
defenses insulated from effective challenge. See generally Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304,315, 20 S.Ct. 944,
948, 44 L.Ed. 1078 (1900).
The dissent by Mr. Justice STEVENS expresses the view that the giving of Miranda warnings does not lessen the
"probative value of (a defendant's) silence ...." Post, at 2246. But in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177, 95
S.Ct. 2133, 2137, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), we noted that silence at the time of arrest may be inherently ambiguous even
apart from the effect of Miranda warnings, for in a given case there may be several explanations for the silence that are
consistent with the existence of an exculpatory explanation. In Hale we exercised our supervisory powers over federal
courts. The instant cases, unlike Hale, come to us from a state court and thus provide no occasion for the exercise of our
supervisory powers. Nor is it necessary, in view of our holding above, to express an opinion on the probative value for
impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence. We note only that the Hale court considered silence at the time of arrest
likely to be ambiguous and thus of dubious probative value.
A somewhat analogous situation was presented in Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704
{1943). A defendant who testified at his trial was permitted by the trial judge to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination in response to certain questions on cross-examination. This Court assumed that it would not
have been error for the trial court to have denied the privilege in the circumstances, see Id., at 196, 63 S.Ct., at 553,
in which case a failure to answer would have been a proper basis for adverse inferences and a proper subject for
prosecutorial comment. But because the privilege had been granted, even if erroneously, "the requirements of fair trial"
made it error for the trial court to permit comment upon the defendant's silence. Ibid.
"An accused having the assurance of the court that his claim of privilege would be granted might well be entrapped if his
assertion of the privilege could then be used against him. His real choice might then be quite different from his apparent
one .... Elementary fairness requires that an accused should not be misled on that score." Id., at 197, 63 S.Ct., at 553.
Johnson was decided under this Court's supervisory powers over the federal courts. But the necessity for elementary
fairness is not unique to the federal criminal system. Cf. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-440, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 1265-1267,
3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959).
The dissenting opinion relies on the fact that petitioners in this case, when cross-examined about their silence, did not
offer reliance on Miranda warnings as a justification. But the error we perceive lies in the cross-examination on this
question, thereby implying an inconsistency that the jury might construe as evidence of guilt. After an arrested person is
formally advised by an officer of the law that he has a right to remain silent, the unfairness occurs when the prosecution,
in the presence of the jury, is allowed to undertake impeachment on the basis of what may be the exercise of that right.
It goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant
who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest. In
that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to challenge the
defendant's testimony as to his behavior following arrest. Cf. United States v. Fairchild, 505 F .2d 1378, 1383 (CA5 1975}.
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As the Court acknowledges, the "fact of post-arrest sileryce could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant
who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest." Ante,
at 2245 and n. 11 .
At Wood's trial, the arresting officer described the warning he gave petitioners:
"I told Mr. Wood and Mr. Doyle of the Miranda warning rights they had the right to remain silent, anything they said could
and would be used against them in a court of law, and they had the right to an attorney and didn't have to say anything
without an attorney being present and if they couldn't afford one, the court would appoint them one at the proper time."
Trial transcript in Ohio v. Wood, No. 10657, Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Wood Tr.), 126.
At the Doyle trial, he testified that he "gave them their rights" and gave them a " 'Miranda Warning.' " Trial transcript
in Ohio v. Doyle, No. 10656, Common Pleas Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio (hereafter Doyle Tr.), 269. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, requires the following warning:
"(The suspect) must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Id., at 4 79, 86 S. Ct., at ·1530.
3A J. Wigmore, Evidences 1042 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
Petitioner Doyle gave the following testimony on direct and cross-examination at his trial:
"Q. {By defense counsel.) And you were placed under arrest at that time?
"A. (By Doyle.) Yes. I asked what for and he said, 'For the sale of marijuana.' I told him, I didn't know what he was
talking about.
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) As a matter of fact, if I recall your testimony correctly, you said instead of protesting your
innocence, as you do today, you said in response to a question of Mr. Beamer, 'I don't know what you are talking about.'
"A. (By Doyle.) I believe what I said, 'What's this all about?' If I remember, that's the only thing I said.
"Q. You testified on direct.
"A. If I did, then I didn't understand.
"... I was questioning, you know, what it was about. That's what I didn't know. I knew that I was trying to buy, which was
wrong, but I didn't know what was going on. I didn't know that Bill Bonnell was trying to frame me, or what-have-you.
"Q. All right, But you didn't protest your innocence at that time?
"A. Not until I knew what was going on." Doyle Tr. 479, 506-507.
At Wood's trial, Doyle gave a somewhat different explanation of his silence at the time of arrest:
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) Why didn't (Wood) tell (the police officers) about Mr. Bonnell?
"A. (By Doyle.) Because we didn't know what was going on and wanted to find out.
"Q. So he hid the money under the mat?
"A. The police officers said they stopped us for a red light. I wanted to get my hands on Bill Bonnell.
"Q. It wasn't because you were guilty, was it?
"A. Because I wanted to get my hands on Bill Bonnell because I suspected he was trying ...
"Q. Why didn't you tell the police that Bill Bonnell just set you up?
"A. Because I would rather have my own hands on him.
"Q. When Mr. Beamer arrived?
"A.•.. (W)hen Mr. Beamer got there I said to Mr. Beamer what the hell is all this about and he said you are under arrest
for the suspicion of selling marijuana and I said you got to be crazy. I was pretty upset.
"Q. So on the night of April 29 you felt that you were being framed like you are being framed today?
"A. I was so confused that night, the night of the arrest.
"Q. How about Mr. Wood?
"A. Mr. Wood didn't know what was going on.
"Q .... Are you as mad and upset today as you were that night?
"A. I can't answer that question.
"Q. Did you feel the same way about what happened to you?
"A. That night I felt like I couldn't believe what was happening.
"Q. You didn't like being framed?
"A. That is right. I didn't like some one putting me in a spot like that.
"Q. Didn't it occur to you to try to protect yourself?
"A. Yes, at this time I felt like I wasn't talking to nobody but John James who was the attorney at that time.
"Q. But you felt ...
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"A. The man walked up and didn't ask me anything.
"Q. You didn't talk to a soul about how rotten it was because you were framed?
"A. I will answer the question, sir, the best I can. I didn't know what to say. I was stunned about what was going on and
I was asked questions and I answered the questions as simply as I could because I didn't have nobody there to help
me answer the questions.
"Q. Wouldn't that have been a marvelous time to protest your innocence?

"A. I don't know if it would or not.
"Q. Do you remember having a conversation with Kenneth Beamer?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What was said?
"A. Kenneth Beamer said I want to know where you stash where your hide out is, where you are keeping the dope and I
said I don't know what you are talking about. I believe the question was asked in front of you.
"Q. Where did this conversation take place?

"A. Took place during the search.
"Q. So any way you didn't tell anyone how angry you were that night?
"A. I was very angry.
"Q. But you didn't tell anyone?
"A. That is right. If I started I don't know where I would have stopped. I was upset." Wood Tr. 424-430.
Petitioner Wood testified on cross-examination at his trial as follows:
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) Jefferson Doyle said he was confused, angry and upset (at the time of the arrest). Were you
confused, angry and upset?
"A. (By Wood.) Upset and confused.
"Q. Why were you upset?
"A. Because I didn't know what was going on most of the time.
"Q. Why would you be upset? Because you found $1300 in your back seat?
"A. Mainly because the person that was in the car Jeff (Doyle} was upset confused and angry and ...
"Q. What has that to do with you?
"A. I am in the car. That is what it has to do with me.
"Q. You are innocent?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Of anything?
"A. I don't know about anything.
"Q. This particular incident, you were placed under arrest, weren't you?
"A. Yes, innocent of this incident.
"Q. Innocent of the entire transaction?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Or even any knowledge of the entire transaction?
"A. Up to a point, sir.
"Q. Mr. Wood, if that is all you had to do with this and you are innocent, when Mr. Beamer arrived on the scene why

5

6

7

didn't you tell him?
"A. Mr. Cunningham, in the last eight months to a year there has been so many implications, etc. in the paper and law
enfo.rcement that are setting people up and busting them for narcotics and stuff." Wood Tr. 467-469.
See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-207, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 1203-1204, 12 L.Ed.2d 246; 8J. Wigmore, Evidence
s 2270, pp. 416-417 (McNaughton rev. 1961); cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961,967, 22
L.Ed.2d 176. Cross-examination and comment upon a witness' prior silence does not raise any inference prejudicial to
the defendant, and, indeed, does not even raise any inference that the defendant remained silent.
"In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege
when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute
or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation. Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106
(1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964}; Comment, 31 U.Chi.L.Rev. 556 (1964);
Developments in the Law Confessions, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 935, 1041-1044 (1966). See also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S.
532,562, 18 S.Ct. 183, 194, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897)." 384 U.S., at 468 n. 37, 86 S.Ct., at 1625.
See n. 4 1 supra.
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As the Court recently recognized in a most carefully considered opinion, an adversary system can maintain neither the
reality nor the appearance of efficacy without the assurance that its judgments rest upon a complete illumination of a case
rather than upon "a partial or speculative presentation of the facts." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709, 94 S.Ct.
3090, 3108, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039. The necessity of insuring a complete presentation of all relevant evidence has led to the
rule that a criminal defendant who voluntarily foregoes his privilege not to testify, and presents exculpatory or mitigating
evidence, thereby subjects himself to relevant cross-examination without the right to reclaim Fifth Amendment protection
on a selective basis. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304,315, 20 S.Ct. 944,948, 44 L.Ed. 1078.
"If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like
that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. '{H)e
has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without layi~g himself open to a cross-examination
upon those facts.'" Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-155, 78 S.Ct. 622, 626, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (citation omitted).
One need not impute perjury to an entire class to acknowledge that a testifying defendant has more to gain and less
to lose than an ordinary witness from fabrications upon the witness stand. Cf. Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301,
304-311, 15 S.Ct. 610, 611-613, 39 L.Ed. 709; Taylorv. United States, 390 F.2d 278, 284-285 (CAS 1968) (Blackmun, J.).
As the Court notes today: "Unless prosecutors are allowed wide leeway in the scope of impeachment cross-examination
some defendants would be able to frustrate the truth-seeking function of a trial by presenting tailored defenses insulated
from effective challenge." Ante, at 2244 n. 7. In recognition of this fact, this Court has allowed evidence to be used for
impeachment purposes that would be inadmissible as evidence of guilt. In Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74
S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503, evidence of narcotics unlawfully seized in connection with an aborted earlier case against a
defendant was held admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant's testimony that he never had been
associated with narcotics, although such evidence clearly was inadmissible for any purpose in the prosecution's case
in chief. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, the Court held admissible for the purpose
of impeaching a defendant's testimony certain partially inconsistent post-arrest statements which, although voluntary,
were unavailable for the prosecution's case because they had been given by the defendant without benefit of Miranda
warnings. And last Term, in a decision closely analogous to Harris, the Court held admissible for impeachment purposes
post-arrest statements of a defendant made after he had received Miranda warnings and exercised his right to request
a lawyer, but before he had been furnished with counsel as Miranda requires in such circumstances. Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570.
In each of these cases involving impeachment cross-examination, the need to insure the integrity of the trial by the
"traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process," Harris v. New York supra, 401 U.S., at 225, 91 S.Ct., at 645,
was deemed to outweigh the policies underlying the relevant exclusionary rules.
Petitioner Doyle was cross-examined as follows at his trial:
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) All right. Do you remember the Preliminary Hearing in this case?
"A. (By Doyle.) Yes Sir. I remember it.
"Q. And that was prior to your indictment for this offense, was it not?
"A. Yes sir. I believe, Yes Sir, it was before I was indicted.
"Q. Arraignment. Is that what you mean?
"A. Yes. The next day after the arrest.
"Q. Yes, when evidence was presented and you had the opportunity to hear the testimony of the witnesses against you.
Remember that?
"A. Yes Sir.
"Q. Mr. Bonnell testified; Captain Griffin testified; Deputy-Chief Deputy White testified?
"A. Yes Sir.
"Q. Kenneth Beamer testified?
"A. Yes Sir.
"Q. You were there, weren't you?
"A. Yes Sir.
"Q. And your lawyer was there, Mr. James?
"A. Yes Sir.
"Q. Tape recording was made of the transcript?
"A. Yes Sir.
"Q. Did you protest your innocence at that proceeding?
"A. I didn't everything that was done with that was done with my attorney. My attorney did it.
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"Q. All right. The first time that you gave this version of the fact was in the trial of Richard Wood, was it not?

"A. Yes Sir. It was the first time I was asked.
"Q, All the time, you being innocent?

"A. Yes Sir." Doyle Tr. 507-508.
Petitioner Wood was subjected to similar cross-examination at his trial:
"Q. (By the prosecutor.) As a matter of fact you never told anyone that you had been set up until today?
"A. (By Wood.) Yes, I believe I did, sir.
"Q. I assume you discussed it with your lawyer?
"A. Yes, I discussed it with my lawyer.
"Q. And you heard the testimony and witnesses against you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And were you aware Mr. James was able to obtain a tape transcript of the proceedings?
"A. Yes.
"Q, And you no doubt listed to those?

"A. Parts and portions of them some of it.
"Q. But you never communicated your innocence?
"A. I believe I did one time to Mr. Beamer.
"Q. When might that have been?

"A. When in the jail house.
"Q. So you protested your innocence?
"A. In a little room. I believe he asked us how do you let people get away with people setting up friends like this. He said
Bill Bonnell is not your friend and I said no, but I figured he was a good enough acquaintance he would do that.
"Q, Where was that?
"A. Little room there.
"Q, Every been there before?

"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. When?
"Q. Did you see me there?

"A. I didn't know who you were at the time. I believe you were in and out of there.
"Q. You didn't say anything to me, did you?

1O

11

"A. No, I didn't know who you were then." Wood Tr. 470-472.
Under Ohio law, the preliminary hearing determines only whether the defendant should be held for trial. The prosecution
need establish, at most, that a crime has been committed and that there is "probable and reasonable cause" to hold the
defendant for trial, and the court need only find "substantial credible evidence" of the charge against the defendant. Ohio
Rev.Code Ann. ss 2937.12, 2937.13 (Supp.1973). Indeed, if a defendant has been indicted, no hearing need be held.
State v. Morris, 42 Ohio St.2d 307,326,329 N.E.2d 85, 97 (1975). Defense counsel thus will have no incentive to divulge
the defendant's case at the preliminary hearing if the prosecution has presented substantial evidence of guilt. Since that
was the case here, no significant impeaching inference may be drawn from petitioners' silence at that proceeding.
Petitioners' failure to refer to the "frame" at any time between arrest and trial is somewhat more probative; for if the
"frame" story were true, one would have expected counsel to try to persuade the prosecution to dismiss the charges
in advance of trial.
Raffel was the last decision of this Court to address the constitutionality of admitting evidence of a defendant's prior
silence to impeach his testimony upon direct examination. Raffel had been charged with conspiracy to violate the National
Prohibition Act. An agent testified at his first trial that he had admitted ownership of a drinking place: Raffel did not take
the stand. The trial ended in a hung jury, and upon retrial, the agent testified as before. Raffel elected to testify and
denied making the statement, but he was cross-examined on his failure to testify in the first trial. This Court held that
the evidence was admissible because Raffel had completely waived the privilege against self-incrimination by deciding
to testify. 271 U.S., at 499, 46 S.Ct., at 568.
Subsequent cases, decided in the exercise of this Court's supervisory powers, have diminished the force of Raffel in
the federal courts. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99; Stewart v. United States, 366
U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 941, 6 L.Ed.2d 84; Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931. All three
of these cases held that the defendant's prior silence or prior claim of the privilege was inadmissible for purposes of
impeachment; all three distinguished Raffel on the ground that the Court there assumed that the defendant's prior silence
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was significantly inconsistent with his testimony on direct examination. Hale, supra, 422 U.S., at 175-176, 95 S.Ct., at
2136-2137; Stewart, supra, 366 U.S., at 5-7, 81 S.Ct., at 943-944; Grunewald, supra, 353 U.S., at 418-424, 77 S.Ct., at
981-984. Two of the three cases relied upon the need to protect the defendant's exercise of the privilege against selfincrimination from unwarranted inferences of guilt, a rationale that is not easily reconciled with the reasoning in Raffel
that the decision to testify constitutes a complete waiver of the protection afforded by the privilege. Compare Hale, supra,
422 U.S., t 180, 95 S.Ct., at 2138 and n. 7, and Grunewald, supra, 353 U.S., at 423-424, 77 S.Ct., at 983-984, with Raffel,
271 U.S., at 499, 46 S.Ct., at 568.

12

At Doyle's trial, the prosecutor made the following arguments to the jury:
"Diffuse what the true facts are; obscure the facts and prosecute the prosecution.
"A typical and classic defense, but keep in mind, when you are considering the testimony of the law enforcement officers
involved, that not until, Ladies and Gentlemen, not until the trial of this case and prior to this case, the trial of Richard
Wood's case, that anybody connected with the prosecution in this case had any idea what stories would be told by
Jefferson Doyle and Richard Wood. Not the foggiest idea. Both of them told you on the witness stand that neither one
of them said a word to the law enforcement officials on the scene
"{continuing) on the scene at the point of their arrest, at the Preliminary Hearing before Indictment in this case. Not a
word that they were innocent; that this was their position; that somehow, they had been 'set-up.'
"So, when you evaluate the testimony of the Law Enforcement Officials, consider
"{continuing) what they had to deal with on the night in question and the months subsequent to that.
"Then they decide that they have been 'had' somehow. They have been framed.
"Now, remember, this fits with the facts as observed by the law enforcement officers except the basic, crucial facts.
Somehow, they have been framed. So, if you believe this, Ladies and Gentlemen, they take off, chase Bill Bonnell around
to give his money back to him or ask him what he did to them, yet they don't bother to tell the Law Enforcement Officers.
"It is unbelievable. I think, when you go to the Jury Room, Ladies and Gentlemen, you are going to decide what really
happened.
"We have the Fifth Amendment. I agree with it. It is fundamental to our sense and system of fairness, but if you are
innocent
"(continuing) if you are innocent, Ladies and Gentlemen, if you have been framed, if you have been set-on, etc. etc. etc.,
as we heard in Court these last days, you don't say, when the law enforcement officer says, 'You are under arrest,' you
don't say, 'I don't know what you are talking about.' You tell the truth. You tell them what happened and you go from
there. You don't say, 'I don't know what you are talking about.' and demand to see your lawyer and refuse to permit a
search of your vehicle, forcing the law enforcement agents to get a search warrant.
"If you're innocent, you just don't do it." Doyle Tr. 515-516, 519, 526.
At Wood's trial, he made similar arguments:
"The defense in this case was very careful to make no statements at all until they had the benefit of hearing all the
evidence against them and had time to ascertain what they would admit and what they would deny and how they could
fit their version of the story with the state's case. During none of this time did we ever hear any business about a set
up or frame or anything else. All right.
"Yes, it is the law of our land, and rightfully so, ladies and gentlemen, that nobody must be compelled to incriminate
themselves. It is the 5th Amendment. No one can be forced to give testimony against themselves where criminal action
charges are pending. It is a very fundamental right and I am glad we have it.
"The idea was nobody can convict himself out of his own mouth and it grew out of the days when they used to whip
and beat and extract statements from the defendants and get them to convict themselves out of their own mouth, and
I am glad we have that right.
"But ladies and gentlemen, there is one statement I am going to make. If you are innocent, if you are innocent, if you have
been framed, if you have been set up as claimed in this case, when do you tell it? When do you tell the policemen that?
"Think about it. After months after various proceedings and for the first time? I am not going to say any more about that
but I want you to think about it." Closing Argument of the Prosecutor 12-14, supplementing Wood Tr.

13

Petitioner Doyle also argues that he was erroneously cross-examined at his trial on his failure to consent to a search
of the car he was driving ~t the time of the arrest. Petitioner Wood appears to raise the similar claim that testimony of
other witnesses that he failed to consent to a search of the car was erroneously admitted at his trial. The parties have
not argued these issues separately from the questions whether prior silence in various circumstances may be admitted
to impeach a defendant or a defense witness. It is apparent, however, that these questions implicate Fourth Amendment
issues that merit independent examination. Accordingly, like the Court, I do not address them.
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100 S.Ct. 2180
Supreme Court of the United States
Charles ANDERSON

v.
Glenn CHARLES.

No. 79-1377.

I
Decided June 16, 1980.

I
Rehearing Denied Aug.

11,

1980.

I

Circuit Court of Washtenaw County, Mich., the State
presented circumstantial evidence linking the respondent
with the crime. The respondent was found with Ziefle's car
and some of his other personal property. The respondent
also owned clothing like that worn by the man last
seen with the victim, and he boasted to witnesses that
he had killed a man and stolen *405 his car. Police
Detective Robert LeVanseler testified that he interviewed
the respondent shortly after his arrest. After giving the
respondent Miranda warnings, LeVanseler asked him
about the stolen automobile. According to LeVanseler,
the respondent said that he stole the car in Ann Arbor
from the vicinity of Washtenaw and Hill Streets, about
two miles from the local bus station.

See 448 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 27.
A petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, and petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit, 610 F.2d 417. reversed, and certiorari was
granted. The Supreme Court held that: (1) Doyle bars
the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained
after receipt of governmental assurances, but it does not
apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior
inconsistent statements; such questioning makes no unfair
use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks
after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to
remain silent; as to the subject matter of the statements,
defend ant has not remained silent at all, and (2) each
of two inconsistent descriptions of events may be said
to involve "silence" insofar as it omits facts included in
the other version, but Doyle does not require any such
formalistic understanding of "silence."

The respondent testified in his own behalf. On direct
examination, he stated that he took Ziefle's unattended
automobile from the parking lot of Kelly's Tire Co. in
Ann Arbor. On cross-examination, the following colloquy
occurred:
"Q. Now, this Kelly's Tire Company, that's right next to
the bus station, isn1t it?
**2181 ''A. That's correct.

"Q. And, the bus station and Kelly's Tire are right next to
the Washtenaw County Jail are they not?
"A. They are.

"Q. And, when you're standing in the Washtenaw County
Jail looking out the window you can look right out and
see the bus station and Kelly's Tire, can you not?

Reversed.

"A. That's correct.

Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Marshall
joined, dissented and would affirm for the reasons stated
in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

"Q. So, you've had plenty of opportunity from-well, first
you spent some time in the Washtenaw County Jail,
haven't you?
"A. Quite a bit.

Opinion
*404 **2180 PER CURIAM.
Respondent Glenn Charles was arrested in Grand Rapids,
Mich., while driving a stolen car. The car belonged to
Theodore Ziefle, who had been strangled to death in his
Ann Arbor home less than a week earlier. The respondent
was charged with first-degree murder. At his trial in the

WESTLAW
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"Q. And, you have had plenty of opportunity to look out
that window and see the bus station and Kelly's Tire?
"A. That's right.

"Q. And, you've seen cars being parked there, isn't that
right?
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.. A. That's correct.

"Q. Is this where you got the idea to come up with the story
that you took a car from that location?
*406 "A. No. the reason I came up with that is because
it's the truth.

"Q. It's the truth?
"A. That's right.
"Q. Don't you think it's rather odd that if it were the truth
that you didn't come forward and tell anybody at the time
you were arrested, where you got that car?

The jury convicted the respondent of first-degree murder.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, People v.
Charles, 58 Mich.App. 371,227 N.W.2d 348 (1975), and
the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, 397
Mich. 815 (1976). The respondent then sought a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan. The District Court withheld
the writ, but a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit *407 reversed. The Court of Appeals
held that "the prosecutor's questions about [respondent's]
post-arrest failure to tell officers the same story he told
the jury violated due process" under the rule of Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976).
610 F.2d 417,422 (6 Cir. 1979). 1 The prison warden now
petitions for a writ of certiorari. We grant the petition,
grant the respondent leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

"A. No, I don't.
"Q. You don't think that's odd?
"A. I wasn't charged with auto theft, I was charged with
murder.

"Q. Didn't you think at the time you were arrested that
possibly the car would have something to do with the
charge of murder?
"A. When I tried to talk to my attorney they wouldn't let
me see him and after that he just said to keep quiet.

"Q. This is a rather recent fabrication of yours isn't [sic]

it not?
"A. No it isn't.

"Q. Well, you told Detective LeVanseler back when you
were first arrested, you stole the car back on Washtenaw
and Hill Street?
"A. Never spoke with Detective LeVanseler.

"Q. Never did?
"A. Right, except when Detective Hall and Price were
there and then it was on tape." Trial Transcript 302-304.

In Doyle, we held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits impeachment on the
basis of a defendant's **2182 silence following Miranda
warnings. The case involved two defendants who made
no postarrest statements about their involvement in the
crime. 2 Each testified at trial that he had been framed. On
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendants
why they had not told the frameup story to the police
upon arrest. We concluded that such impeachment was
fundamentally unfair because Miranda warnings inform
~ person of his right to remain silent and *408 assure
him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used
against him. 426 U.S., at 618-619, 96 S.Ct., at 2245; see
.Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239-240, 100 S.Ct. 2124,
2129-2130, 65 L.Ed.2d 86.
[1)
Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant
of silence maintained after receipt of governmental
assurances. But Doyle does not apply to crossexamination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent
statements. Such questioning makes no unfair use of
silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after
receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to
remain silent. As to the subject matter of his statements,
the defendant has not remained silent at all. See United
States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 354-356 (CA3) (en bane),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2889, 61 L.Ed.2d 315
(1979); United S~tates v. Mireles, 570 F.2d 1287, 1291-1293
(CAS 1978); United States ,,. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501,
503-504 (CAl 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067, 98 S.Ct.
1245, 55 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978).

WESTU>.W @20·17 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

2

Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980)
100 S.Ct. 2180 1 65 L.Ed.2d 222

In this case, the Court of Appeals recognized that the
respondent could be questioned about prior statements
inconsistent with his trial testimony. The court therefore
approved the "lat.ter portion of the above quoted crossexamination .... " 610 F.2d. at 421. But the Court of
Appeals found. that "the earlier portion of the exchange"
concerned the "separate issu[et of the respondent's
"failure to tell arresting officers· the same story he told
the jury." Ibid In the court's view, these questions were
unconstitutional inquiries about postarrest silence. Thus,
the Court of Appeals divided the cross-examination into
two parts. It then applied Doyle to bar questions that
concerned the respondent's failure to tell the police the
story he recounted at trial.
We do not believe that the cross-examination in this case
can be bifurcated so neatly. The quoted colloquy, taken as
a whole, does "not refe[r] to the [respondent's] exercise of
his right to remain silent; rather [it asks] the [respondent]
why, if [his trial testimony] were true, he didn't tell the
officer that he stole the decedent's car from the tire store
parking lot instead of telling him that he took it from
the *409 street." 58 Mich.App., at 381, 227 N.W.2d, at
354. Any ambiguity in the prosecutor's initial questioning
was quickly resolved by explicit reference to Detective

LeVanseler's testimony, which the jury had heard only a
few hours before. The questions were not designed to draw
meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a
prior inconsistent statement.
(2] We conclude that Doyle does not apply to the facts of
this case. Each of two inconsistent descriptions of events
may be said to involve "silence" insofar as it omits facts
included in the other version. But Doyle does not require
any such formalistic understanding of "silence," and we
find no reason to adopt such a view in this case.
**2183 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice
MARSHALL joins, dissents and would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated
in its opinion.
All Citations

447 U.S. 404, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 222

Footnotes

1

2

Neither the Court of Appeals nor the state courts addressed the question whether Doyle should be applied retroactively.
Although the petitioner now claims that Doyle should be limited to prospective application, see Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), there is no indication that this claim was raised in the courts below.
Moreover, the respondent asserts that Doyle's prohibition against use of postarrest silence was the law of the Sixth Circuit
and of the State of Michigan long before his arrest. In view of our disposition of the merits of this controversy, we express
no view on the retroactivity question.
One defendant said nothing at all. The other asked arresting officers, "What's this all about?" 426 U.S., at 615, n. 5, 96
S.Ct., at 2243. When told the reason for his arrest, he exclaimed "you got to be crazy," or "I don't know what you are
talking about." Id.• at 622-623, n. 4, 96 S.Ct., at 2246-2247 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Both the Court and the dissent
in Doyle analyzed the due process question as if both defendants had remained silent. The iss·ue was said to involve
cross-examination of a person who "does remain silent" after police inform him that he is legally entitled to do so. Id.,
at 620, 96 S.Ct., at 2245 (STEVENS, J., dissenting): see id., at 616-619, 96 S.Ct., at 2244-2245; id.• at 621 1 622, 626,
96 S.Ct., at 2246, 2247, 2248 (STEVENS, J., dissenting}. In any event, neither the inquiry nor the exclamation quoted
above contradicted the defendant's later trial testimony.

End of Document

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

WESTLAW ~;) 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

3

Addendum C

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AmendmentV

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

Addendum D

APPEARANCES
(ti)

For the Plaintiff:

GEORGE F. VO-DUC
Deputy District Attorney

For the Defendant:

SCOTT A. WILSON
Attorney at Law
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THE COURT:

2

I'm sorry,

3

You may be seated.
I need to have you be sworn in.

you'd just raise your right hand.

Okay.

JAMES C. MCCALLIE

4
5

having been first duly sworn, testified

6

upon his oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

7
8

If

BY MR. WILSON:

9

Q

Will you state your name please?

10

A

James c. Mccallie.

11

THE COURT:

12

THE WITNESS:

Can I get you to approach the mike?
James C. McCallie.

13

Q

(BY MR. WILSON) And the people know you as Chris?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Chris,

16

A

Well, not at the moment.

17

Q

Were you empioyed as a truck driver?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And for how long?

20

A

Off and on the last 10 years.

21

Q

I'd like for you to refer back in your memory to

I want you to - are you employed?

22

the events of March the 30 th and 3pt of 2013.

23

driving a truck on March 30 th ?

24
25

A

Were you

Yes.
MR. WILSON:

May I approach the witness, Your
31

1

Honor?

2
3

THE COURT:
Q

You may.

(BY MR. WILSON)

I'm going to show you what's been

4

marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 14.

5

log and some receipts.

6

those.

It says driver's daily

Now I'd like for you to look at

7

MR. VO-DUC:

State would stipulate to publish.

8

MR. WILSON:

Okay.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

10

Q

(BY MR. WILSON)

What is the daily log?

11

A

That's my driver's log book.

I have a DOT laws I

12

have to follow to show my every movement in a truck whether

13

stopping for fuel or food or sleeping.
C\

~

14

Q

And does that so depict that -

15

A

That is for the 30 th and 31 st •

16

Q

And what were you doing on the 30 th ?

17

A

On the 30 th I was driving from Wolcott, Iowa and I

18

had stopped in Sydney, Nebraska.

19

Q

Were you driving alone?

20

A

No,

21

Q

And what does that mean?

22

A

That means we drive in teams.

I had a team driver.

I drive for 11 hours

23

and he drives for 11 hours and when I'm training a driver I

24

don't get much sleep when we're pulling doubles and triples

25

when I'm training someone that hasn't driven, doubles and
32

----1

triples.

2
3

·-------·····--···-·-~-------

Q

Is this - the person that you had on was he an

experienced driver?

4

A

He was an inexperienced driver.

5

Q

So on the 30 th who was actually driving?

6

A

I started at l:1s· in the morning and I drove until

7

12:15 that afternoon.

8

Q

And then what?

9

A

I moved up into the sleeper and kept the curtains

10

open to watch the new driver to try to train him.

11

hear the rumble strips or anything you can't sleep and with

12

another driver, my life is in his hands while I'm driving

13

(sic).

14

Q

And so he drove from when to when?

15

A

From Sydney, Nebraska all the way back into Salt

Q

And what time does it show that you arrived in Salt

A

I was still in the sleeper at the time so we

16

19

20
21
22
23

24
25

So I have a hard time sleeping with another driver.

Lake.

17
18

If you

Lake?

arrived in Salt Lake between 8:30 and 9:00.
Q

Okay. And you had some,

are attached there.
A

there's some receipts that

What are those receipts?

Just my normal receipts I save on the road for CPA,

for tax purposes.
Q

Okay.

All of them?
33
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1

A

All of them.

2

Q

Would you look at all of them?

3

A

Except for my bank receipt.

4

Q

And what is that?

5

A

That's where I stop at the bank and pulled out $200

6

so I could pay rent that night to Tim and Jody Krogh.

7

Q

What is the time on the ATM receipt?

8

A

On the Chase receipt it's 10:00 p.m. on the 30 th •

9

Q

So I guess - I

10

here.

11

9:00 on the 30 th ;

forgot to staple one of these on

I'm going to staple this again.

So you got in around

is that right?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

And then you had to do some things there and then

14

you went to - what did you do after you came in?

15

A

Well,

at 9:00 when we arrived I helped my team

16

driver, we had to disconnect a set of doubles and put them to

17

the doors to be unloaded.

18

we got back in to do the post trip and unload both -

19

put the trailers through the doors to be unloaded.·

So it took us about an hour after
well,

20

Q

And then where did you go?

21

A

I got the rest - we went back to Penske, dropped

22

the truck off 'cause we were in a rental truck and I got all

23

of my stuff out of the truck for being on the road for seven

24

to ten days I had my TV, my bedding and my clothes and my

25

DVDs.

So I had to unload that truck and put all my stuff in
34
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1
'ljp

my pickup truck to drive home.

2

Q

Where did you go then?

3

A

On the way home I stopped at 7-Eleven and picked up

4

any 18-pack of beer and I stopped at Chase Bank to pick up

5

the.$200.
Q

6
7

I notice that there's not a receipt for the

beer, why is there not a receipt for the beer?

8

9

Okay,

A

Sometimes I

do and sometimes I don't.

I

was trying

to get home and I do it all through my card.

10

Q

I mean, could you deduct the beer from your taxes?

11

A

Well, my CPA isn't that good.

12

Q

So after you pick up the beer, how much beer did

13

you pick up?

14

A

An 18-pack.

15

Q

All right.

16

A

Went to the bank and picked up $200.

And you then went to the bank.

I was going to

17

pay rent the next morning and I was going golfing the next

18

morning.

19

Q

Okay.

20

A

A girl named Tammy.

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

No,

24

Q

So then where do you go?

25

A

I head home and the bank is probably not even five

23

And who were you going to go golfing with?

Were you going golfing with-Mr. Pearce?

I've never seen Mr. Pearce golf before in my

life.

35

1

minutes from my house where I lived at Tim and Jody's.

2

Q

Now,

3

A

I was renting a room at Tim and Jody's.

4

Q

Okay. And about how often were you in this room?

5

A

Depending on the run I had a long run and a short

you were renting what at Tim and Jody's?

So some days I would be home maybe eight days out of

6

run.

7

the month and then on my long runs I would be home for maybe

8

a day and a half, 34 hours.

9

Q

But you were paying rent on this single room at Tim

10

and Jody's?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

For those limited amount of time that you were -

13

A

The longest I was maybe there eight to ten days out

14

15

16
17
18
19

21

of the month.
Q

Okay.

So what happened when you got home?

Who was

up, what was happening?
A

Well, when I pulled in I noticed Mr. Pearce's car

was there and Q

Did you know him?

A

I'd met him a few times at that particular

residence.

I hadn't known him all that well.

22

Q

Were you all friends?

23

A

Kind of.

We were becoming friends.

Like I

said,

24

I'm not there that often and I'd met him a few times at Tim

25

and Jody's house where I was residing.
t!:,

lalW
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1

Q

All right.

Then what happened?

2

A

I walked to the door, I actually got my parking

3

space which I was surprised because every time some stays

4

there they park in my parking space.

5

and I don't want things to happen to it and.when I walked to

6

the door John was there and had been drinking and, you know,

7

explained to me that he didn't park in my parking space and

8

was happy about it.

I've got a nice truck

Works for me.

9

Q

So did you see Tim and Jody?

10

A

No, their door was closed and they were asleep.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

When I walked through the door I still had my truck

So what happened then?

13

bag with me and the 18-pack of beer that I set down next to

14

the refrigerator. There's a picture of the refrigerator in

15

one of those - and took my log book out with my clipboard and

16

set it on the table and John was, Have a drink with me.

17

was like let me put my stuff down,

18

here in a second.

I

I'll have a drink with you

19

Q

Okay.

20

A

So I take my truck bag and go into my room,

drop my

21

truck bag off and, you know, sitting there kind of relaxing,

22

I finally made it home.

23

Hey, you going to have a drink with me?

24

I'll be out there in a minute,

25

and finish my logs off and I'll be out there in a second.

And John walks right in my room,
I was like,

yeah,

I've got to do my paperwork
So
37
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1

I went out there put my 18-pack in the refrigerator on the

2

bottom shelf, grabbed a beer and sat down at the table with

3

him and was looking through my notes to make sure my log book

4

was correct.

5

Q

Okay.

6

A

And we're talking back and forth and he was asking

7

me about my gun 'cause he'd known I had a gun and I

talked

8

about it before.

9

front of Tim and Jody to see it and I didn't know him well

He's asked probably three or four times in

10

enough so I always told him it was in the pawn shop,

11

have it here.

12

Q

Okay, then what?

13

A

We talked about guns.

He had a 308 and a

I don't

.30-06

14

and I talked about AR-lSs and mini 14s and M-16s, all

15

military weapons and we're talking about that for half hour,

16

45 minutes, maybe longer,

17

beers in me.

18

Q

Okay,

19

A

I got up to go -

and at this time I probably had two

then what happened?

I told him,

I'm going to go

20

golfing - he was asking if he could see the gun. It's like,

21

yeah,

22

into my room.

23

latched but it was shut -

I have the weapon here,

I went

I will show it to you.

I hadn't closed the door all the way,

i t wasn't

24

Q

Can you lock your room?

25

A

No, Tim and Jody would not allow me to put a

lock
38

1

on my door.

2

Q

Okay, go ahead.

3

A

So I go to the dresser to pull the gun out and I

4

set it on the bed and in walks John,

5

here?

It's like ye~h,

6

Q

Okay.

7

A

So I

Hey, you corning back out

I'll be out in a second.

unloaded the weapon 'cause I

keep a loaded

8

weapon in the house with me and I'm starting to unload it and

9

in he walks again,

like the third time he walked in my room

10

without knocking or anything.

It's like, Look,

I told you,

11

I ' l l be out there in a minute.

12

unload the weapon and I have the cylinder open and I'm

13

holding it by the open cylinder and I take the gun back out

14

and show it to him and he's like this is a nice gun,

15

silver, and we continue talking about guns.

So he goes back out there, I

it's

16

Q

All right.

17

A

I said, you've seen it enough and I go to put it

18

away.

I put the weapon -

19

in walks John again.

20

the feeling that he's trying to find out where I'm putting

21

the weapon so he can steal it.

Now,

I'm starting to load the weapon and
at this point in time I'm getting

That was my impression.

22

Q

Right.

23

A

Finally got him out of the room, he comes in - he

24

25

came in my room five or six different times that night.

a·

Okay.

So what did you do with the gun?

39
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1
2
3

4
5

A

pillow.
Q

r
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I ended up reloading the gun and I put it under my
I put the case up on Why did you do that?

Why did you put it under your

pillow?
A

Because I didn't have enough time to put it away,

6

he kept coming into my room and I didn't want him to know

7

where I was putting my weapon.

r:·,

'llllil

8

Q

Okay, all right.

Then what did you do?

9

A

I came back out and we sat and talked a little bit

10

more, started playing a little bit of guitar and he's asking

11

me, do a shot with me, do a shot with me.

12

alcohol once a year on my birthday.

13

alcohol and everybody that knows me, knows this.

I drink hard

I don't drink hard

14

Q

So what do you drink?

15

A

I drink beer.

16

Q

So did you take a shot of whiskey?

17

A

Well, he was adamant about me doing a shot with him

I'm a beer drinker.

18

so I took the bottle and put it to my lips as if I was taking

19

a shot.

20

continued drinking my beer.

I set the bottle back down.

Ummm, that's great and

21

Q

Okay.

At what point does Tim or Jody come in?

22

A

Well, we're still talking about weapons back and

23

forth and Tim had come out and he has a.cyst and I remember

24

this directly because he sat down in a chair across from me

25

and he was kind of ginger when he sat down and I said,

Your
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Oh yeah,

it's like, You guys are being a little bit

loud out here and I'm pointing at John going, Yeah,

I

know.

4

Q

It was John - had John continued to drink?

5

A

Oh yes.

6

Q

And what was he drinking?

7

A

He was drinking R&R Whiskey.

8

Q

Okay, all right.

9

A

Said, Sure, you know, not a problem, we'll keep it

So what happened after that?

10

down.

11

to the kitchen, I grabbed two beers out of the refrigerator,

12

went to my room and you know, got my night clothes on,

13

black pair of shorts that have an elastic waistband.

14

two beers in the shower with me and I guess it's a

15

construction worker,

it's like sitting in a Jacuzzi with a

16

cold beer, you know,

I'm just sitting there relaxing with a

17

beer in the shower with me.

18

didn't open it.

19

can and the full can back into my room because I save

20

aluminum cans.

21
22

I was like I'm going to go take a shower.

Q

went

a
I took

The other beer got warm so I

Got done with my shower and took the empty

I'm going to show you what has been marked as

Exhibit No. 9 and ask if you recognize that.

23

A

Yes, it's a picture of my bedroom.

24

Q

Okay, and it's been introduced.

25

So I

And it looks like

there's some beer cans on the dresser and on - is that a
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refrigerator?

2

A

No, that's my night stand.

3

Q

Okay. And on the night stand; is that right?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And how many of those beers did you consume and how

6

many were unopened?

7

A

There is two full unopened ones on the night stand.

8

Q

Two unopened ones?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And then it looks like there's,

11

A

I believe so, four,

12

Q

And is that what you consumed?

13

A

Yes,

14

Q

All right, go ahead.

15

16

is it four on the -

yes.

I think so.
What - you went to take a

shower.
A

I took my shower and I came back out into room,

17

hung my towel up and I was on my bed putting on my shorts, my

18

black shorts.

19

uAre you going to come back out here?"

In comes John again through a closed door.

"Yeah, I ' l l be out there in a minute."

20

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

"Are you going to do another shot with me?"

23

"Sure, I'll be out there in a minute."

So I

go

24

back out there and we're, you know, talking back and forth,

25

I'm sitting on one side of the table playing guitar.

Tim
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1

comes out and we're being a little bit loud.

2

my guitar down and John is normally loud because Tim is about

3

half deaf anyway and Tim is loud himself.

4

talking and about this time Jody comes out.

5

woke me up.

6

lived here you've woken me up several times pounding on my

7

door and I've asked her, when the light is off and the door

8

is closed, do not wake me up to eat dinner and she is adamant

9

about me eating for some reason.

It's like really,

Okay,

Well, we continued
She said,

Q

So when she says something like that -

11

A

I

I

finally woke you up.

Well, she started to, excuse my - getting a

12

You

out of the 13 months that I've

10

said, Look,

I ' l l turn

little

13

pissy with me and started, you know, yelling and screaming at

14

me.

15

crumbles,

16

started f-n' me up one side and down the other.

17

like a drunken sailor on leave, believe it or not, and she

18

was -

I'm going,

Hey, that's too bad, that's how the cookie

I finally woke you up, good.

19

Q

So how did you respond?

20

A

My exact words?

21

cunt,

22

with you.

23

anyway.

Well, then she
She can cuss

It's like, Look, you fat fucking

I'm out of here next week anyway,
I'm done doing this,

I'm done doing this

I'm out of here next week

I planned on moving out.

24

Q

And so you were upset?

25

A

Oh yeah.
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1

Q

Then what happened?

2

A

Finished my beer off and it's like I'm going to go

4

Q

Did John say anything to you?

5

A

Yeah, he was like you need to apologize to her and

3

to -

6

it was like I don't think so, chief.

You don't live here.

7

What happens in this house you have no idea what goes on

8

around here because you don't live here.

G

Well, you're going to apologize to my aunt.

9

And it's like I don't think so.

10
11

Q

All right, then what happened?

12

A

Ummm, I went to my room.

Tim and Jody both had

13

said something,

14

refrigerator and went to my room and I was going to go to

15

bed.

16

last time.

17

I got up and I grabbed another beer out the

I closed my door and that's when John came in for the

Q

All right.

I'm going to show you what's been

18

marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 10.

19

look at that and tell me what that is.

20

A

I'd like for you to

That's a picture of my bedroom where I had pulled

21

my bed down and was getting ready to go to bed.

22

is my truck bag and I was sitting on the edge of the bed as

23

John walked in, again I'm like, Oh, here we go again.

Camouflage

24

Q

So what happened then?

25

A

At this point he stands over the top of me and he
44
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1

has one of his feet on top of my feet and he's got both of

2

his fists up like this, pointing down at me going you're

3

going to apologize to my aunt.

4

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

5

A

And I'm like no,

I'm not going to. And he was

6

adamant about it and he's standing over the top of me and I

7

can't move the bed back because of this filing cabinet to get

8

some space between us.

9

Q

So he's right on top of you?

10

A

He's right on top of me.

11

Q

And then what happened?

12

A

I can't move, and he's, you know, he's got both his

13

fists clenched and he's pointing at me like this.

14

reached behind me and grabbed my gun from out of the pillow.

15

Q

Why did you do that?

16

A

I

could not get -

I

Well,

I

couldn't get enough space

17

between him and I.

18

where I could not move out of the way.

19

Tim because Tim can't hear me.

He had me in an elevated position to
I couldn't call for

20

Q

Did you feel threatened?

21

A

Oh yes,

22

Q

So you reached back and you got the gun.

23

A

I

I felt very much threatened.

:,
~
'

reached back and grabbed my weapon.

When I

24

pulled the weapon around I had my finger against the frame of

25

the gun.

L
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1

Q

You're using your left hand.

2

A

Yes,

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

Is there - can I see the picture -0f the weapon?

5

Q

Yes.

6

A

When I've got this in my left hand, my finger is

I'm left-handed.

That's State's Exhibit No. 3.

7

along the frame of the gun this way on the pistol grip.

8

been through enough gun training with Special Forces that are

9

different -

I've

10

Q

Are you a gun enthusiast?

11

A

Yes I am, very much so.

12

Q

Had you fired that gun on -

13

A

Several occasions.

14

Q

All right, go ahead.

15

A

I've got my finger across the frame of the weapon

16

this way,

I've been trained not to put my finger on the

17

trigger when it comes to people who,

18

and regular securities, not to ever put your finger unless

19

you have a target acquired.

20

I'm going,

21

grabbed the gun and he pinned my finger against the frame of

22

the gun.

23

top of me and he had his finger in the trigger guard and in

24

essence, when he fell over the top of me, he pushed the

25

trigger and fired the weapon himself.

in private securities

Well, when I come up with it,

you need to get out of my room.

That's when he

Well, when I pulled back on it, he fell over the

I'm going, Oh my God.

46

....... •·--------·•----···--•------------·-

1

._.

________ ___
,.

.

---------

You're going to shoot me again.

3

It's like,

5

6

I didn't shoot you to begin with,

Q

Let me ask you something.

Did you ever threaten to

kill him?
A

No,

8

Q

Did you ever, did you walk in the room,

10

I didn't.

I

just wanted him out of my room.
turn around

with this gun and point it in his face and say I'm going to
kill you?

11

A

No.

12

Q

So you're on the bed, he's on top of you,

13
14

you

shot yourself.

7

9

-------

Let's see how bad you're hit.

2

4

-----------

you're

struggling over the gun, then what happens?
A

Well, we're struggling over the gun when -

when I

15

finally got my fingers around the grip and had my thumb on

16

the back of the hammer to make sure he didn't pull the

17

trigger again because he was yanking on the gun.

18

sure that he couldn't push on the trigger again.

19

20
21

22

Q

So I

made

Meaning what kind of - is this a single or double

action A

This is a double action weapon that has been

modified.

23

Q

What do you mean modified?

24

A

It has a spring kit in it.

25

Q

What does that mean?
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A spring kit is where you can make a hair trigger,

2

I don't know if you've ever heard the term ~efore, but you

3

know quick draw McGraw, they've got a hair trigger,

4

barely touch it and the hammer will fall.

5

the same thing with a double action.

6

hammer spring to make it an easier pull for a double action

7

or single action.

,.:;·,
\::V

you just

Well, you can do

You can loosen up the

8

Q

And where is the spring?

9

A

The springs are inside the handle.

10

Q

So the gun goes off, you're asking him are you hit

11
12

13

and what happens then?
A

Oh I knew he'd been hit.

I go let's see how bad

you've been hit.

14

No, no, you're going to shoot me again.

15

It's like I didn't shoot you to begin with.

16

Well, this time he'd got ahold or the barrel of the

17

weapon now.

18

around the pistol grip, not in the trigger guard and I'm

19

trying to get him off of me so I can see how bad he's hit.

20

21
22
23
24
25

Q

I've got my thumb on the back of the hammer and

So with your thumb on the back of the hammer,

what

does that do?
A

That's to keep him from pushing on the trigger and

having the hammer pull back again.
Q

So in order to be fired on a double action it,

when

in push, pull on the trigger the ·hammer goes back and then
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goes forward -

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

We're fighting over the gun and I'm not going to

Then what happened?

5

relinquish it to him to have him turn around and use i t on

6

me.

7

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

8

A

And I'm trying to keep it from firing on himself

9

again and he's got the, his right hand on the barrel.

He's

10

got both of his knees on my arm and I'm not letting go and

11

he's not letting go.

12

called the police, they're on their way.

13

Q

Tim had come in and said I've already

Okay, let's stop just a second.

So if you would

14

mark where you were sitting with an 'x', if you would,

15

you were sitting and where he was standing before he came

16

down on top of you; an 'x' where you were sitting.

17

A

This is where I was sitting right here.

18

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

19

A

And, well,

20

this is where he was standing.

wasn't there previous.

where

That box

This is me -

Q

So in essence he was standing right in front of

23

A

He was standing on my foot.

24

Q

Okay.

21
22

25

you.

Would you circle the 'x' where you say he

was?
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1

A

And he was actually standing on my right foot.

2

Q

If I could display this to the jury, and we'll wait

3

just a sec So they can look at it.

I want to show you another exhibit, No. 11 and it

4
5

looks to be the same type of depiction but in there,

6

photo there is an 'x' at the top, is there not?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

All right.

9

you were and a

10

in that

Would you again mark with an 'x' where

'x' with a circle where he was?

In between - well, it's going to be hard to see the

A

11

'x', but in between the dresser and the bed was where he was

12

standing over the top of me.

Oh, make a circle, this one.

13

Q

Yes.

14

A

It's a little difficult.

15

Q

Right.
So,

So when you have a moment you can look at

16

that.

you're struggling over the gun and it has already

17

fired?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

Then what happened?

20

A

That's when Tim had come in and said he had called

21

the police.

22

Q

All right,

23

A

Well, me and John or John and I continued to

G

then what happened?

24

struggle over the gun,

I told him I wasn't going to give it

25

to him so he could turn around and use it on me and neither
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1

one of us were going to give it up.

2

in and said the police are here.

3

there and tell them it was an accident like it was to begin

4

with.

Well,

Tim had come back

John stated,

I'll go out

5

Q

Okay.

6

A

I relinquished the weapon to h~m and he walked out.

7

When I noticed when he walked out he had a little bit of a

8

blood stain on his back where the bullet had gone through and

9

I've seen bullet shot wounds before, gun shot wounds before

10

and it was just an in and out.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

I'm in awe.

So after he goes out what do you do?
I can't believe this just happened.

13

So I get up and I start to walk down the hallway and·I get

14

right to Tim and Jody's bedroom and Jody is yelling at Tim,

15

starts yelling Tim's name out and I told Jody to quit yelling

16

and when I get to the door to the patio,

17

Hey, the police are here.

18

going to go put my clothes on because all I had on was my

19

black shorts and I put on my slippers and my grey, what I'm

20

wearing in that picture right there that you have.

21

what I put on to go outside.

22
23

Q

that's when Tim says

I said-I will be right back,

I'm

That's

I'm showing you what's been marked as State's

Exhibit No. 6.

Are those the clothes that you put on?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And what are they again?

51

----··-·-···--·-··--··-·------------- ---------·-·------·-•-• - - 1

2

A

My·grey, both of them, my grey sweatshirt,

grey

sweat pants and my· slippers.

3

Q

And you looked a little bedraggled there.

4

A

Just a little bit.

5

Q

So what happened after you put these clothes on?

6

A

I walked out the door and when I got on the patio

7

there was police right there, said put your hands above your

8

head and keep walking forward.

9

and I had my hands behind my head and walked forward.

I abided by their commands
Now,

10

as soon as I went through the gate to the outside they kept

11

saying, keep telling me walk forward, no problem.

12

right to the gun one of the officers told me to stop right

13

where I'm at and another officer told me to keep walking

14

forward.

15

me so I stop right where I was at.

When I got

Well, I've got 8 or 10 people pointing weapons at

16

Q

Then what happened to you?

17

A

To me?

Urnmm, I was hit very hard from the back

18

right in the middle of my back and taken down to the ground

19

and someone had ahold of my hair and had a knee in the back

20

of my head grinding my face into the pavement and another

21

officer with his knee in the middle of my back and he has

22

knocked the wind out of me and I tried to catch myself with

23

both my hands. · I've got both my hands pinned underneath me

24

and he's yanking on my arm and grinding his knee in my back

25

and telling me to stop resisting.

r;·-.

~

I can't pull my hands out
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1

because he's sitting on top of me.

2

Q

Now this photograph,

3

A

It shows, ummm,

it shows - what does i t show?

some pretty good cuts on my

4

forehead and on my cheek.

5

the police have done to me grinding my face into the

6

pavement.

7
8

Q

That's not a mole.

That's what

So those are injuries caused by them taking you

down to the ground?

9

A

Right and I -

10

Q

On the pavement?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Now, was there any other injuries to you?

13

A

Oh, both my knees were scrapped up rather bad,

14

pretty much looks like my face.

15

Q

All right, what were you thinking at this time?

16

A

This was an accident and this, this roughness

17

wasn't necessary at all.

18

had except for one told me to keep walking and one told me to

19

stop while they're pointing weapons at me.

20

~

I was compliant to every rule they

So I was a

little

I wasn't going to move anywhere.

21

Q

Then what happened?

22

A

When they finally got my hands behind me, they

23

clamped the handcuffs down around my ·wrist where the bone is

24

where they cut the circulation off to both of my hands and

25

this wasn't the chain handcuffs, this was the solid bar so
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1

you can't move around in them at all.

2

Q

And did you, did you ask that they be loosened?

3

A

Well, they picked me up by my arms, got me on my

4

feet and rushed me over to the squad car to transport me and

5

I asked them, can you please loosen the cuffs up and they

6

were no, and they frisked me and everything else and I

7

them again,

8

up on me and they kept saying no.

9

wasn't happy about it.

asked

literally I was begging them to loosen the cuffs
So needless to say I

10

Q

So then you were taken down to the police station?

11

A

I was taken down to the police station and put in

12

the elevator.

13

Q

Was this photo taken down at the police station?

14

A

Yes,

15

Q

You don't appear to be very happy.

16

.A

17

Q

18

it was.

Now this -

No .
All right.

When you were down at the police

station were you belligerent?

19

A

20

Q

21

A

Yes, to a point.
. And uncooperative?
Yes.

When I came out of the elevator there was

22

three of them standing in the elevator and had me in the

23

corner and they're going step out of the elevator and I said

24

I will as soon as you loosen these cuffs up on me.

25

when they grabbed both of my fingers and proceeded to try to

That's
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1

break my wrist because I wasn't compliant to them any more

2

and they had not loosened the cuffs up.

3

hands any more.

4

still numb from when they had me cuffed.

5
6

Q

I can't feel my

I still have - the backs of my hands are

All right.

So after this, after you were arrested

you went to jail, right?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

And did you make some phone calls from there?

9

A

Yes,

10

Q

And who did you call?

11

A

I called Tim first.

12

Q

And when you make a phone call from this jail is

I did.

13

there a recording that says whatever you say is being

14

recorded?

15

A

It's actually written on the wall.

16

Q

All right.

17

A

It says all phone calls could be monitored and

18

recorded at any time.

19

Q

So you called - who did you call?

20

A

I called Tim Krogh.

21

Q

And why did you call him?

22

A

Number one to find out exactly what happened on his

24

Q

How did you do that?

25

A

I

23

end.

just asked him, you tell me what happened I don't
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remember anything that happened, you tell me what happened, I

2

want to hear your side of the story.

3

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

And did you have ~ome phone

4

calls - so you called him to find out what was happening.

5

Why did you want to know what he had to say?

6

Well, when they were trying to read my rights and

A

7

do the interrogation or investigation for however they

8

(inaudible) - oh, what do you call it, interview, they were

9

asking me what happened and it's like I'm not telling you

10

anything and they read my rights and said I'm - no,

11

understand my rights,

12
13

I don't

I'm not telling you anything.

C,

\lil

And then did you - so you called Tim and you asking

Q

what happened?

14

Yeah,

A

I was asking him what happened and he's going

15

why?

16

and that didn't happen.

17

wanted to hear his side of. the story, you know, to find out

18

what's going on on his end.

19

20
21

22
23
24
25

I was like, Well the detective told me that I shot you

Q

I knew exactly what happened but I

So what did you - did you know what you'd been

charged with?
A

No, as far as I know this was an accident because

John had shot himself.
Q

All right.

Q

Did you have more than one phone call

with Tim?
A

I made a couple of phone calls with Tim.

·r

was
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trying to get my, get him to call my boss at Alta Express,

2

get my mom's number because I didn't have that.

3

phone doesn't accept collect calls and the only one that had

4

a land line was Tim, so that's my only form of communication

5

to the outside world.

Her cell

6

Q

Okay.

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

All right, did you call your mother?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And did you have a conversation with her?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And what did you want from her or what did you say

13

14

15
16

Did you get that?

to her?
A

I told her to come down and, you know, come down

and bail me out, there's been an accident.
Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

All right.

And did you say

17

something to her about get John to be cooperative or

18

something to that effect?

19

A

This is later on.

The phone calls I made to her

20

were probably three weeks later because the jail wouldn't

21

give me my ID. They wanted to take another picture because of

22

my wounds that I had.

23

commissary or phone cards or I couldn't make any more calls

24

to Tim, they were refusing calls.

25

pictures of my wrist and, you know, my injuries and they

So I went three weeks without any

And I went to jail to get
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refused to do it.

2

Q

3

again?

4

A

5

····--·-···-·

So after three weeks did you call your mother

-I finally got commissary and got a phone card and

was able to contact her.

r--·

~

6

Q

And what was - why did you call her at this time?

7

A

Well, she'd come into visit -and come to find out

8

that I had charges of attempted murder and I was like,

9

minute, this was an accident and when I first got the court

Wait a

10

papers, that's what I found out John Pearce's last name.

11

didn't even know his last name until I received court papers.

12
13

Q

All right.

I

Had you been told that your mother had

talked to John?

14

A

No.

15

Q

Did she tell you that she had talked to John?

16

A

After - yeah, the first phone call said she had

17

talked to John when they went to get all my stuff out of the

18

house.

19

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

20

A

They had packed all my stuff up. They did the

21

investigation. They were cleared to·back in and they packed

22

all my stuff up and put it in storage and Tim and Jody were

23

there and she had talked to John and he said that it was an

24

accident.

25

THE COURT:

Excuse me, counsel?
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1

MR. WILSON:

2

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. WILSON:

Okay.

(Inaudible) .
It's not intended for the truthfulness

5

of it as to why he did what he did.

6

the Court not object for the State.

7

THE COURT:

8

(End of sidebar)

9

10

Q

I'm - I'd just as soon

(Inaudible).

{BY MR. WILSON)

So had you received information

that he had said this was an accident?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And then later on are you, you're told that you're

13

charged with attempted murder?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And do you then have another phone, another

16

conversation with your mother where you say to her,

17

about that you're going to have to change game plans because-

18

A

something

There's another phone call in there for Christy

19

which is Tim Krogh's daughter.

She's my best friend.

20

she told me that John just wanted to be compensated -

And

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

John just wanted to compensated for the days off

23

24
25

that he missed from work.
Q

So, when you found out that the charges were not

going to be dropped because this was an accident, did you
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1

make some kind of statement to your mother that the game

2

plan, I have to change the game plan?

3
4

A

Yeah, because he said he wasn't going to press

charges to begin w~th and THE COURT:

5

Sir, please don't speak to what·

6

somebody else may have told you.

7

speak to what you said.

8

THE WITNESS:

9

THE COURT:

10

12

Q

Okay.
What I said?

Okay.

(BY MR. WILSON)

So after you found that out did

you make that statement to your mother?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

And that's why you're here today?

15

A

Yes.

16

17

MR. WILSON:

'-'
MR. VO-DUC:

19

21

Answer any questions the prosecutor

may have.

18

20

just

Yes.

THE WITNESS:

11

So unless you had -

Thank you.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY

MR. VO-DUC:
Q

Good morning, Mr. Mccallie.

I'd like to just

22

followup a little bit.

23

their house because at one point you ran out of propane,

24

heating propane where you were living?

25

A

You end up with Tim and Jody Krogh at

No.

G
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1

Q

Very good.

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

You were paying rent?

4

A

Yes .

5

Q

.Keeping a room?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Because probably since you're so much on the road

8

You - but they took you in?

it's not worth it to have a fully furnished house?

9

A

Correct.

10

Q

With stuff that you'd never get to use.

11

A

Correct.

12

Q

How old are you, Mr. Mccallie?

13

A

Forty-six.

14

Q

Forty-six.

15

said for 13 months?

16
17

And you - so you stayed with them you

A

Yes, at this particular time.

I had stayed with

them previous, before.

18

Q

Okay.

19

A

Sure.

20

Q

And Jody, did I hear you correctly, she cooked for

21

you?

We'll stick to this particular time.

She wanted you to eat?

22

A

On occasions yes, she cooked all the time.

23

·Q

Cooked all the time.

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And she was adamant,

I believe your testimony was
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1

about you eating?

2

A

Constantly.

3

Q

That makes her a cunt.

4

A

Not at this particular juncture, no.

5

She wants to

cook, she wants to cook for everybody.

6

Q

But when you get annoyed at her waking you up, and

7

you said there was a discussion (inaudible) did you call her

8

a cunt and basically because she bugs you all the time about

9

eating?

10

A

Well, there's circumstances that lead up to that.

11

Q

And Tim Krogh did tell you guys to move out,

12

A

Yes, I had already planned on moving out the

13

right?

following week anyway.
Q

But he told you that he wanted you out, you and

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

The next day?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And you'd just come back from a haul, from a trip?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

And when you come back you don't go right back· out

14

15

22
23

John?

usually, you have a regular route?
A

Well, DOT regulates that I have 70 hours to ·work

24

with and I have a 34-hour re-start and on long runs and short

25

runs I have 34 hours off or I have two days off.
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1

Q

So this was a long run?

2

A

This was a short· run.

3

Q

That you were coming back from?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

With a trainee?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Okay.

8

And a trainee can't drive unless you're

there next to him,

9

A

right?

That's the regulation?

Well, with doubles.

He was inexperienced.

He had

10

carried doubles before but didn't have enough experience so I

11

was monitoring how he drove with the doubles.

12

Q

13

right?

14

A

15

But you were training on a doubles on that day,

No,

he'd already had his doubles endorsement.

He

just hadn't had enough time pulling doubles.

16

Q

· Okay.

Now we've used the word belligerent to

17

describe you,

sir, and I'd like to round off a little of that

18

testimony, specifically as it relates to your appearance at

19

the police station, you saw Detective Arnn yesterday -

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

He testified and you remember they put you in a

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

All right.

22

25

room?

And at one point there's more than one

of them?
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1

A

Oh yes.

2

Q

Detective Arnn is there?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

And you say, While we're in here, big guys,

5

you

think you can all handle me?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

That's what you told them, right?

8

A

Oh, yes.

9

Q

And they offered you a drink?

10

A

Yes .

.11

Q

Right?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

And then they offered you a Coke?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And your answer was,

16

A

Sure.

17

Q

Right.

yes,

I'll have a rum and Coke.

I was being belligerent.
And I want the jury to understand exactly

18

what that means.

So thank you for your answers.

19

came back and we'll ~o get you a Coke and then you said not a

20

problem, how about a six pack and a cigarette?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And then you asked them,

23

why I'm here.

And they

ustill don't understand

What happened?"

24

A

Exactly.

25

Q

They said you're under arrest and you said for
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1

what?

...

····-·-------

Yes?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

They tried to help you wi~h that and then you say

4

again,

"I drive a truck 5000 miles a week, why am I here?"

5

A

Exactly.

6

Q

And then tried to explain and again you said,

7

Why am I here?"

what?

"For

And then they explained your rights.

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

And then at one point Detective Arnn says what part

10

of your rights do you not understand and your answer was "The

11

part where you're fucking jerking me off.

12

doing here to begin with? You people woke me up."

What the fuck am I

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Detective Arnn tries to explain - this could be a

15

real short thing.

16

fuck I

17

in."

And you said, "No,

I want to know what the

am doing here in the first place, in the place I

live

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And then he explained to you someone got shot and

20

your answer was,

uwhose got a gunshot wound?"

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And they try to explain that to you and after that

23

you said u'Cause I want to know what the fuck is going on."

24

This was the second time you said this, "You woke me up.

25

want to know what's going on."

I

Right?
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

They tried to take your photo -

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

- and you said something about Facebook or You

6

A

They o~ght to get my picture off of that.

7

Q

And you made several calls from the jail where they

5

8

Tube.

put you after your arrest?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Calls to Tim, several calls to your mom, over first

11

call to the Tim was the day, April 1 st ,

right?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

And then you made several calls to your mom,

14

12 th ,

13 th ,

18 th •

April

Yes?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

And one of those calls was to Chrissy?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

And she told you that John was unwilling, ·John

19

Pearce was unwilling to say that this was an accident,

20

she not?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

To which your answer was,

23

care of him.

24

while.''

25

Talk to him again.

did

"I told John we'd take

This will be well worth his

A
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1

Q

This is what you told Chrissy to tell John.

2

A

What about the previous call when I talked to

3

Chrissy where she said -

4

Q

Sir, sir -

5

A

- John wants to be compensated.

6

Q

- I appreciate that.

You'll have a chance to offer

I just want

7

your own evidence and feel free to offer that.

8

to followup on what you told us.

9

you ended up telling Chrissy can you be pushy with John -

In the same conversation

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

- about saying this was an accident?

And about

12

three weeks after your stay here you called your mom actually

13

later in the year, you talked to your mom later that month,

14

sorry, and you knew these calls were being recorded,

right?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

And as a matter of fact you knew that these calls

17

were going to be played out today in this trial, right?

18

A

More than likely, yes.

19

Q

Well, your attorney shared them with you, told you?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

What's coming.

22

You know knew that I would play

these recordings.

23

·A

24

Q

You've known for some time.

25

A

But you didn't play the whole phone call.

Yes.
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2

Q

sir,

you have the opportunity to do so

if you want to.
Now, sir, are you the holder of a commercial

3
4

That~s fine,

....·-···•········-------------------~

driver's. license a CDL?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

And that is governed by federal law?

7

A

DOT.

8

Q

DOT,

9

Department of Transportation.

And you

understand, sir, we can agree that if you were to be

10

convicted today that would jeopardize your livelihood as a

11

truck driver?

12

A

Yes.
MR. VO-DUC:

13

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

14
15

16
17

That's all I have.

BY MR. WILSON:
Q

Mr. Mccallie, have you received information that

John wanted compensation?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

Is that why you replied that he will be rewarded?

20

A

Yes.

21

MR. WILSON: Thank you.

22

MR. VO-DUC:

23

THE COURT:

24

25

Nothing further,

thank you.

Do members of the jury have any

questions for this witness?

Yes?

Okay.

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:
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(Inaudible conversation)

2

MR. WILSON:

It's been covered.

3

MR. VO-DUC:

(Inaudible).

4

MR. WILSON:

I don't mind.

5

(End of sidebar)

6

THE COURT:

7

I think it has.

Ummm, the jury member would like to

know if you were ever told what your charges were?

8

THE WITNESS:

9

MR. WILSON:

No.
I gather that's by the police?

10

JURY MEMBER:

Yes.

11

THE WITNESS:

No, they didn't.

12

MR. WILSON:

13

THE COURT:

14

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

15

MR. WILSON:

16

May we approach, Your Honor?
Anything else?

Can we have a short recess

(inaudible) .

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. WILSON: Can we have a short recess?

19

(Inaudible conversation)

20

MR. WILSON: Oh, iri regard to that (inaudible).

21

THE COURT:

22

(End of sidebar)

23

THE COURT: Go ahead.

24

MR. VO-DUC: Thank-you.

25

(Inaudible).

Yes.

Ill
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FURTHER RE-CROSS EXAMINATION

1

2

BY MR. VO-DUC:

3

You spoke to Sargent Arnn who testified yesterday,

Q

4

perhaps we could refresh your recollection.

5

told,

6

were under arrest for attempted homicide and your answer was,

7

uAttempted homicide?

I told you by Sargent Arn0 who was here, told you you

To who?"

Do you remember that?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

And then he explained further,

10

reading your rights."

11

wound?"

12

In fact you were

A

uThat's why I'm

And then you said uwhose got a gunshot

That's what you said?
Yes.

13

MR. VO-DUC:

Thank you.

14

MR. WILSON:

May we have a recess?

15

THE·COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we need a brief

16

recess.

So five minutes?

17

MR. WILSON:

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

Ten minutes?

Five minutes.
Okay, five minutes.

All right.

You

19

are admonished don't discuss the case, don't make up your

20

mind.

21

Please rise for the jury.

22

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

23

THE COURT: You may step down now.

24
25

It doesn't

appear that it's that difficult to walk, is it?
THE WITNESS:

No.
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1
2

THE COURT:

I don't understand the big deal about

(inaudible).

3

(Inaudible conversation)

4

THE WITNESS:

5

THE COURT:_

6

seem like it's that big of a -

I can't run (inaudible).
The walking back and forth,

7

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

8

DEFENDANT MCCALLIE:

9

10

it doesn't

If you want, if I were to get

back up on the stand, you don't have to take the jury out, I
can walk stiff legged in front of them. It doesn't bother me.

11

THE COURT:

12

DEFENDANT MCCALLIE: Okay.

13

THE COURT: I'm not really quite.sure why, you know-

14

DEFENDANT MCCALLIE: Well, it's so they don't see my

15

restraints.
THE COURT:

16

17

it's not a big deal -

18

MR. WILSON:

19

THE COURT:

21

MR. WILSON:

23

24
25

It's not a big deal to walk (inaudible)

It clicks, Your Honor.

It clicks and

then locks up.

20

22

I think we're going to be okay.

If you try to walk too fast.
I find this unnecessary to start off

with.
THE COURT:

That's not an issue.

That's an issue

with (inaudible).
MR. WILSON:

We know the bailiff is here and~
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1

It's not an issue for debate.

The

2

issue is to whether it's necessary to have the jury go in and

3

out every time and your client, your own client just said

4

that he can walk it if he needed to get back -

5

MR. WILSON:

6

THE COURT:

7

DEFENDANT MCCALLIE:

8

9

I told him that it.was not necessary I'll take the advice of my

attorney.

~

THE COURT:

10

MR. WILSON:

11

THE COURT:

12

If he makes a mistake then -

Okay.

Are we ready to proceed?

Yes Judge.
Okay.

Let's go ahead and call

(inaudible) .

13

(Inaudible conversation)

14

MR. WILSON:

15

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

16

MR. WILSON: Closings after lunch?

17

THE COURT: No,

Closings after lunch?

I'm - well,

18

on how long your witnesses are.

19

MR. WILSON:

20

21

22

I guess it all depends

I'd like to have about 10 or 15

minutes to make some notes.
THE COURT:
before the rush.

I wanted to get them started with lunch

So that was my ....

23

MR. WILSON:

Best laid plans.

24

(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom)

25

THE COURT:

Ready for the jury?

Come on in.
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1

----

get back at 10 after, okay?

2

MR. WILSON:

Okay, thank you.

3

(Whereupon a noon recess was taken)

4

THE COURT:

All right.

We're back on the record in

5

the matter of state of Utah vs. James Mccallie, Case No.

6

131903319 and Mr. Mccallie is present with counsel and

7

counsel for the State is also present.

8
9

And State, are you prepared to proceed with your
opening - closing statement?

10

MR. VO-DUC:

11

THE COURT:

12
13

Yes, Your Honor.
Closing argument,

I guess. Thank you. I

correct myself.
MR. VO-DUC:

Ummm,

I'd like to take some time to

14

assist you using the instructions you'll get because we have

15

two counts here on the table.

16

would prove these beyond a reasonable doubt through the

17

evidence, testimony of the officers but we've charged two

18

crimes that at first blush may seem so similar as to be

19

inseparable but they are separate.

20

I told you yesterday that I

And let's start with the aggravated assault count.

21

You have these instructions.

We have Instruction 26.

I'm

22

not going to read them word-for-word; however,

23

show a few things beyond a reasonable doubt that this man - I

24

don't think there's any doubt that this man had the gun, that

25

he committed an assault and used a dangerous weapon.

I do have to
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1

Now here when we're talking about assault there's

2

often-a· misconception that leads people_astray.

3

·1aw I don't need to actually inflict injury to commit an

4

assault.

5

on, but if you want to re~er to it right now, 26,

6

to do" - this is 3{b) - nthreaten to do bodily injury to John

7

Pearce followed by a .show of immediate force or violence."

8
9

Under Utah

You can see in Sub(b) - and you can do that later
nThreaten

So what this basically says is if you threaten
someone and then you show them right there and then that you

10

can carry out that threat,

11

going to bash your head in and I take out a bat and I

12

on the table~

13

with you?

14

been committed because I have threatened you with bodily

15

injury which is at the most basic level pain, followed by an

16

immediate show of force which is the bat slammed on the

17

table.

18

No.

it's an assault.

There's an assault.
Have you been hurt?

Example,

I'm
slam it

Has the bat connected
No.

But an assault has

~

Now we have an assault.

What makes it aggravated

19

is the use -of a dangerous weapon and now a dangerous weapon,

20

again that's defined in your jury instructions but you have a

21

revolver with a 6-inch barrel.

22

So when we're talking about. aggravated assault, we won't need

23

for a person to shoot the gun to actually commit aggravated

24

assault. And you heard the testimony of John Pearce,

25

happened is this, something along the lines of I'm going to

That's·the dangerous weapon.

what
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1

kill yori,

2

completed.

3

a show of immediate force and there are very few shows of

4

immediate force more persuasive than putting a gun to the

5

face of someone within six inches of their nose.

6

why th~ defendant is guilty of the aggravated assault count.

7

We have the evidence as to all those elements.

9

the gun is raised, the aggravated assault is
Why?

We have a threat to kill you accompanied by

So that is

So the first point that I'd like you to keep in

8

mind

is all the instructions but understand that Utah law

10

does not require for an aggravated assault that the person

11

carry out on that threat,

12

show of force and we have that in this case.

just that it's made, followed by a

The second thing is the other charge, felony

13

·~

- - - - - -------------·------~

14

discharge of a firearm.

This is when we have a kind of

15

kissing cousins but not twins.

16

Mccallie twice, different crimes for the same thing.

17

are not the same things.

18

discharge are different crimes and what separates those two

19

crimes?

20

have to·off,

21

the gun in single action - you've heard-his testimony,

22

Special Forces, this is a man well acquainted with guns.

23

cocked the hammer.

24

makes the pull even lighter and then he stuck it in the face

25

of John Pearce, aggravated assault, he had his finger on the

We did not charge Mr.
These

The aggravated assault and felony

The shot went off.

The shot went off.

It didn't

it went off because that man, Mr. Mccallie put

He

Remember, this has a spring kit that

93

·····-·-···

···----···•·-·-------------------,

1

trigger, Mr. Mccallie did, and when John Pearce tried to

2

defend himself, the defendant pulled the trigger.

3

And I stress by happenstance, really pure luck that

4

the shot went here and not here because you saw the

5

demonstration, boom, boom.

6

deflected it using both hands, it would be gone in his face.

7

This was not an accident.

8

it's not an accident, evidence from that man right here, his

9

own statements after the events happened.

10

The shot, if Mr. Pearce had not

There's plenty of evidence that

Let's not defuse the two counts.

But I digress.
You can commit

11

both, the threat and he committed the second act when he

12

pulled the trigger in an effort to intimidate.
If we turn to Instruction No. 23,

13

(1) the

14

defendant, James Mccallie - there's no question of this;

15

knowing or having reasonable belief that a person may be in

16

danger.

17

within five feet of him and that's John Pearce.

18

intent to intimidate or harass.

19

than a 6-inch barrel, stainless steel revolver,

20

.38 in your face.

21

the firearm which we did, pulling the trigger causing bodily

22

injury~

23

instructions and we don't have to show that the injury was

24

any more than what we have here, ·a burn and a through and

25

thiough.

Well, there's only two people and one of them is

W~

With the

What is more intimidating
(inaudible)

But, we also need to have the discharge of

have bodily injury.

Again, it's defined in your

Now some efforts have been made to minimize this,
G.;1
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it's just a through and through.

2

through and through but it's also bodily injury.

3

have the two crimes~

4

Now,

You know what,

it is just a
So here we

I've offered evidence and the defendant has

5

chosen ·to try to convince you that he acted in self defense.

6

I '·d like to address that now and again you' 11 get these

7 ·

instructions but there's a basic principle of self-defense.

8

Let's not get lost in the wording.

9

is my interpretation of the law that you received.

Trust the wording.

This

But it's

10

basically this,

11

will protect you for yelling back.

12

will protect me from punching you back.

13

and threaten me or shoot in my direction, the law will

14

protect me if I get my own gun and shoot you back.

15

there's this principle of correspondence.

16

response have to be equivalent.·

17

insult your mother, the law will not protect·you for pulling

18

a gun and teaching me a lesson by shooting me in the stomach.

19

It's that simple.

20

in self-defense, if I yell at you the law
If you punch me,

the law

If you get out a gun

So

The threat and the

All I 'rn saying is this, if I

In this case I need to add one thing,

just because

21

Mr. Mccallie claims it was self-defense doesn't mean you have

22

to take him at this word.

23

like the testimony of everybody else that you've seen in the

24

last 12 hours _in court, okay?

25

self-defense is this,

His testimony.is to be weighed

But, the reason there's no

Instruction 19 you must determine from
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all the evidence whether or not the resisting party -

2

would be Mr. Mccallie under his theory - believed the amount

3

of resistence used was necessary to protect himself or

4

another.

5

d~termine wh~ther the resisting party's actions were

6

reasonable.

7

And when we have this correspondence, somebody (inaudible)

8

with a gun it's necessary to respond with your own weapon,

9

right, because you (inaudible) but here we have necessary and

In this case it was himself.

that

You must also

So you have necessary and reasonable, right?

10

reasonable.

11

going to assume that you're (inaudible) believe the

12

defendant's own account.

13

the gun from the pillow, from under the pillow?

14

Mccallie.

15

Is thai reasonable?

16

here arid get beaten to death, you know, if that's what

17

happening.

18

would like you to believe that he was exercising his right of

19

self-defense reasonably, that the threat that John Pearce

20'

claims caused, made it necessary for him; Mr. Mccallie,

21

use the revolver.

22

if you don't believe Mr. Pearce - from the defendant's own

23

words,

24

John·Pearce had a gun.

25

defendant reasonable in believing - and again you have a

We don't have that here.

Who put out -

Let's take his account.

and I'm

Who pulled
Chris

He brought the gun to what had been a word fight.
Of course, no one expects you to lie

That's not what was happening.

But this man

But from his own words, at least -

he's the one who pulled the gun.

to

that's

No one ever said

And was a gun necessary?

Is the
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1

definition for reasonable, looking at all the circumstances,

2

was it reasonable for him to think that he, a Special Forces

3

operative, truck driver, his own words, would need,

in a word

4

fight to bring a 6-inch .357 revolver (ina~dible)?

No.

5

not.

It's

So these are the elements that we've had to prove

6
7

and I believe we've proven them.

We've overcome the claim

8

that this was a self-defense because Mr. McCallie's actions

9

were not reasonable and they were not necessary.

He

10

completed one crime when he raised that gun in John Pearce's

11

face and said I'm going to kill you, committed an assault.

12

In that split second between that threat and the discharge of

13

a gun, we moved over into discharge of a·firearm and bodily

14

injury.

15

must result from this.

That is what happened and a guilty verdict is what
Thank you.

16

MR. WILSON:

If it please the Court, George

17

MR. VO-DUC:

Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

18

MR. WILSON:

- and above all may it please you

19

ladies and gentlemen of the jury.
Quote, nAll I know is I was about to die and I

20

Quote,

ur

21

said, not today."

know for sure he was going to

22

kill me and probably kill Jody and Tim."

23

from Mr. Pearce.

24

of a cartoon action figure?

25

him?

Is he for real?

Is it believable?

These·are quot~s

Aren't these the actions

Heroic, grandiose assertions by

It is reasonable? Is it logical?·
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1

And then we go to he tells this story that defies all

2

logic, all reason and all believability. And that story is

3

he's invited into Chris's bedroom and immediately - there's

4

been no ~rguing for hours, there's not been -any bad words

5

said, there is no indication that Chris was going to do

6

anything in those three hours.

7

before is you should apologize and yet he would have you to

8

believe that he was lured into Chris's bedroom and

9

immediately Chris turns, right when he gets into the bedroom,

All that Mr. Pearce had said

10

back towards the hallway, produces this .357 - and you saw

11

it, ladies and gentlemen, this is not a weapon that is easily

12

hidden.

13

hi~ bed, he doesn't get it out of his night stand, he doesn't

14

bend over, he doesn't see it coming out of his waist.

15

magically appears.

16

supposedly Chris pulls the gun up, cocks it at the same time

17

which is a double action which he didn't have to cock it, it

18

already had a hair trigger on-it.

19

the thing and he fired that gun on numerous occasions and

20

knew exactly how it worked.

21

gun, pointed it at Mr. Pearce and said

22

something to that effect.

23

It appears from nowhere.

He doesn't get it out of

It

There is no reason that it appeared.

And

All he had to do was shoot

But he supposedly cocked the

ur

should kill youn or

And then another grandiose statement, you would

24

think that-this, being a surprise to-you, a shock to you if

25

you come up and a person puts a gun in your face, that you
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1

may go like tpi~, hesitate for a moment.

2

He's right on that gun imm~diately, pushes it down,

3

is fir~d,

4

discuss it later,

5

direction, behind where the gun is supposedly pointed and

6

enters a wall up in the ceiling almost.

7

all belief and all reason.

But not Mr. Pearce.
the gun

it goes through a portion - and then I'm going to
the gunshot goes through in the opposite

It defies all logic,

8

And that's what jurors are asked to do, to use your

9

common sense to evaluate evidence critically, to determine if

10

it's believable, if it's reasonable.

You know,

like you

11

would make decisions in your everyday life about things that

12

are important.

13

Now,

And you make a decision based upon that.
in every criminal case,

ladies and gentlemen,

14

there's a presumption of innocense.

15

innocent.

16

someone whose been shot and want to believe that they are

17

telling the truth.

18

The law says that you're to presume him innocent and you're

19

to look critically at what Mr. Pearce has to say to determine

20

whether the case has been proven, whether that presumption

21

goes away and the case has been proven beyond a reasonable

22

doubt.

Now there is a tendency to give deference to

However, that's not what the ·1aw says.

Now it's the same thing,

23

Chris is presumed to be

if you remember during

24

voir dire, one of the prospective jurors said, Well,

25

charged,

I would think that maybe something happened.

he's
You're
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1

called upon a higher duty than that.

2

here with you.

3

That's why she's· not in

And Sargent Arnn, yo~ know, he wasn't impartial.

I

4

usually don't like to cast dispersions at officers but in

5

this case I think it's worthy of it.

6

question of a hypothetical, if that hole in the ceiling is a

7

bullet hole,

8

statement of what occurred completely inconsistent with where

9

that hole was?

I asked him the simple

if, isn't the defendant's,

I mean Mr. Pearce's

Obviously, it is because the pointing of the

10

weapon was a direct different direction than where that hole

11

was and he refused to answer it.

12

hypothetical questions."

13

answer ·it.

14

the presumption of innocense and that unless the proof·

15

convinces beyond a reasonable doubt then you should vote for

16

acquittal.

17

"I'm not used to answering

He was prepared and he wouldn't

But you're called upon, as I said, a higher road,

Now in this case there are a multitude of problems

18

in the State's case and the very most important problem is

19

Mr. Pearce and what he had to say because this case is based

20

upon Mr. Pearce, not Sargent Arnn, not Tim and Jody Krogh,

21

because they weren't in there and they weren't there for the

22

few hours before that as to what occurred.

23

Pearce and Chris know what happened-in that room.

24

have to believe Mr. Pearce beyond a reasonable doubt.

25

don't have to convince you, Chris doesn't have to convince

So only Mr.
So you
We
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you that he is not guilty.

-----------

They have to prove that he is

2

guilty based upon Mr. Pearce's t~stimony beyond a reasonabl~

3

doubt.

4

Now what about, what other thing~ about Mr.

5

Pearce's testimony shows that he is unbelievable?

One of the

6

main things is the .31.

7

you based upon what he saw, his judgment that Mr. Pearce was

8

not under the influence, he was not intoxicated, he was not

9

drunk in the five or ten minutes that he spoke with him in

Now the officer tried to convince

10

the hospital.

11

and that's the purpose of his blood.

12

no judgment.

13

almost the .08 presumptive limit for someone being under the

14

influence of alcohol.

15

are some variables but a .31 is astronomically high and that

16

.31 is true, it doesn't tell lies, it has no judgment,

17

what it is.

18

alcohol is in the blood, way beyond the limit.

19

Sargent Arnn did not perform any tests on him,
It doesn't lie.

It has

It speaks for itself that a .31, four times

Dr. Rothfeder testified, yes,

there

it is

It's a scientific test that shows how much

Not only do we have Dr. Rothfeder's testimony but

20

we have the treating physician's testimony who has no axe to

21

bear, who has no influence at all but who has intimate

22

contact with Mr. Pearce·while in the hospital and his notes

23

show that he was way intoxicated.

24

25

So we have someone who is very intoxicated and then
we look at Chris, according to Sargent Arnn that he was
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1

better, that Mr. Pearce was better than Chris was when he

2

talked to Chris.

3

all right?

4

probably· very unlikeable.

5

important is that, you know, he didn't do a field sobriety

6

test, certain things that have been shown to be accurate in

7

determining whether someone's under the influence, walk and

8

turn, the finger to the nose, recitation of the alphabet,

9

certain things that would indicate whether someone is under

10
11

Well, Chris wasn't cooperative with him,

He was belligerent, smart, and uncooperative and
That's (inaudible).

And what's

the influence.
What else is important is that no breathalyser was

12

given to.him that will scientifically show whether he was

13

under the influence, what kind of breath did he have,

14

he was under the influence and most importantly, no blood was

15

drawn from him that will dictate to you exactly what his

16

level was under scientific terms.

17

Sargent Arnn who had already had the distinct unpleasant

18

opportunity to talk to Chris when he was belligerent,

19

uncooperative, ·smart, and just not very pleasing.

20

whether

So we have the judgment of

And another important factor to take into

21

consideration is the officers didn't take these - you know,

22

my client, Chris is drinking beer.

23

drink of whiskey but he doesn't.

24

beer and we have those five or six cans in the bedroom - and

25

they have access to the entire house.

He acts like he takes a
He acts like he is drinking

They do not take any
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1

of those cans into evidence. They do not check to see how

2

many had had been drank, how many were still closed.

3

don't take any evidence of the R&R whiskey that Mr. Pearce

4

They

·was drinking or any indication of how much he had been

5

drinking.

But we know that he was drinking and he's

6

testified or he's given statements that he had been drinking

7

from that afternoon all night and.we know that because when

8

he was admitted into the hospital at (inaudible) in the

9

morning he still had a .31.

No amount of drinking on a

10

regular basis every night will keep someone from being drunk

11

if they have a .31, four times almost the limit.

12

intoxicated.
So why is that important?

13

So he's

Does he not know what

happened to him?

15

depressant.

16

It ·causes memory problems. It causes judgment problems.

17

reduces motor skills. It is a disabling drug, especially when

18

you have .31.

19

Yes. And why is that?

What - alcohol is a

14

It slows down the mental faculties of a person.

Then we have Mr. Pierce's testimony that he,

It

that

20

he testified that Chris was there that afternoon and all

21

evening, was playing cards with them. And what did Tim and

22

Jody testify to?

23

evening.

24

testimony, until after they had gone to bed around 9:00 or

25

10:00 p.m, not what Mr. Pearce says - and you're called upon

No, he wasn't there all afternoon and

Chris didn't get there,

from Jody and Tim's
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1

to believe him, beyond ·a reasonable doubt.

2

that this argument with Jody and my client using vulgar

3

language to her happened before they went to bed, I'm talking

4

about Tim and Jody.

,5

And he testified

Both of them testified that it happened

after, long after they'd gone to bed. They were awakened by

6

them, both of them went outside and then there was this

7

conversation between Jody and Chris.

8

he used vulgarities and John said you should apologize.

Both

9

of them contradict what Mr. Pearce has to say and both -

and

She used vulgarities,

10

his testimony contradicts what my client has introduced into

11

evidence in regard to a receipt from an ATM that he got money

12

out of the bank at around 9:59 or 10:00 p.m. that night and

13

then he went ·home.

14

not to believe him.

So another contradiction.

Another reason

Then he says that when he goes into the bedroom - I

15
16

just want to back up one thing,

17

you believe Mr. Pearce, that Chris waited to go into the

18

bedroom to pull that gun.

19

the house?

20

I mean, he doesn't know where the gun came from.

21

he didn't see him get it from any place in the bedroom or on

22

his person.

23

happened in any place of the house.

24

in the bedroom and he immediately turns with this gun put to

25

his face and cocks it and says I'm going to kill you or

Huh?

I don't understand ~hyi if

Did he pull it anywhere in

I mean, what was so importarit about the bedroom?

It just magically appeared.

Obviously

It could have

But supposedly they go
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1

something to that effect.

2

And when Mr. Pearce is interviewed, a couple of

3

days later, that thank goodness his own tape and the

4

statement is transcribed, does he say on three occasions when

5

he is specifically asked did he say anything and the officer

6

tells him what he had said before, did Chris say anything

7

about I'm going to kill you, did he say anything?

8

three occasions during the same interview he says I don't

9

know, maybe he did, my memory is not 100 percent,

And on

I'm not

10

quite sure.

11

has convinced himself of what occurred, not from his memory,

12

not from what happened, but to continue that persona of the

13

great protector, the heroic figure,

14

myself -and he would probably kill Jody and Tim as well.

And yet today he is absolutely sure because he

not today,

I'm· protecting

They go into the bedroom, and if you look at the

15
16

picture of the bed it;s obvious that Chris had pulled the

17

sheets back and the blanket in preparation for going to bed

18

unless he's so devious that he pointed that out as well.

19

they go in the bedroom.
All right.

20

So,

This is the front door or his door;

21

it's a very small room,

all right.

Chris goes into the

22

bedroom, not very far,

and he turns and Mr. Pearce is right

23

there in front of him,

all right,

24

hallway, right?

25

the wall.

facing out towards the

The bullet hole is found way back up here in

According to Mr. Pearce when he points a gun -
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1

also Mr. Pearce says, Oh, yeah,

2

Chris is left handed.

3

~o not only is the gun directed away from where that bullet

4

hole was but was down, not up but down.

5

.6

it was his right hand and

He pulls the gun down and it goes off.

Now the officer thought that that was a bullet
hole, that's why he investigated.

He didn't find a bullet,

7

but that's not unusual because as he testified it could have

8

gone anywhere.

9

'cause it could have dropped down behind a wall, it could

He looked for it but he didn't look real hard

10

have gone in a number of directions and there was no

11

indication, no other hole in that room and neither did he

12

look for any other hole after he supposedly only found out

13

afterwards that the bullet was not longer in Mr. Pearce.

14

don't know why he was looking for a bullet hdle in the first

15

place if he didn't,

16

in Mr. Pearce.

17

he was looking for a bullet hole.

18

I

if he thought that the bullet was still

Obviously he thought it wasn't and that's why

So he's looking for this bullet hole and he finds

19

one but he cannot find the bullet.

20

it's location is consistent with Chris's statement to you.

21

And you look at the photographs as to where Mr. Pearce was

22

and where Chris was on that day and he's laying over the top

23

of him, the gun goes off, it's going up like this and i t ' s

24

directly behind where· that hole was.

25

And that bullet hole,

You know, the prosecutor talked a little bit about
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In

1

the instructions and I

2

regard to discharge of a firearm,

3

beyond a reasonable doubt then Chris is guilty, he pulled

4

this trigger, he discharged that firearm.

5

you don't believe him beyond a reasonable doubt then he's not

6

guilty.

7

doubt,

8

doubt and Chris's statement is very consistent with what the

9

facts show,

10

just want to say a few words.
if you believe Mr.

Pearce

If you believe, if

You don't have to believe Chris beyond a reasonable
you have to believe Mr. Pearce beyond a reasonable

that Mr. Pearce in that struggle over the gun

discharged the firearm.
Now,

11

is he guilty of assault in threatening Mr.

12

Pearce with this handgun?

13

doubt·about that.

But ask yourself and put yourself in

14

Chris's po~iiion.

He's sitting on the bed, Mr. Pearce for

15

the umpteenth time comes into that room without asking

16

permission, without knocking on the door,

17

through that door and he comes over there and hets standing

18

over· the top of Chris whose sitting on the bed.

19

a very vulnerable position because when Mr. Pearce goes in

20

there he's obviously got in his mind this guy is going to

21

apologize or ·r' 11 know better, and he stands over top of him,

22

he's got his first clenched, he's standing on his feet which

23

keeps him from moving and he says to Chris, You're going to·

24

apologize.

25

Obviously a dangerous weapon.

No

just comes busting

Chris is in

· Now what kind of thoughts would be going through
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1

Chris's mind, what mind of reasonable thoughts would be going

2

through your mind?

3

justification for getting that gun out and putting i t to him

4

and saying get out of my room?

5

use it unless he was attacked by Mr. Pearce and you would

6

think any reasonable person would have backed off and gone

7

out of the room but Mr. Pearce is not a reasonable person.

8

He is a drunk person, irrational, using very bad judgment and

9

he's going to make sure that Chris apologizes, threatening in

I'm going to be attacked.

Isn't that

He didn't intend actually to

10

a menacing way, physical injury to Chris.

11

has the right of self protection to the assault, he didn't

12

fire the gun in regard.to discharge of a firearm.

13

So what about the defense's case?

So under those he

You can consider

14

it but it's still not, we don't have to prove beyond a

15

reasonable doubt.

16

doubt and you heard from Carol Ibarra and Marjorie Maughan,

17

they talked to Mr. Pearce - Ms. Ibarra twice, once on the

18

phone and once in person and what is said to them is this was

19

an accident,

20

Pearce, he cannot go back and re-construct his statements,

21

he's stuck with them.

22

on the phone and his mom who can hear him over the phone say

23

it was an accident.

24

another John.

25

somebody and she says to them, Can I ta'lk to John?

They have to prove beyond a reasonable

an accident because it was an accident.

It was an accident.

This is John.

Really?

And Mr.

He talks to them

It could have been

You know, Carol was talking to

He gets
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1

on the phone.

2

now.

3

not some John Doe. Why, he wouldn't even know what ·they were

4

talking about.

5

Ms. Maughan hears it and• Carol goes over the next week to get

6

the rest of his stuff and John is there and he says again,

7

it's an accident, I don't wish to prosecute, I'm not going to

8

press charges.

9

Yes, it's John Pearce, they know who he is

They heard his voice and he says it was an accident,

But John Pearce, he's talking so loud that

·But here he is pressing charges.

And then we have the testimony of Chris.

He is on

10

the road for an extended period of time, he keeps the log of

11

where he's been, what he's doing and that's into evidence.

12

He keeps the receipts, that's into evidence.

13

late on the 30 th ,

14

there's a receipt for that.

15

shortly thereafter and who is up?

16

and Jody also corroborate, they had gone to bed.

17

out there and said drinking a beer or two, he's trying to get

18

his log together and everything and Mr. Pearce is talking

19

about guns and they talk about guns and Mr. Pearce obviously

20

knows that Chris has a gun and he's hounding him to show him

21

this gun. And he walks into his room on several occasions

22

without knocking or permission and he's just a~ he's just

23

not very nice or very thoughtful which is in keeping with

24

someone whose intoxicated.

25

He comes home

he gets the money out of the bank and
He gets home around 10:00 or
Just Mr. Pearce. As Tim
So he is

And finally Chris says I'll show you the gun.
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1
. 2

Well, he tri~s·to get the .gun out without showing Mr. Pearce
where the gun is, all right.

He takes the bullets out and

3

finally shows him about the fourth,

4

they go back out.

5

playing poker.

6

He's out there. They're getting too loud and Jody comes out

7

and then there's this vulgar conversation and John is

8

incensed about that and Chris said, I'm not going to

9

apologize which incenses Mr. Pearce even more.

10

fifth occasion and then

Chris is playing the guitar. He's not

He's playing guitar as Tim corroborated.

They go back to bed. There may have been one other

11

occasion when they were loud and Tim comes out and says you

12

all, both of you are going to be out of here tomorrow and

13

then Chris says that he goes to his room to go to bed and Mr.

14

Pearce comes through that door without permission.

15

being in your castle, although it is a very small little

16

room.

17

own space, for the right not to be attacked or threatened by

18

someone else.

19

want Mr. Pearce to find out where it is.

20

bed getting ready to go to sleep and Mr. Pearce comes in and

21

I've already told you what he did.

22

under the circumstances to get that guy, this drunk out of·

23

his room.

24

the gun.

25

is saying, Let me see,

It's like

You have a right to some privacy, the right· to your

He hasn't put the gun back because he doesn't
He's sitting on the

And he acts reasonably

But he didn't bargain for a drunk who will grab
They fight over the gun, the gun goes off and Chris
let me see if you're .hurt.

He's still
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struggling over it because he's drunk.

2

And finally,

the police are there and he's,

Chris

3

is convinced by Mr. Pearce that it is going to go down as an

4

accident and he gives the gun up and Mr. Pearce goes out with

5

the .gun, and shortly thereafter Chris goes out. In the·

6

meantime he has put on some clothes because he's only iri his

7

black shorts and that's what he puts on and he goes out and.

8

he is slammed down to the ground and you can see the injuries

9

on him.

This is not his photograph. It is the police

10

photograph.

11

concrete.

12

ground.

13

police don't know that, you know,

14

been ~hot and somebody did the shooting.

15

down to the ground and put the cuffs on him and they're so

16

tight that they have taken his feeling out of hands and he

17

asks them to lighten them up and nothing is done and no one

18

has come in here to testify otherwise.

19

then the officers are trying to be real nice to him down

20

here, want something to drink?

21

But he is mad; an innocent man has been slammed down,

22

arrested for an accident and therefore he is belligerent, he

23

is uncooperative, he gets smart with the officers and that

24

causes them to be not very pleasant when he ·comes to testify.

25

This is no birthmark, that is a rub mark on the
His knees are scraped as a result of going to the

All of this for an accident.

It's not right but the

they think somebody had
So they slam him

He's taken down and

It's all being recorded then.

Yes, he makes some phone calls from the jail and
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1

it's quite believable as to what he knew they were going to

2

be recorded and he made them anyway .. He wanted to know from

3

Tim what was going on,

4

here,

5

has been an accident has turned into an attempted murder.

6

so he played dumb.

What happened

I don't remember, to get all the facts out because what

You know, he gets word that Mr. Pearce wants

7

compensation and he's willing to do that and then he finds

8

out that that's not going to happen.

9

another game plan and the game plan is self protection.

So he had to go to

10

mean, what would a person do in those circumstances?

11

that believable? Isn't it reasonable and logical?

12

and now we're here today.
You saw his demeanor.

13

I

Isn't

And then -

I thought he was straight

14

forward.

He didn't, you know, beat around the bush.

15

didn't try to convince you of things that were not true.

16

didn't try to give explanations for everything under the sun,

17

he answered the questions,

18

sincerely.

He

answered them directly and

You know, this is my last time.

19

He

~'

Mr. - George gets

20

to get back up here and give another closing in essence

21

because it's their burden and I hope that you take with you a

22

few words of what I said.

23

evidence.

24

You make the decision.

25

doubt that this was an accident but we don't have to prove

You know, 'it's not me,

i t ' s the

I'm just bringing some things to your attention.
I think it's beyond a reasonable

~I
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1

that to you and I think they've gone far,

2

proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Chris is guilty.

3

Thank you.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. VO-DUC:

6

I'd like first

far less than

Mr. Vo-Due.
Your Honor, thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

(inaudible) not here because John

7

Pearce wants us to be here.

He did not put up with pressing

8

charges.

9

charged him and if that meant -

This is not (inaudible} but we are here because I

10

MR. WILSON:

Pardon?

11

MR. VO-DUC:

We charged him, my office charged.

12

MR. WILSON:

Okay.

13

MR. VO-DUC:

It had nothing to do with his wishes.

14

Mr. Wilson will echo this, the State decided based on the

15

investigation of the police what charges will be filed and we

16

file charges that the victim wants us to file in certain

17

cases you file cases that (inaudible), let's be clear about

18

that.

19

vendetta and that Mr. Pearce is.just out to get the defendant

20

because it's convenient for the defendant's theory.

21

So let's not get the impression that this is a

Sargent Arnn - and please, your recollection

22

prevails here but Sargent Arnn testified that that hole in

23

the ceiling that the defense would like you to believe was

24

caused by a bullet, he said no,

25

it, I used a Saws All. We cut a section and, you know,

(inaudible)

I investigated
I
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1

looked at it.

2

surfaces and he- said as plain as day, that this was not

3

caused by a bullet wheri I got up there but th~ def~ridaht was

4

not very happy with that and kept pushing and he pushed

5

Sargent Arnn into (inaudible) let's be quite frank,

6

you this was riot a bullet, whi do you want me to surmise when

7

I told you in my observations,

8

this was not a bullet strike.

9

I have experience•in bullet strikes, hard

I

told

in my experience with guns,

So what you're being lead down to here is a bunch

10

of distractions, but check your recollections of what Sargent

11

Arnn - he was not (inaudible).

12

to why he thought this was a bullet hole and he confirmed

13

that in his significant experience, as a shooter, as a police

14

officer, as a detective, this was not a bullet hole,

15

fact,

16

was also testified to.

17

wall,

We have to go blow by blow as

this· was not the only hole in the w·all.

and,

in

I believe that

There were other imperfections in the

in the room (inaudible).
Now, of course, also Sargent Arnn is not impartial.

18
19

Is anyone really, truly impartial?

There's also an attempt

20

to hypnotize you with this magic number 31 and this is the

21

case here.

22

evidence really makes the case,

23

And let's start with Dr. Rothfeder, very helpful.·

24

agree that basically what he said·is it depends,

25

tell you anything,

We have·the evidence but the defendant's own
it's not about Mr. Pearce.

it depends on the individual.

We can
.31 doesn't
I will not
G;1
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make, what he said, a conclusion, unless I know more.
What did the nurses observe about the person?

2

So

3

Dr. Rothfeder, the defendant's own witness told you i t

4

depends . . 31 is not the end of the story because of the

5

individual's build, genetic makeup, how long they'd been

6

drinking, how long had they been a drinker?

7

tolerance and it also depends on what I as a doctor get from

8

people who are seeing the person.

9

into .31, case closed,

10

They build up

So don't get hypnotized

four time the legal limit for DUI.

DUI, okay which is not what we're talking about here.
Yes, I'll sell you the goods, that's man was drunk

11
12

at .31, drunk.

13

(Inaudible) .

14

evidence.

Did he get it wrong about a few things?
That's not my belief. I'll show you with the

Also again check my recollection, Detective Arnn

15

16

said that he spoke to Mr. Pearce at the hospital and -

17

an hour of the event happening and then twice that night.

18

him Mr~ Pearce told him that Chris Mccallie had threatened

19

him.

20

reported Sargent Arnn, yes, Chris Mccallie, before he shot

21

said I'm going to kill you or something to that effect.

22

There were two quotes and I had Sargent Arnn (inaudible) the

23

quotes that he noted in his report.

24

25

within
To

Within one hour of the event happening Mr. Pearce had

So please, your understanding, your recollection
rules here. Fine.

Let's get down to this case.

This case is
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1

not (inaudible).

2

that without this man, this case is nothing.

3

thinking about the considerable amount of ~vidence and tw6·

4

words came to mind, it's going to sound like a science

5

lecture; one is vacuum.

6

world nothing that happens has absolutely no effect on what

7

surrounds it.

8

particle, not a person, not an animal, not a rock acts on

9

this world without affecting everything around it.

10

The defendant would like you to believe
Wrong.

It's

I say this vacuum because in this

Nothing goes through this world, not a

That kind

of evidence is what make this case.
John Pearce, he was shot. No doubt. A gun was used.

11
12

No doubt.

That man's gun was used. No doubt.

But let's look

13

at the circumstances.

14

actions before, during, and after these ·events.

15

the effect 6f everyone's actions on the other people?

16

do you know about Mr. Mccallie that day?

17

wasn't angry just when he was· apprehended by the police.

18

know he was angry when he uttered that word, cunt.

19

that word,

20

anger right there before we know we're dealing with an angry

21

man.

First let's look at Mr. McCallie's
Let's see

Angry man.

it resonates so harshly right now.

What
He
We

Yeah,

That was his

Dealing with an angry man whose about to be evicted.
Who is - where does the anger come from and how does

22

23

that anger affect other people?

24

shot.

25

of the defendant.

Well, we know Mr. Pearce got

We know that anger also drives the subsequent actions
He insulted Jody. He insulted the officer.

<;,
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1

Right now the defendant would like you to believe that he got

2

indignant, how dare you arrest me.

3

from the arrest, the anger came and the arrest resulted from

4

the anger, from the acts that the anger prompted.

5

insulted the officers.

6

own admission, and that's why I say that this case is not

7

about this man, John Pearce.

8

defendant's own actions and his words.

9

guys.

No, the anger didn't come

This man was not indignant, by his

This case is made by the

You think you can all handle me?

10

knows his guns.

11

drinking.

12

been drinking -

He

(Inaudible), big
Special Forces guy,

By his own statement, I hadn't been

Of course, here in the jail calls he said he's

13

MR. WILSON:

I object, Your Honor.

14

MR. VO-DUC: = two beers, two beers and two shots.

15

MR. ·WILSON:

Okay.

16

MR. VO-DUC:

By his own ·statements that he agreed

17

to on the phone calls.

Belligerent, combative, yeah,

18

don't you bring me a rum and coke.

19

and a cigarette?

Why

Heh, how about a 6-pack

Again, his own admissions.

And then when he's told you're under arrest he says

20
21

for what,

for what, for what but this is within hours of this

22

happening.

23

remembers crystal clear (inaudible) what happened.

24

nothing happens in a vacuum.

25

angry before, he was angry during, he was angry after.

Today he would like you to believe that he
Look,

This was an angry man who was
We
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This doesn't come through Mr. Pearce.

Jody told you about the insults that he hurled at

3

her~

Tim told you that he had evicted him.

Offic~r Arnn and

4

the defendant admitted to all this course of conduct.

He was

5

defiant from the very start, he was angry.

No,

6

I'm not going to apologize.

You heard,

So, nothing happens in a vacuum and it's the

7
8

interactions of all these things that make the case.

9

don't have to just believe him, you also have other evidence.

10

You

This case does not hang on this man.
Now Mr. Wilson was perfectly right, common sense, I

11
12

want you to use common sense.

(Inaudible) 18 years to ·serve

13

on a jury, 18 times 8, 144 years on this planet.

14

want people that we can just plug facts in.

15

machine for that.

16

experience in this world.

17

how the actions of certain people explain subsequent actions

18

of other people in their home.

19

that.

20

evidence that this man has agreed to when I crossed him.

21

was angry, he had reason to be angry.

22

woman who wanted to feed him, cannot - what was that -

23

understand normal thinking.

24

that he admitted to having uttered really reflect his own

25

state of mind before the shot and those words absolutely

We don't

We could have a

You're here because you have significant
You have significant experience on

We're asking you to draw on

Look at all the evidence.

So

But really, look at the

we

He

He was mad at the

see his words, the words
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1

undermine everything he would like you to believe today.
Which leads me my second science word, but i t ' s

2
3

(inaudible).

This vacuum, this lack of vacuum how, of the

4

facts that I've offered react together, show an evolution, a

5

progression of what?

6

when I crossed and I played the messages, this man's own

7

words to his mom, to Tim Krogh, to his friend Chrissy.

8

Listen to the words, they were all in chronological order and

9

we see an evolution.

Of the defendant's fabrication.

ur need John to say this was an

10

ac~ident."

11

John,

12

call to Tim, on the first

I

Recall

Well, first he says to Tim, I

thought I shot you.

I

shot you?

I

shot

don't remember anything,

first

(inaudible}. There's the evolution.

A couple of weeks later to his mom, the second

13

I need John to state that this was an accident.

Day

14

call,

15

after, again to his mom,

16

will be a team player.

17

However, in a phone call to Chrissy, Chrissy says and the

18

defendant admitted this, John is unwilling to say this was an

19

accident, to which it was then revised ur told him I'd take

20

care of him,

21

while."

22

then the last one,

23

the story,

24

now,

25

ball."

ur already have a game plan.

John

John will say this was an accident.

talk to him again,

i t ' l l be well worth his

ucan you Chrissy get a little pushy with him?"

And

uI'm going in a different direction with

I'm going a different direction with the story

it's self-defense now since John doesn't want to play
That's the evolution of the story.

The story that
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1

he's had months to think about, to offer you.

2

he knew about these phone calls. We disclosed them.

3

made the calls fit the story.

4

progression.

He's admitted

It doesn't fit.

He's

We see the

Again, vacuum works with the evolution of this

5
6

story.

7

man won't go along with that, so we change.

8

it's self-defense because he's not playing ball, John Pearce

9

is not saying this is an accident, he refuses to.

10

At first it's got to be an accident.

No, no,
All of a

Again, we

Now, this man may be w~ong.

I'm not going to tell

12

you that I think he's wrong on everything, right?

13·

contradictions.

14

telling the truth.

15

beginning when they questioned him, what does he say?

16

I here? Why are you jerking me off?

17

woke me up. You woke m~ up.

18

accident.

There are

This man may be wrong,· that man is not
The evolution of his story from the very

He didn't say it was an

He doesn't say this was self-defense.

~I

Two hours -

MR. WILSON:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. WILSON:

22

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

23

THE COURT:
argument.

Why am

Nothing happened. You

19

25

sudden

have this common sense appreciation of what's happened here.

11

24

this

Objection Counsel Can we approach?

Please don't interrupt during closing

This is· (inaudible}.
MR. WILSON: I have to make my objection when it
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1

occurs. I can't wait until the end of (inaudible). He's now

2

commenting on my client's

3

MR. VO-DUC:

No, not even close.

4

MR. WILSON:

(Inaudible) he says, he didn't say it

5

was self-defense.

H didn't say it was an accident, you know,

6

and now he's coming in here saying (inaudible).

7

comment on my client's right to remain silent and I move for

8

a mistrial.

That is a

THE COURT: And the motion is denied.

9

10

(End of sidebar)

11

MR. VO-DUC:

(Inaudible) contrast.

Again,

common

12

sense.

13

John Pearce to lie, say this was an accident.

14

work.

15

Why?

16

intent on having you believe this was self-defense or that

17

this was an accident?

18

Today he's had time to think about it, tried to get
It didn't

Now he wants you to believe this was self-defense.
Nothing happens in a vacuum.

Why is Mr. Mccallie so

It's interesting, Mr. McCallie's mother was on the

19

stand, we don't need an expert to know how a mother feels

20

about their son.

21

interesting.

22

on the phone and her quote was this,

23

why would Chris shoot me, he's my best friend."

24

that woman's mouth.

25

reasonable doubt from his mouth and from his, they're not

It was an interesting - her answer was

She said she spoke to the def - to Mr. Pearce
uJohn Pearce told me,

Well, what do we know?

Came out of

Beyond a
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1

friends at.all.

2

acquaintances at best.

3

loving mother who is telling you what Mr. Mccallie wants you

4

to say - to hear.

5

Clear as (inaudible), he's my best friend.

6

not best friends and (inaudible) not best friends.

7

They were acquaintances at best,
Well, what do we see?

He's tried with him and it didn't work.

So nothing operates in a vacuum.

8

facts. Don't hang this on John Pearce.

9

inconsistent.

I

We see a

(inaudible).

We know they're

Look at the

Yeah, he's

But he took a bullet in the

10

gut and everything else that follows, not just from these

11

actions but from the evidence from Sargent Arnn, but mostly

12

from this man's own words and course of action afterwards,

13

he's co~ering it up.

14

just doesn't hold up, a story that he tried to build over the

15

last few months and his own words hang him.

16

pull the wool over your·eyes.

17

for threatening John Pearce and for shooting him and that's

18

the verdict he deserves.
THE COURT:

19

He wants you to believe a story that

He's trying to

He·is guilty of both counts,

I need to make one thing clear.

The

20

charges here as I identified earlier and as ·will be shown in

21

the verdict form that needs to be filled out are discharge of

22

a firearm with injury and aggravated assault.

23

charges.

24

homicide, that -is not, those.are not the charges and I

25

wanted to ·make sure that that's understood.

Those are the

There's, .you know, reference been made to attempted
just

Okay?
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1

{Whereupon the ~ailiff was sworn)

2

THE COURT:

This is the - let's see - where's the

3

.(inaudible)?

4

you have exact copies bf that but for purposes of the record

5

I need to provide you the official ·record; verdict 'form that

6

will need to be filled out and the exhibits that have been

7

received into evidence and now the matter is turned over to

8

you for your good judgment and for you to return a verdict.

9

And I thank you in advance for the attention that you've paid

10

These are the additional•instructions although

so far and the work you're going to be doing next.

11

Please rise for the jury.

12

{Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

13

THE COURT:

Please be seated.

Ummm, for the

14

record, Mr. Wilson made a mistrial motion.

15

that -

16

comment on the defendant's right to remain silent or not to

17

incriminate himself but even.for purposes of this analysis,

18

assuming that what essentially was, would have been construed

19

as a slip of the tongue, the tests that I need to apply is

20

whet~er it probably influenced the jury to the prejudice of

21

the defendant.

22

could be construed -as the defense has construed it, was a, is

23

something that would be a - would have influenced the

24

the prejudice of the defendant, that it probably influence

25

which is the test is that it probably influenced the jury to

I don't believe

I disagree that the comments by the prosecutor was a

I am not persuaded that the comment,

if it

jury to
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1

the detriment .of the defendant.

2

denial of the motion.

3

MR. WILSON:

So that is the reason for my

Okay, for the record-I want to put on

4

that the defendant was advised and invoked his right to

5

remain silent when he was interviewed by the police even

6

though he was belligerent and smart with the·police.

7

statement was obtained from him in regard to the event.

8

the prosecutor, when he said that after he was arrested there

9

was nothing, he didn't make any statements that it was an

So no
So

10

accident, that he was acting in self protection would lead

11

the jury to believe that he has made that up between his

12

arrest and today does prejudice my client and is obvious its

13

intent, when given to the jury and the jury could not avoid

14

the same conclusion.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. VO-DUC:

l:;1

~Response?
Your Honor, the Court knows that

17

accusation of recent fabrication,

it's in the rules and that

18

is exactly what the State was inferring, not that if -

19

argument was·not if he's so innocent why didn't he say that

20

then?

21

inconsistent with what he said before which was nothing

22

happened and none of their questioning.

23

were invoked, discussed because when they were invoked,

24

know, at the interview and so is it to show that this was a

25

fabrication?

the

The argument is this, today he says this, that's

Before his rights
you

Absolutely, not to smear the defendant and - as
~)
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1

Mr. Wilson suggested and I think that the method is perfectly

2

appropriate for closing argument to highlight the

3

inconsistency.

4

5

··'1.ifi

MR. WILSON:

But there is no inconsistency_ and I

·would agree with the prosecutor in that nothing was said at

6

the time that he was·arrested and to indicate that this is a

7

recent fabrication,

8

about self protection or a accident when he was arrested and

9

therefore what he's saying on the stand is a recent

indicates that he didn't say anything

10

fabrication and it goes directly back to the fact that he

11

remained silent when he was arrested.

12
13

THE COURT:

All right.

I think the record has been

amply made.

14

MR. VO-DUC:

Thank you, Your Honor.

15

MR. WILSON:

Thank you.

16

MR. VO-DUC:

17

Do

you want my number?

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. WILSON:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. WILSON:

22

· Can I give the Court {inaudible) .-

Yes, and Mr. Wilson Yes.
Will you be remaining or

·r' 11

-

·be going back to the office and

I'll give my phone number.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. WILSON:

25

THE COURT:

Thank you.
I ' l l turn it on.
Yeah, that would be helpful.
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